FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
October 31, 2012
TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
No. 12-6203
(D.C. Nos. 5:12-CV-00249-M and
ESTEBAN DIAZ,
5:07-CR-00094-M-1)
(W.D. Okla.)
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY *
Before KELLY, TYMKOVICH, and GORSUCH, Circuit Judges.
After the government charged Esteban Diaz with distributing and
attempting to distribute methamphetamine, the parties struck a deal. Under the
deal’s terms, Mr. Diaz agreed to plead guilty to a single count of attempted
distribution rather than face trial on all the charges against him. Now in this 28
U.S.C. § 2255 motion, Mr. Diaz alleges that his lawyer gave him inaccurate
advice in the plea process, promising him that the government would seek a
sentence reduction under Rule 35. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 35(b)(1) (“Upon the
*
This order is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of law of
the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its
persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
government’s motion made within one year of sentencing, the court may reduce a
sentence if the defendant, after sentencing, provided substantial assistance in
investigating or prosecuting another person.”). This inaccurate advice, Mr. Diaz
maintains, amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694 (1984). For its part, the district court agreed
that counsel performed deficiently but it ruled against Mr. Diaz on Strickland’s
prejudice prong. Mr. Diaz now requests a certificate of appealability (COA) in
order to appeal the district court’s ruling.
We may grant a COA only if Mr. Diaz makes a “substantial showing of the
denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). To do this, he must
demonstrate that “reasonable jurists could debate whether (or, for that matter
agree that) the petition should have been resolved in a different manner or that the
issues presented were adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.”
Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 483-84 (2000) (internal quotation marks
omitted). Because Mr. Diaz proceeds in this court pro se, we review his
pleadings with special solicitude.
With these standards in mind, we conclude that Mr. Diaz is not eligible for
a COA. Mr. Diaz had to show that but for his lawyer’s advice it was at least
reasonably probable he would have rejected the government’s offer, taking the
risk that another (presumably better) offer would come his way or he would
proceed to trial. See Premo v. Moore, 131 S. Ct. 733, 745 (2011); Hill v.
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Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985); see also Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399,
1409 (2012). The difficulty is, there is no evidence in the record suggesting any
of this. To the contrary, there’s ample evidence the agreement he had in hand
was a very attractive one even without the prospect of a Rule 35 reduction. The
government agreed to dismiss three of the four counts of his indictment. It
promised to recommend a downward adjustment to the advisory guidelines range.
See Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(1)(B). And it pledged not to inform the court at
sentencing of Mr. Diaz’s prior drug conviction. See 21 U.S.C. § 851(a)(1).
Turning down the deal, moreover, carried with it considerable risk given a strong
case the government could have presented at trial: the government had
intercepted a box of methamphetamine Mr. Diaz admitted to mailing from
California to Oklahoma. Even without the promise of a Rule 35 motion, then, the
deal Mr. Diaz received was a strong one and there is before us no credible
account in the record from Mr. Diaz to suggest anything hinged on a Rule 35
promise. Accordingly, we see no way to debate the district court’s conclusion
that there is no reasonable probability Mr. Diaz would have walked away from the
plea he had in hand and taken his chances at obtaining something better from the
prosecution or a jury.
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The application for a COA is denied and this appeal is dismissed.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Neil M. Gorsuch
Circuit Judge
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