10-4273
Onondaga Nation v. State of NY
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED
ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE
PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A
DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST
SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
2 for the Second Circuit, held at the Daniel Patrick Moynihan
3 United States Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, in the City of
4 New York, on the 19th day of October, two thousand twelve.
5
6 PRESENT: DENNIS JACOBS,
7 Chief Judge,
8 ROBERT A. KATZMANN,
9 DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON,
10 Circuit Judges.
11
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13 ONONDAGA NATION,
14 Plaintiff-Appellant,
15
16 -v.- 10-4273-cv
17
18 THE STATE OF NEW YORK, GEORGE PATAKI,
19 IN HIS INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY AND AS GOVERNOR OF
20 NEW YORK STATE, ONONDAGA COUNTY, CITY OF
21 SYRACUSE, HONEYWELL INTERNATIONAL,
22 INC., TRIGEN SYRACUSE ENERGY
23 CORPORATION, CLARK CONCRETE COMPANY,
24 INC., VALLEY REALTY DEVELOPMENT
25 COMPANY, INC., AND HANSON AGGREGATES
26 NORTH AMERICA,
27 Defendants-Appellees.
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1
1 FOR APPELLANT: JOSEPH HEATH, Law Office of Joseph
2 Heath, Syracuse, NY (Curtis
3 Berkey, Alexandra C. Page,
4 Alexander, Berkey, Williams &
5 Weathers LLP, Berkeley, CA, on
6 the brief).
7
8 FOR APPELLEES: DENISE A. HARTMAN, Assistant
9 Solicitor General, for Eric T.
10 Schneiderman, Attorney General
11 of the State of New York,
12 Albany, NY (Barbara D.
13 Underwood, Solicitor General,
14 Andrew D. Bing, Deputy Solicitor
15 General, Albany, NY and Gus P.
16 Coldebella and Mark S. Puzella,
17 Goodwin Procter LLP, Boston, MA,
18 on the brief).
19
20 FOR AMICUS: Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Michigan
21 State University College of Law,
22 East Lansing, MI (Kathryn E.
23 Fort, Michigan State University
24 College of Law, East Lansing, MI
25 and Carrie Garrow, Syracuse
26 University College of Law,
27 Syracuse, NY on the brief), for
28 amicus curiae Indigenous Law and
29 Policy Center in Support of
30 Appellant.
31
32 Appeal from a judgment of the United States District
33 Court for the Northern District of New York (Kahn, J.).
34
35 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED
36 AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court be
37 AFFIRMED.
38
39 The Onondaga Nation (“Onondaga”) appeals from the
40 judgment of the District Court for the Northern District of
41 New York (Kahn, J.) dismissing its suit. We assume the
42 parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the
43 procedural history, and the issues presented for review.
44
2
1 This Court reviews 12(b)(6) dismissals de novo, taking
2 “as true all of the allegations in plaintiff[‘s] complaint
3 and draw[ing] all inferences in favor of the plaintiff[].”
4 Weixel v. Bd. of Educ., 287 F.3d 138, 145 (2d Cir. 2002).
5 Dismissal is appropriate if the complaint fails to state a
6 claim that is “plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
7 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). When the district court takes
8 notice of facts outside a complaint, this Court reviews that
9 decision under an abuse of discretion standard. Staehr v.
10 Hartford Fin. Servs. Grp., Inc., 547 F.3d 406, 424 (2d Cir.
11 2008).
12
13 This appeal is decided on the basis of the equitable
14 bar on recovery of ancestral land in City of Sherrill v.
