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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 12-10423
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 1:11-cr-00491-TWT-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee
versus
ANTONIO JAMAL DAVIS,
Defendant-Appellant
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
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(November 8, 2012)
Before BARKETT, PRYOR, and JORDAN, Circuit Judges.
JORDAN, Circuit Judge:
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On October 27, 2011, Antonio Jamal Davis pled guilty to possession of a
firearm by a felon. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). This offense carried a statutory maximum
sentence of 10 years’ imprisonment but no statutory minimum sentence. See 18
U.S.C. § 924(a)(2). Due to his prior criminal history, Mr. Davis’ advisory range
under the Sentencing Guidelines was 37-48 months’ imprisonment. At Mr. Davis’
sentencing hearing, the district court imposed a sentence of 37 months’ imprisonment
and explained that the sentence was based, in large measure, upon Mr. Davis’ prior
offenses (including a state conviction for possession of a firearm by a felon) and
numerous revocations of probation. On appeal, Mr. Davis argues that the sentence
was substantively unreasonable, and that the district court should have imposed a
lesser sentence of 24 months given that he had undergone various positive changes
in his life during the pendency of the case.
We review a sentence for substantive reasonableness under an abuse of
discretion standard. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51, 128 S. Ct. 586, 597
(2007). In so doing, “we do not, as the district court did, determine the exact sentence
to be imposed.” United States v. Talley, 431 F.3d 784, 788 (11th Cir. 2005). In fact,
even if the district court’s sentence is more severe or more lenient than the sentence
we would have imposed, reversal is only warranted if we are “left with the definite
and firm conviction that the district court committed a clear error of judgment in
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weighing the [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) factors by arriving at a sentence that lies outside
the range of reasonable sentences dictated by the facts of the case.” United States v.
Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1190 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (quoting United States v. Pugh,
515 F.3d 1179, 1191 (11th Cir. 2008)). On this record, the district court’s sentence
was not substantively unreasonable.
First, Mr. Davis received a sentence that was within the advisory range under
the Sentencing Guidelines. Although we do not automatically presume a sentence
falling within the guideline range to be reasonable, we ordinarily expect such a
sentence to be reasonable. See United States v. Hunt, 526 F.3d 739, 746 (11th Cir.
2008) (quoting Talley, 431 F.3d at 788). Under the Sentencing Guidelines, Mr. Davis
was in Criminal History Category IV and, notably, had a prior conviction for
possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in 2009. D.E. 15 at 5. In this case, the
district court reasoned that Mr. Davis’s sentence needed to “convince him that he just
is not allowed to [possess firearms].” Id. at 14. The district court also concluded that
a sentence at the low end of the guideline range would be sufficient “because the
aggravating factors that exist in this case, principally the Defendant’s criminal record,
have already been taken into consideration in the calculation of the guideline range.”
Id. at 16 (emphasis added). Therefore, the district court’s reliance on the advisory
guideline range was ultimately case-specific and not a rote application. We find
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nothing in the record to suggest that the district court’s judgment was substantively
unreasonable.
Second, the record reflects that the district court sufficiently considered the §
3553(a) factors. At the sentencing hearing, the district court permitted Mr. Davis,
through counsel, to argue in favor of a variance. D.E. 15 at 6-10. The argument was
heard, subsequently addressed, and rejected. See, e.g., id. at 14 (“And the excuse that
he has got a firearm because he wants to protect his family is just not going to be
accepted. I applaud Mr. Davis for getting involved in his young child’s life, but that’s
another reason why he shouldn’t be having firearms . . .”).
Mr. Davis nevertheless contends that the district court “fail[ed] to consider his
life history and circumstances in its balancing of the Section 3553(a) factors.” Initial
Br. at 7. We disagree. On the contrary, the district court expressly acknowledged
that it considered the § 3553(a) factors including “the history and characteristics of
the Defendant.” D.E. 15 at 16. See also United States v. Scott, 426 F.3d 1324, 1329
(11th Cir. 2005) (holding that an acknowledgment by the district court that it
considered the factors set forth in § 3553(a) is generally sufficient). Thus, what Mr.
Davis is essentially arguing is that the district court did not give sufficient weight to
the particular circumstances he raised at his sentencing hearing. But, “we will not
second guess the weight (or lack thereof) that the [district court] accorded to a given
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factor . . . , as long as the sentence ultimately imposed is reasonable in light of all the
circumstances presented.” United States v. Snipes, 611 F.3d 855, 872 (11th Cir.
2010) (citations and quotation marks omitted) (emphasis in original). In this case, the
district court considered all the relevant factors but chose to place a greater emphasis
upon Mr. Davis’ prior criminal history (including the same criminal violation three
years earlier) and numerous violations of probation. D.E. 15 at 14. The district court
is entitled to make that evaluation. See Pugh, 515 F.3d at 1192 (finding that a
sentence is not necessarily unreasonable simply because the district court attached
great weight to a single factor). We do not believe that the circumstances in this case
cause that evaluation to be substantively unreasonable.
AFFIRMED.
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