UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 12-4229
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
TYRONE DWAYNE DENNIS,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Columbia. Cameron McGowan Currie, District
Judge. (3:11-cr-02067-CMC-1)
Submitted: September 20, 2012 Decided: October 31, 2012
Before WYNN and DIAZ, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Andrew R. MacKenzie, BARRETT-MACKENZIE, LLC, Greenville, South
Carolina, for Appellant. Julius Ness Richardson, Assistant
United States Attorney, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Tyrone Dwayne Dennis appeals his 180-month sentence
imposed following his guilty plea, pursuant to a written plea
agreement, to one count of possession with intent to distribute
crack cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841 (a)(1), (b)(1)(B)
(2006), and one count of possession of a firearm in furtherance
of a drug trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(c)(1)(A) (2006). Counsel for Dennis filed a written brief
in this court in accordance with Anders v. California, 386 U.S.
738 (1967), certifying that there are no non-frivolous issues
for appeal, but questioning whether Dennis’ trial counsel
provided ineffective assistance by failing to object to the
district court’s acceptance of Dennis’ guilty plea where there
was an insufficient factual basis for the plea. Dennis has
filed a pro se supplemental brief, raising several issues
discussed below. The Government has elected not to file a
brief. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the district
court’s judgment.
We first address the validity of Dennis’ guilty plea.
Rule 11 requires the district court to perform the following
procedures prior to accepting a defendant’s guilty plea: the
court must conduct a colloquy in which it informs the defendant
of the charges against him and determines that the defendant
comprehends the nature of those charges, any mandatory minimum
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penalty, the maximum possible penalty, and the rights he is
relinquishing by pleading guilty; the court must ensure that
defendant’s plea is voluntary; and the court must ensure that
there is a factual basis for defendant’s guilty plea. Fed. R.
Crim. P. 11 (b).
Because Dennis did not move to withdraw his guilty
plea in the district court or raise any objections to the Rule
11 colloquy, the colloquy is reviewed for plain error. United
States v. Martinez, 277 F.3d 517, 524-27 (4th Cir. 2002). To
demonstrate plain error, a defendant must show that: (1) there
was an error, (2) the error was plain, and (3) the error
affected his “substantial rights.” United States v. Olano, 507
U.S. 725, 732 (1993). To establish that a Rule 11 error has
affected his substantial rights, the defendant “must show a
reasonable probability that, but for the error, he would not
have entered the plea.” United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542
U.S. 74, 84 (2004). A review of the record reveals that the
district court properly ensured that Dennis’ plea was knowing,
voluntary, and supported by a sufficient factual basis. We
therefore hold that the district court fully complied with Rule
11 in accepting Dennis’ guilty plea.
We next address the reasonableness of Dennis’
sentence. Applying an abuse of discretion standard, we first
review for procedural reasonableness, and in the absence of
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significant procedural errors, then review for substantive
reasonableness. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007).
We conclude the district court’s sentence is both procedurally
and substantively reasonable. Contrary to Dennis’ contention,
the district court did not err in enhancing Dennis’ sentence
based on two prior felony drug convictions. Accordingly, the
district court reasonably imposed the mandatory minimum sentence
in this case.
We next consider whether Dennis’ trial counsel
provided ineffective assistance. This claim is cognizable on
direct appeal only if the record conclusively establishes
ineffective assistance. United States v. Baldovinos, 434 F.3d
233, 239 (4th Cir. 2006). Because we find it does not, this
claim is not yet ripe for review.
We now turn to whether an inculpatory statement Dennis
made on April 22, 2011 was taken in violation of Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). When a defendant voluntarily
enters a guilty plea, he waives his right to challenge
antecedent nonjurisdictional error not logically inconsistent
with the establishment of guilt. See Menna v. New York, 423
U.S. 61, 62-63 (1975); Tollet v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267
(1973). Because Dennis’ guilty plea was knowing and voluntary,
he has waived appellate review of this issue.
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In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record
in this case and have found no meritorious issues for appeal.
We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment. This court
requires that counsel inform Dennis, in writing, of the right to
petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further
review. If Dennis requests that a petition be filed, but
counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then
counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from
representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof
was served on Dennis.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before the court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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