15 Oneida Indian Nation, 544 U.S. 197 (2005) (“Sherrill”), and
16 this Court’s cases of Cayuga Indian Nation v. Pataki, 413
17 F.3d 266 (2d Cir. 2005) (“Cayuga”) and Oneida Indian Nation
18 v. County of Oneida, 617 F.3d 114 (2010) (“Oneida”). Three
19 specific factors determine when ancestral land claims are
20 foreclosed on equitable grounds: (1) “the length of time at
21 issue between an historical injustice and the present day”;
22 (2) “the disruptive nature of claims long delayed”; and (3)
23 “the degree to which these claims upset the justifiable
24 expectations of individuals and entities far removed from
25 the events giving rise to the plaintiffs’ injury.” Oneida,
26 617 F.3d at 127; see also Sherrill, 544 U.S. at 214, 221
27 (summarizing that the equitable considerations in this area
28 are similar to “doctrines of laches, acquiescence, and
29 impossibility,” and grew from “standards of federal Indian
30 law and federal equity practice”) (internal quotation marks
31 omitted). All three factors support dismissal.
32
33 As to length of time, the district court noted that
34 “approximately 183 years separate the Onondagas’ filing of
35 this action from the most recent occurrence giving rise to
36 their claims.” Onondaga v. New York, No. 5:05-cv-0314, 2010
37 WL 3806492, at *8 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 2010). The disruptive
38 nature of the claims is indisputable as a matter of law. It
39 is irrelevant that the Onondaga merely seek a declaratory
40 judgment. Oneida held that a declaratory judgment alone--
41 even without a contemporaneous request for an ejectment--
42 would be disruptive. 617 F.3d at 138 (“[T]he applicability
43 of an equitable defense requires consideration of the basic
44 premise of a claim, rather than the particular remedy
45 sought. . . . [T]he ‘disruptiveness [is] inherent in the
46 claim itself’”) (quoting Cayuga, 413 F.3d at 275).
3
1 As to settled expectations, the district court took
2 “judicial notice that the contested land has been
3 extensively populated by non-Indians, such that the land is
4 predominantly non-Indian today, and has experienced
5 significant material development by private persons and
6 enterprises as well as by public entities.” Onondaga, 2010
7 WL 3806492, at *8. Under the Supreme Court’s Sherrill
8 precedent, the Government and current occupants of the land
9 therefore have “justifiable expectations” to ownership. See
10 544 U.S. at 217 (“dramatic changes in the character of the
11 properties” since their transfer to New York creates
12 justifiable expectations about ownership).
13
14 We reject the argument that it was inappropriate for
15 the district court to take judicial notice of population and
16 development at this stage of litigation. Discovery is not
17 needed to ascertain whether the City of Syracuse has been
18 extensively developed and populated over the past 200 years.
19 It was not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to
20 take judicial notice of such obvious facts. See FED R.
21 EVID. 201(b) (judicial notice may be taken of facts that are
22 “generally known”).
23
24 The Onondaga urge that, if permitted to engage in fact
25 discovery, they would show that they have “strongly and
26 persistently protested” both the population and development
27 of their ancestral lands. But evidence of similar
28 protestations did not avail the plaintiffs in Cayuga.
29 There, the district court found “considerable proof as to
30 the Cayuga's efforts, beginning in 1853, and continuing
31 right up until the filing of this lawsuit in 1980, to ‘make
32 their voice heard’ with respect to the sales to the State of
33 their homelands in 1795 and 1807.” Cayuga Indian Nation v.
34 Pataki, 165 F.Supp.2d 266, 354 (N.D.N.Y. 2001), rev’d, 413
35 F.3d 266 (2d Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1128 (2006).
36 This Court nevertheless held that the equitable
37 considerations barred a recovery. 413 F.3d at 277-78.
38 Thus, even if the Onondaga showed after discovery that they
39 had strongly and persistently protested, the “standards of
40 federal Indian law and federal equity practice” stemming
41 from Sherrill and its progeny would nonetheless bar their
42 claim. 544 U.S. at 214.
43
44
45
4
1 Finding no merit in the Onondaga’s remaining arguments,
2 we hereby AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.
3
4 FOR THE COURT:
5 CATHERINE O’HAGAN WOLFE, CLERK
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