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[PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 11-14258
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 2:10-cv-02142-JHH
SHERRY ROSS,
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
JEFFERSON COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH,
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll Defendant-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Alabama
________________________
(November 15, 2012)
Before HULL, PRYOR and FAY, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
We sua sponte vacate and reconsider our original opinion in this matter. We
substitute the following opinion for our original opinion.
The main issue presented in this appeal is whether the Jefferson County
Department of Health is a state agency entitled to sovereign immunity, under the
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Eleventh Amendment, from a complaint of discrimination by a former employee.
Sherry Ross appeals the summary judgment in favor of her former employer, the
Health Department, and against her complaint of discrimination in violation of the
Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101, and Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e, 1983. The district court ruled that the
Health Department is entitled to immunity, under the Eleventh Amendment, from
Ross’s complaint of disability discrimination and, alternatively, that Ross failed to
request a reasonable accommodation for her disability. The district court also
ruled that Ross waived her complaint of racial discrimination and, alternatively,
that Ross failed to establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination. We
conclude that the Health Department is immune from Ross’s complaint of
disability discrimination and that Ross waived her complaint of racial
discrimination. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
Ross, a former dental assistant with the Health Department, filed a complaint
of discrimination based on her alleged disability of fibromyalgia, 42 U.S.C. §
12101, and based on her race, id. §§ 2000e, 1983. Ross alleged that the Health
Department approved her request to take medical leave under the Family and
Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2612, but that the Health Department later refused
her a reasonable accommodation when it denied her light duty and fired her for
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using leave under the Act. Ross alleged that a similarly-situated dental assistant
who is white, Jennifer Glover, was not terminated after exhausting her leave under
the Act.
The Health Department moved for summary judgment. The Health
Department argued that, as a state entity, it enjoyed immunity, under the Eleventh
Amendment, from Ross’s complaint of disability discrimination. In the alternative,
the Health Department argued that Ross failed to request an accommodation for
her fibromyalgia. The Health Department also argued that Ross had withdrawn her
complaint of racial discrimination by admitting during her deposition that race was
not related to her termination and, alternatively, that the Health Department had
proffered legitimate non-discriminatory reasons for Ross’s termination.
Ross responded that the Health Department was not entitled to summary
judgment. Ross argued that the Health Department was not entitled to immunity
and that she had established a prima facie case of disability and racial
discrimination. Ross submitted several exhibits in support of her response,
including her termination letter from the Health Department and her affidavit. The
termination letter stated that Ross was fired “for failure to return from approved
medical leave” and that “the Department [was] no longer able to approve
additional leave” because of the “critical nature of the position” that she occupied.
The letter explained that Ross’s “approved leave of absence ended on February 16,
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2009”; her doctor’s note “stated [she] [was] able to return to work on February 19,
2009”; and “[o]n February 11, 2009, [she] [had] exhausted [her] rights granted
under the . . . Act.” Ross’s affidavit recounted the events that led to her
termination. In paragraph 32 of her affidavit, Ross said she “[had] personal
knowledge” that, in 2006, Glover had exhausted her leave under the Act without
being disciplined.
The Health Department moved to strike Ross’s statements in her affidavit
about Glover. The Health Department argued that Ross’s statement about having
personal knowledge of Glover’s leave under the Act contradicted Ross’s
deposition testimony. The Health Department also argued that Ross had failed to
explain the source of her information and that knowledge about Glover’s leave
could have been acquired only through inadmissible hearsay.
The district court granted the motions of the Health Department to strike
paragraph 32 of Ross’s affidavit and for summary judgment. The district court
ruled that the Health Department was immune from Ross’s complaint of disability
discrimination. In the alternative, the district court ruled that the Health
Department was entitled to summary judgment because Ross failed to request an
accommodation for her disability. The district court also ruled that Ross waived
her complaint of racial discrimination and, alternatively, that Ross failed to
establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination.
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II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review a summary judgment de novo and view the evidence in the light
most favorable to the nonmoving party. Univ. of Ala. Bd. of Trs. v. New Life Art,
Inc., 683 F.3d 1266, 1271 (11th Cir. 2012). Summary judgment should be entered
when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
III. DISCUSSION
We divide our discussion of this appeal in two parts. First, we address
whether the Health Department is entitled to immunity, under the Eleventh
Amendment, from Ross’s complaint of discrimination based on her disability.
Second, we address whether Ross waived her complaint of racial discrimination.
A. The Health Department Is a State Agency Immune From Ross’s Complaint of
Disability Discrimination.
