UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 12-4087
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
GABRIEL ELIJAH MARTIN,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. Catherine C. Eagles,
District Judge. (1:11-cr-00048-CCE-2)
Submitted: November 6, 2012 Decided: November 9, 2012
Before NIEMEYER, KING, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Michael E. Archenbronn, LAW OFFICE OF MICHAEL E. ARCHENBRONN,
Winston-Salem, North Carolina, for Appellant. Michael A.
DeFranco, Assistant United States Attorney, Greensboro, North
Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Gabriel Elijah Martin pled guilty pursuant to a plea
agreement to two counts of brandishing a firearm during and in
relation to a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(c)(1)(A)(ii) (2006). After the court granted the
Government’s motion pursuant to U.S. Sentencing Guidelines
Manual (“USSG”) § 5K1.1, p.s. (2011), and 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e)
(2006), Martin was sentenced to 63 months’ and 225 months’
imprisonment, to run consecutively. On appeal, counsel has
filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738
(1967), stating that there are no meritorious issues for appeal
but questioning whether the district court committed procedural
error by failing to consider the factors in USSG § 5K1.1(a) when
determining whether to depart more than the sentence reduction
requested by the Government. Martin was advised of his right to
file a pro se supplemental brief, but he did not do so. We
affirm.
We review Martin’s sentence for reasonableness under a
deferential abuse-of-discretion standard. Gall v. United
States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007). A sentence is procedurally
reasonable if, among other requirements, the court considers the
factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006). See Gall, 552 U.S. at
49-51. However, “in determining the extent of a departure below
a statutory minimum a district court should look [solely] to the
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substantial assistance factors listed in [USSG] § 5K1.1(a) . . .
and other factors related to that assistance.” United States v.
Hood, 556 F.3d 226, 234 n.2 (4th Cir. 2009) (internal citation
omitted); see also United States v. A.B., 529 F.3d 1275, 1285
(10th Cir. 2008) (holding that district court did not have
authority to depart any further below statutory minimum after
granting § 3553(e) motion and could not consider § 3553(a)
factors); United States v. Williams, 474 F.3d 1130, 1130-31 (8th
Cir. 2007) (holding that district court may look only to
§ 3553(e) in going below statutory minimum and not to factors
listed in § 3553(a)).
Our review of the record leads us to conclude that the
district court did not err in its determination of whether to
depart more than the reduction requested by the Government. The
court considered the parties’ arguments based on factors
relevant to substantial assistance. See USSG § 5K1.1(a), p.s.
(providing non-exhaustive list of substantial assistance
factors). The court then determined that the Government’s
recommendation was appropriate “given the nature of the
cooperation and the procedural situation that existed when
[Martin] came forward.” (E.R. 230); * see USSG § 5K1.1(a)(1),
*
“E.R.” refers to the electronic record filed in this
court.
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(3). The court then correctly noted that, under Hood, it did
not have the authority to consider Martin’s family and personal
history as that information did not relate to Martin’s
substantial assistance. While the court did mention the
§ 3553(a) factors, it already had determined the extent of the
downward departure based on substantial assistance factors
alone, and the additional explanation served only to provide a
basis for the sentence in the event that the court had
misinterpreted Hood, which it did not.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record
in this case and have found no meritorious issues for appeal.
We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment. This court
requires that counsel inform Martin, in writing, of the right to
petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further
review. If Martin requests that a petition be filed, but
counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then
counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from
representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof
was served on Martin.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before the court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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