UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 12-4268
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
COREY JERMAINE HAIRSTON,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. Catherine C. Eagles,
District Judge. (1:11-cr-00071-CCE-1)
Submitted: October 24, 2012 Decided: November 8, 2012
Before KEENAN, WYNN, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Louis C. Allen III, Federal Public Defender, Mireille P. Clough,
Assistant Federal Public Defender, Winston-Salem, North
Carolina, for Appellant. Ripley Rand, United States Attorney,
Sandra J. Hairston, Assistant United States Attorney,
Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Corey Jermaine Hairston pled guilty to distribution of
cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (2006), and
received a sentence at the bottom of the Guidelines range of
ninety-two months’ imprisonment. On appeal, Hairston argues the
district court unreasonably ran the federal sentence consecutive
to his undischarged state sentence rather than concurrent with
it. We affirm.
At the time of his sentencing, Hairston was serving a
thirty-five-year sentence on Virginia state convictions for
second degree murder, felon in possession of a firearm, and use
of a firearm in connection with a felony. Hairston does not
argue these offenses were related to the instant federal
offense.
We review a sentence for reasonableness under a
deferential abuse-of-discretion standard. Gall v. United
States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). A reasonableness review
includes both procedural and substantive components. Id. A
sentence is procedurally reasonable where the district court
committed no significant procedural errors, such as improperly
calculating the Guidelines range, failing to consider the 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006) factors, or insufficiently explaining
the selected sentence. United States v. Boulware, 604 F.3d 832,
837–38 (4th Cir. 2010). The substantive reasonableness of a
2
sentence is assessed in light of the totality of the
circumstances. Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. While a sentence may be
substantively unreasonable if the § 3553(a) factors do not
support the sentence, “[r]eviewing courts must be mindful that,
regardless of ‘the individual case,’ the ‘deferential abuse-of-
discretion standard of review . . . applies to all sentencing
decisions.’” United States v. Diosdado–Star, 630 F.3d 359, 366
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 2946 (2011) (citing Gall,
552 U.S. at 52). Moreover, a sentence that falls within a
properly calculated Guidelines range is presumptively
reasonable. United States v. Allen, 491 F.3d 178, 193 (4th Cir.
2007).
Hairston asserts that U.S. Sentencing Guidelines
Manual (“USSG”) § 5G1.3(c) (2011) compels a sentencing court to
construe the undischarged state offense as if it were a federal
offense and to compute a hybrid Guidelines range that would be
applicable to both offenses. Cf. United States v. Hill, 59 F.3d
500, 503 (4th Cir. 1995). However, the application notes to
USSG § 5G1.3(c) no longer advise such a procedure. See USSG
§ 5G1.3(c), cmt. n.3(A). As this court has explained, a
district court need not calculate a hypothetical combined
Guidelines range to comport with the current version of
§ 5G1.3(c). United States v. Mosley, 200 F.3d 218, 224–25 (4th
Cir. 1999). Instead, a district court’s discretion in imposing
3
consecutive or concurrent sentences is bounded only by the
relevant factors that the current version of § 5G1.3(c) directs
the court to consider. Id. Those factors include the concerns
enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a); the type and length of the
prior undischarged sentence; the time likely to be served before
release on the undischarged sentence; and the fact that the
prior undischarged sentence may have been imposed in state court
rather than federal court. See USSG § 5G1.3(c), cmt. n.3(A).
Section 5G1.3(c) first directs courts to consider the
factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). See USSG § 5G1.3(c),
cmt. n.3(A). Here, the district court explicitly referred to
Hairston’s long criminal record, noting the murder and gun
convictions, and opined that the need to protect the public
weighed in favor of a consecutive sentence. The district court
further concluded that a sentence at the bottom of Hairston’s
Guidelines range adequately took into account the long sentence
he is serving on the state offense and a “record otherwise
primarily but not exclusively of misdemeanors.” We conclude the
district court properly considered the relevant factors under
USSG § 5G1.3(c), and properly explained the sentence it imposed.
United States v. Montes-Pineda, 445 F.3d 375, 380 (4th Cir.
2006).
As this court has emphasized, “[a] district court’s
decision to impose a sentence that runs concurrently with,
4
partially concurrently with, or consecutively to a prior
undischarged term of imprisonment is constrained only by its
consideration of the factors mentioned in the commentary to
§ 5G1.3(c).” Mosley, 200 F.3d at 223. Because the district
court considered the factors listed in the commentary to USSG
§ 5G1.3(c) — including the guideposts referenced in § 3553(a) —
we conclude that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in imposing a consecutive sentence in this case.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
Court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
5