UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-2124
GUALBERTO ZURIEL CRUZ-MACHORRO,
Petitioner,
v.
ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., Attorney General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration
Appeals.
Submitted: October 2, 2012 Decided: October 18, 2012
Before NIEMEYER, KING, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.
Petition denied by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Christopher T. Handman, Adam N. Bitter, A. Elizabeth King, HOGAN
LOVELLS US LLP, Washington, D.C., for Petitioner. Stuart F.
Delery, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Erica B. Miles,
Senior Litigation Counsel, James A. Hunolt, Senior Litigation
Counsel, Office of Immigration Litigation, UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Gualberto Zuriel Cruz-Machorro, a native and citizen
of Guatemala, petitions for review of an order of the Board of
Immigration Appeals (“Board”) granting in part his motion to
reconsider and amending its decision of August 19, 2010, which
affirmed the immigration judge’s denial of Cruz-Machorro’s
requests for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection
under the Convention Against Torture. For the reasons set forth
below, we deny the petition for review.
A determination regarding eligibility for asylum or
withholding of removal is affirmed if supported by substantial
evidence on the record considered as a whole. INS v. Elias-
Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 (1992). Administrative findings of
fact are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be
compelled to decide to the contrary. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B)
(2006). Legal issues are reviewed de novo, “affording
appropriate deference to the [Board]’s interpretation of the
[Immigration and Nationality Act] and any attendant
regulations.” Li Fang Lin v. Mukasey, 517 F.3d 685, 691-92 (4th
Cir. 2008). This court will reverse the Board only if “the
evidence . . . presented was so compelling that no reasonable
factfinder could fail to find the requisite fear of
persecution.” Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. at 483-84; see Rusu v.
INS, 296 F.3d 316, 325 n.14 (4th Cir. 2002). Furthermore,
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“[t]he agency decision that an alien is not eligible for asylum
is ‘conclusive unless manifestly contrary to the law and an
abuse of discretion.’” Marynenka v. Holder, 592 F.3d 594, 600
(4th Cir. 2010) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(D) (2006)).
We have reviewed the evidence of record and conclude
that substantial evidence supports the agency’s finding that
Cruz-Machorro failed to establish that his membership in a
particular social group was at least one central reason for any
persecution he suffered in Guatemala. See 8 U.S.C.
§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(i) (2006) (providing that an asylum applicant
must establish that the protected ground asserted “was or will
be at least one central reason for persecuting the applicant”);
Quinteros-Mendoza v. Holder, 556 F.3d 159, 164-65 (4th Cir.
2009) (finding that money and personal animosity, not religion
or political opinion, motivated initial assaults on alien and
concluding that alien “provided no evidence that his religious
or political beliefs were more than incidental or tangential to
any part of the persecution he suffered”). We therefore uphold
the denial of Cruz-Machorro’s requests for asylum and
withholding of removal. See Camara v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 361,
367 (4th Cir. 2004) (“Because the burden of proof for
withholding of removal is higher than for asylum — even though
the facts that must be proved are the same — an applicant who is
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ineligible for asylum is necessarily ineligible for withholding
of removal under [8 U.S.C.] § 1231(b)(3).”).
Additionally, Cruz-Machorro challenges the denial of
his request for protection under the Convention Against Torture.
To qualify for such protection, a petitioner bears the burden of
proof of showing “it is more likely than not that he or she
would be tortured if removed to the proposed country of
removal.” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2) (2012). Based on our review
of the record, we conclude that substantial evidence supports
the denial of his request for relief. See Dankam v. Gonzales,
495 F.3d 113, 124 (4th Cir. 2007) (setting forth standard of
review).
Accordingly, we deny the petition for review. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
PETITION DENIED
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