The Eleventh Amendment guarantees that nonconsenting states cannot be
sued by private individuals in federal court. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett,
531 U.S. 356, 363, 121 S. Ct. 955, 961–62 (2001). Although Congress may
sometimes abrogate the immunity of the states, under the Eleventh Amendment,
Congress did not validly abrogate that immunity under Title I of the Act. Id. at
360, 374 & n.9, 121 S. Ct. at 960, 967–68 & n.9. Because immunity from suit
under the Eleventh Amendment “is in the nature of a jurisdictional bar,” it “should
be decided at an early stage” to protect the sovereignty of states and state agents by
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sparing them “the indignity of being haled into federal court by private litigants.”
Bouchard Transp. Co. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 91 F.3d 1445, 1448 (11th Cir.
1996).
The Eleventh Amendment protects the immunity of not only the states, but
of state agencies and entities that function as an “arm of the state.” Manders v.
Lee, 338 F.3d 1304, 1308 (11th Cir. 2003) (en banc). Whether an entity functions
as an “arm of the state” is a federal question that we resolve by reviewing how the
state courts treat the entity. Versiglio v. Bd. of Dental Exam’rs of Ala., 686 F.3d
1290, 1291 (11th Cir. 2012) (on petition for reh’g) (citing Regents of the Univ. of
Calif. v. Doe, 519 U.S. 425, 429 n.5, 117 S. Ct. 900, 904 n.5 (1997)). “In
conducting our analysis, this court ‘has stated the most important factor is how the
entity has been treated by the state courts.’” Id. at 1292 (quoting Tuveson v. Fla.
Governor’s Council on Indian Affairs, Inc., 734 F.2d 730, 732 (11th Cir. 1984)).
In Versiglio, we initially held that the Alabama Board of Dental Examiners was
not an “arm of the state” based upon a decision by the Alabama Court of Civil
Appeals. Id. at 1292. After we became aware that the Supreme Court of Alabama
granted a petition for a writ of certiorari filed by the Board, we withheld issuance
of our mandate for fear of “the incongruous result of having a ‘state agency’ that is
immune from suit under state law but not federal law.” Id. The Supreme Court of
Alabama issued a decision that the Board of Dental Examiners “is in fact an arm of
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the state and is entitled to immunity from suits in Alabama state courts.” Id. After
that decision, we vacated the prior panel opinion and entered a new opinion that
the Board was an “arm of the state.” Id. at 1291.
Alabama courts have uniformly treated county boards of health as state
agencies. See Pack v. Blankenship, 612 So. 2d 399, 400 n.1 (Ala. 1992) (holding
that an employee of the Morgan County Health Department is a state employee);
Bathgate v. Mobile Cnty. Bd. of Sch. Comm’rs, 689 So. 2d 109, 112–13 (Ala. Civ.
App. 1996) (affirming summary judgment in favor of employees of the Mobile
County Health Department under the reasoning employed in Pack); Williams v.
Madison Cnty. Bd. of Health, 523 So. 2d 453, 455 (Ala. Civ. App. 1988) (holding
that the Madison County Board of Health is a state agency entitled to sovereign
immunity). The Court of Civil Appeals has held, in the context of determining the
immunity of an employee, that the Health Department is a state agency. Smith v.
Smith, 778 So. 2d 189, 191 (Ala. Civ. App. 1999). We must defer to that
determination “absent some persuasive indication that the state’s highest court
would decide the issue otherwise.” Silverberg v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis,
Inc., 710 F.2d 678, 690 (11th Cir. 1983).
Ross argues that the Health Department is not immune from a complaint for
monetary damages under the Act because the Health Department serves as an
agent of the county, instead of the state, in its performance of personnel functions,
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but this argument fails. “In Eleventh Amendment cases, this Court uses four
factors to determine whether an entity is [a state agent] in carrying out a particular
function: (1) how state law defines the entity; (2) what degree of control the State
maintains over the entity; (3) where the entity derives its funds; and (4) who is
responsible for judgments against the entity.” Manders, 338 F.3d at 1309.
Because Ross sued about her allegedly wrongful termination, the “function” at
issue is the termination of employees, and state law establishes that the state
controls that function.
As to the first factor, state law defines the Health Department as an “arm of
the state.” State statutory law assigns to county boards of health the exclusive
authority to perform “public health work” that is subject to “the supervision and
control of the State Board of Health.” Ala. Code §§ 22-1-3, 22-2-2(7), 22-3-1, 22-
3-4. The Health Department is headed by the Health Officer, id. § 22-3-2(5), who
is defined by statute as a state officer, see id. §§ 22-3-2(5), 22-3-4, 22-3-5.
