UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-5194
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
KEITH MASON,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. W. Earl Britt, Senior
District Judge. (5:11-cr-00198-BR-2)
Submitted: September 20, 2012 Decided: October 22, 2012
Before MOTZ and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed in part; dismissed in part by unpublished per curiam
opinion.
Thomas P. McNamara, Federal Public Defender, Stephen C. Gordon,
Assistant Federal Public Defender, James E. Todd, Eric J.
Brignac, Research and Writing Attorneys, Raleigh, North
Carolina, for Appellant. Thomas G. Walker, United States
Attorney, Jennifer P. May-Parker, Joshua L. Rogers, Assistant
United States Attorneys, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Keith Mason appeals both the district court’s order
transferring him to adult prosecution and its order in the
subsequent criminal case sentencing him to 228 months of
imprisonment on his pleas of guilty to conspiracy to commit
Hobbs Act robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (2006), and
to use of a firearm during a crime of violence, in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (2006). Having thoroughly reviewed the
record, we affirm in part and dismiss in part.
Mason first claims that the district court erred in
granting the Government’s motion to transfer him to adult
prosecution. A district court’s decision to transfer a juvenile
to adult prosecution is generally reviewed for abuse of
discretion, which occurs “if the district court fails to make
the required factual findings, or if those factual findings are
clearly erroneous.” United States v. Juvenile Male, 554 F.3d
456, 465 (4th Cir. 2009) (quoting United States v. Robinson, 404
F.3d 850, 858 (4th Cir. 2005)). The court’s legal rulings
relating to the entry of a transfer order, however, are reviewed
de novo. Id.
Relevant to this case, a juvenile may be transferred
to adult federal prosecution where the juvenile has committed a
felonious crime of violence or drug offense in which there is a
substantial federal interest warranting federal jurisdiction.
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Id. at 460. If the juvenile has committed such an offense, a
district court may order a transfer if it is in the interest of
justice to do so. Id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 5032 (2006)
(outlining the relevant factors to be considered in making such
a determination).
Although Mason first suggests that there was no
substantial federal interest in federally prosecuting him as an
adult, he concedes that this court has recently held that there
is such an interest in prosecuting violations of 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(c), such that district courts possess jurisdiction over
juveniles who commit such offenses. See United States v. T.M.,
413 F.3d 420, 426-27 (4th Cir. 2005). We decline Mason’s
invitation to revisit our ruling in T.M. and accordingly observe
that Mason’s conduct warranted federal jurisdiction.
Likewise, we find no fault with the district court’s
careful analysis of each of the factors it was statutorily
obligated to examine in determining whether Mason’s transfer to
adult prosecution was in the interest of justice. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 5032. Despite the fact that Mason’s family background and
intellectual deficits are distressing, the district court
properly relied on the seriousness of his crime spree, his prior
delinquency record, his ongoing pattern of violence while in
state custody, the uncertain extent to which Mason would benefit
from further treatment, and the fact that the available federal
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treatment programs could keep Mason only for a period of time
that would be insufficient to effectively rehabilitate him. See
Robinson, 404 F.3d at 858; United States v. Juvenile Male No. 1,
86 F.3d 1314, 1323-24 (4th Cir. 1996). On this record, we
conclude that the district court’s decision to transfer Mason to
adult prosecution was a proper exercise of its discretion.
Citing the Supreme Court’s recent decision in
Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012), which ruled that
juveniles could not constitutionally be sentenced to mandatory
life imprisonment without parole, Mason next asserts that his
228-month sentence violates the Eighth Amendment because it
disproportionately punishes a juvenile through a sentencing
scheme that was designed for adult offenders. The Government
asserts that Mason’s argument is barred by his appellate waiver,
and our review of the plea agreement and the transcript of the
Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 hearing convinces us that the Government is
correct. Because Mason knowingly and voluntarily waived his
right to appeal and because the issues he seeks to raise on
appeal fall squarely within the compass of his waiver of
appellate rights, we dismiss the portion of Mason’s appeal that
challenges his sentence. United States v. Blick, 408 F.3d 162,
168 (4th Cir. 2005).
Accordingly, we affirm in part and dismiss in part.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
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contentions are adequately presented in the material before the
court and argument will not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED IN PART;
DISMISSED IN PART
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