United States v. Keith Mason

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 11-5194

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

KEITH MASON,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. W. Earl Britt, Senior
District Judge. (5:11-cr-00198-BR-2)

Submitted: September 20, 2012 Decided: October 22, 2012

Before MOTZ and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.

Affirmed in part; dismissed in part by unpublished per curiam
opinion.

Thomas P. McNamara, Federal Public Defender, Stephen C. Gordon,
Assistant Federal Public Defender, James E. Todd, Eric J.
Brignac, Research and Writing Attorneys, Raleigh, North
Carolina, for Appellant. Thomas G. Walker, United States
Attorney, Jennifer P. May-Parker, Joshua L. Rogers, Assistant
United States Attorneys, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:

Keith Mason appeals both the district court’s order

transferring him to adult prosecution and its order in the

subsequent criminal case sentencing him to 228 months of

imprisonment on his pleas of guilty to conspiracy to commit

Hobbs Act robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (2006), and

to use of a firearm during a crime of violence, in violation of

18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (2006). Having thoroughly reviewed the

record, we affirm in part and dismiss in part.

Mason first claims that the district court erred in

granting the Government’s motion to transfer him to adult

prosecution. A district court’s decision to transfer a juvenile

to adult prosecution is generally reviewed for abuse of

discretion, which occurs “if the district court fails to make

the required factual findings, or if those factual findings are

clearly erroneous.” United States v. Juvenile Male, 554 F.3d

456, 465 (4th Cir. 2009) (quoting United States v. Robinson, 404

F.3d 850, 858 (4th Cir. 2005)). The court’s legal rulings

relating to the entry of a transfer order, however, are reviewed

de novo. Id.

Relevant to this case, a juvenile may be transferred

to adult federal prosecution where the juvenile has committed a

felonious crime of violence or drug offense in which there is a

substantial federal interest warranting federal jurisdiction.

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Id. at 460. If the juvenile has committed such an offense, a

district court may order a transfer if it is in the interest of

justice to do so. Id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 5032 (2006)

(outlining the relevant factors to be considered in making such

a determination).

Although Mason first suggests that there was no

substantial federal interest in federally prosecuting him as an

adult, he concedes that this court has recently held that there

is such an interest in prosecuting violations of 18 U.S.C.

§ 924(c), such that district courts possess jurisdiction over

juveniles who commit such offenses. See United States v. T.M.,

413 F.3d 420, 426-27 (4th Cir. 2005). We decline Mason’s

invitation to revisit our ruling in T.M. and accordingly observe

that Mason’s conduct warranted federal jurisdiction.

Likewise, we find no fault with the district court’s

careful analysis of each of the factors it was statutorily

obligated to examine in determining whether Mason’s transfer to

adult prosecution was in the interest of justice. See 18 U.S.C.

§ 5032. Despite the fact that Mason’s family background and

intellectual deficits are distressing, the district court

properly relied on the seriousness of his crime spree, his prior

delinquency record, his ongoing pattern of violence while in

state custody, the uncertain extent to which Mason would benefit

from further treatment, and the fact that the available federal

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treatment programs could keep Mason only for a period of time

that would be insufficient to effectively rehabilitate him. See

Robinson, 404 F.3d at 858; United States v. Juvenile Male No. 1,

86 F.3d 1314, 1323-24 (4th Cir. 1996). On this record, we

conclude that the district court’s decision to transfer Mason to

adult prosecution was a proper exercise of its discretion.

Citing the Supreme Court’s recent decision in

Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012), which ruled that

juveniles could not constitutionally be sentenced to mandatory

life imprisonment without parole, Mason next asserts that his

228-month sentence violates the Eighth Amendment because it

disproportionately punishes a juvenile through a sentencing

scheme that was designed for adult offenders. The Government

asserts that Mason’s argument is barred by his appellate waiver,

and our review of the plea agreement and the transcript of the

Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 hearing convinces us that the Government is

correct. Because Mason knowingly and voluntarily waived his

right to appeal and because the issues he seeks to raise on

appeal fall squarely within the compass of his waiver of

appellate rights, we dismiss the portion of Mason’s appeal that

challenges his sentence. United States v. Blick, 408 F.3d 162,

168 (4th Cir. 2005).

Accordingly, we affirm in part and dismiss in part.

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal

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contentions are adequately presented in the material before the

court and argument will not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED IN PART;
DISMISSED IN PART