Because Jefferson County has a population greater than 400,000, state law requires
the Health Department to use the county personnel and merit systems instead of the
state merit system, Enabling Act, Act No. 248 § 2, 1945 Ala. Acts 388, 377; Ala.
Code § 36-26-83, but the Health Officer, a state official, is the “appointing
authority” who both hires and terminates employees, Act No. 248 §§ 20, 22, 1945
Ala. Acts 394–95.
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As to the second factor, the state controls the personnel decisions within the
Health Department, including terminations. The state board of health supervises
and controls the county boards of health, each county health officer, and all public
health work. Ala. Code §§ 22-1-3, 22-2-2(7), 22-3-1. The state health officer
approves and may remove from office any county health officer. Id. § 22-3-2(5).
The state health officer must approve any leave taken by any county health officer
exceeding 30 days, id. § 22-3-5(7). The Health Department uses the county
personnel system, see Act No. 248 § 22, 1945 Ala. Acts 395, but, through the
Health Officer, the Health Department is “vested with discretion to dismiss or
demote any employee ‘for just cause whenever [it] considers the good of the
service will be served thereby,’” see id. § 22, 1945 Ala. Acts 395–97. The Health
Officer, a state official, controls the termination function alleged in Ross’s
complaint.
As to the third factor, the source of funding for the Health Department does
not “tip the balance” against immunity because state law requires the county to
supply those funds. See McMillian v. Monroe Cnty., 520 U.S. 781, 791, 117 S. Ct.
1734, 1740 (1997). State statutes mandate that the county provide an office and
pay the salary for the Health Officer, mandate that the county furnish and staff the
Health Department, and give the county discretion to levy a tax that is used
exclusively to fund the Health Department. Ala. Code §§ 22-3-5(11), 22-3-6, 22-
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3-10; see also Op. Ala. Att’y Gen. 2007-087 (2007) (opining that the “Jefferson
County Board of Health is a state agency receiving state funds that is subject to the
Relationship Disclosure Law”). County funding of the Health Department does
not “tip the balance” against immunity because there is no evidence that the county
exerts control over the Health Department, see McMillian, 520 U.S. at 791, 117 S.
Ct. at 1740, and the county funds the Health Department only because state law
requires it to do so, see Manders, 338 F.3d at 1324.
As to the fourth factor, our precedent holds that liability by the state treasury
is not determinative of whether a governmental entity should enjoy Eleventh
Amendment immunity. Id. at 1327. The lack of a per se rule derives from states
maintenance of “certain attributes of sovereignty, and a purpose of the Eleventh
Amendment is to accord[] the States the respect owed them as members of the
federation and not to affront the dignity or integrity of a state by requiring a state to
respond to lawsuits in federal courts.” Id. (internal quotation omitted). The Health
Department is responsible for paying any monetary judgment “out of [its] budget,”
and state law exempts the county from any claim against the Health Department.
Ala. Code § 22-3-12. We do not limit Eleventh Amendment immunity “to who
foots the bill . . . .” Manders, 338 F.3d at 1328.
Ross also argues that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar her claim for
injunctive relief, but Ross failed to file a complaint against a state officer. Ross
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named only the Health Department as a defendant, but an injunction can issue only
against an individual officer. See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44,
74, 116 S. Ct. 1114, 1132 (1996) (“The Eleventh Amendment bar [may] be lifted,
as it was in Ex parte Young, [209 U.S. 123, 28 S. Ct. 441 (1908)], to allow a suit
against a state officer.”). Ross argues that she could not list an official of the
Health Department as a party because the Health Department was her employer,
but Ross could have sought injunctive relief against the Health Officer who is
vested with the authority to hire and terminate employees. See Ala. Code § 22-3-4.
The district court correctly granted summary judgment in favor of the Health
Department and against Ross’s complaint of discrimination based on her disability.
The Health Department is a state agency entitled to immunity under the Eleventh
Amendment, and the Health Department is immune from a complaint of
employment discrimination under Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act.
B. The District Court Correctly Granted Summary Judgment Against Ross’s
Complaint of Racial Discrimination.
Ross waived her complaint of racial discrimination. Under Title VII, it is
unlawful for an employer “to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). “The ultimate
burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated
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against the plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff.” Springer v. Convergys
Customer Mgmt. Grp., Inc., 509 F.3d 1344, 1347 (11th Cir. 2007). When asked
during her deposition whether she “[felt] like [her] termination had anything to do
[with] . . . [her] race,” Ross responded, “no.” Based on Ross’s unequivocal
concession, the district court was entitled to grant summary judgment in favor of
the Health Department.
IV. CONCLUSION
We AFFIRM the summary judgment in favor of the Health Department.
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