UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 12-4449
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
JOELL TYRONE JOYCE,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of Virginia, at Charlottesville. Norman K. Moon,
Senior District Judge. (3:08-cr-00025-NKM-1)
Submitted: October 5, 2012 Decided: October 25, 2012
Before DUNCAN, KEENAN, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Larry W. Shelton, Federal Public Defender, Andrea L. Harris,
Assistant Federal Public Defender, Christine Madeleine Lee,
Research and Writing Attorney, Charlottesville, Virginia, for
Appellant. Timothy J. Heaphy, United States Attorney, Jeb T.
Terrien, Managing Assistant United States Attorney,
Harrisonburg, Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Joell Tyrone Joyce appeals the district court’s
judgment imposing a four-month term of imprisonment and a four-
year term of supervised release for violating the terms of his
supervised release. On appeal, Joyce argues that his revocation
sentence is plainly unreasonable because the district court
erred in considering statutorily prohibited factors and
dismissed violations in fashioning his sentence. We affirm.
This court will affirm a sentence imposed after
revocation of supervised release if the sentence is within the
prescribed statutory range and is not plainly unreasonable.
United States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 438 (4th Cir. 2006). In
determining whether a revocation sentence is unreasonable, “we
follow generally the procedural and substantive considerations”
used in reviewing original sentences. Id. at 438. “This
initial inquiry takes a more deferential appellate posture
concerning issues of fact and the exercise of discretion than
reasonableness review for [G]uidelines sentences.” United
States v. Moulden, 478 F.3d 652, 656 (4th Cir. 2007) (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted). Only if we find the
sentence procedurally or substantively unreasonable must we
decide whether it is plainly so. Id.
A revocation sentence is procedurally reasonable if
the district court has considered the policy statements
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contained in Chapter Seven of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines
Manual (“USSG”) and the applicable 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a), 3583(e)
(2006) factors. Crudup, 461 F.3d at 439. A sentence is
substantively reasonable if the district court states a proper
basis for its imposition of a sentence up to the statutory
maximum. Id. at 440. Only if a sentence is found unreasonable
will this court “then decide whether the sentence is plainly
unreasonable.” Id. at 439. A sentence is “plainly”
unreasonable if it is clearly or obviously unreasonable. Id.
Chapter Seven provides that “at revocation the court
should sanction primarily the defendant’s breach of trust, while
taking into account, to a limited degree, the seriousness of the
underlying violation and the criminal history of the violator.”
USSG ch. 7, pt. A, cmt. 3(b) (2010). Section 3583 requires
consideration of a majority of the factors listed in § 3553(a),
omitting only two. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e). Among the omitted
factors is the need for the sentence “to reflect the seriousness
of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide
just punishment for the offense.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A).
Joyce contends that his sentence is plainly
unreasonable because the district court improperly considered
the need to promote respect for the law, the seriousness of the
offense, and the need for just punishment. We conclude that the
district court’s observations regarding the seriousness of
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Joyce’s offenses and the need to provide just punishment and
promote respect for the law were relevant to other required
considerations, including “the nature and circumstances of the
offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant,”
adequately deterring criminal conduct, and protecting the public
from further crimes of the defendant. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1),
(a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(C). The district court expressly considered
the factors in § 3553(a) that are applicable to revocation
sentences. We conclude that in light of the district court’s
articulation of factors specifically listed in § 3583,
consideration of other factors and pending charges in another
jurisdiction did not render Joyce’s sentence plainly
unreasonable.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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