FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION NOV 16 2012
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ALVARO YOVANI SANCHEZ- No. 09-71753
GARCIA, a.k.a. Alvaro Jovany Sanchez,
Agency No. A094-461-588
Petitioner,
v. MEMORANDUM *
ERIC H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted November 13, 2012 **
Before: CANBY, TROTT, and W. FLETCHER, Circuit Judges.
Alvaro Yovani Sanchez-Garcia, a native and citizen of El Salvador, petitions
for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order denying his
motion to remand and dismissing his appeal from an immigration judge’s decision
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
denying his application for asylum and withholding of removal. Our jurisdiction is
governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for substantial evidence factual findings,
Zehatye v. Gonzales, 453 F.3d 1182, 1184-85 (9th Cir. 2006), and for abuse of
discretion the denial of a motion to remand, de Jesus Melendez v. Gonzales, 503
F.3d 1019, 1023 (9th Cir. 2007). We deny in part and dismiss in part the petition
for review.
Substantial evidence supports the agency’s finding that Sanchez-Garcia did
not demonstrate past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution on
account of a protected ground. See INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481-82
(1992); Parussimova v. Mukasey, 555 F.3d 734, 740 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[t]he Real
ID Act requires that a protected ground represent ‘one central reason’ for an
asylum applicant’s persecution”). Accordingly, Sanchez-Garcia’s asylum and
withholding of removal claims fail. See Ochoa v. Gonzales, 406 F.3d 1166, 1172
(9th Cir. 2005).
The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Sanchez-Garcia’s request to
remand to consider his claim for cancellation of removal because he did not
demonstrate prima facie eligibility for that form of relief. See Fernandez v.
Gonzales, 439 F.3d 592, 599 (9th Cir. 2006). We lack jurisdiction to review
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Sanchez-Garcia’s contentions related to hardship because he failed to raise this
issue to the BIA. See Barron v. Ashcroft, 358 F.3d 674, 678 (9th Cir. 2004).
Further, we deny Sanchez-Garcia’s motion for judicial notice of the
declaration by his wife and do not consider the additional documents he submitted
with his opening brief because they are not part of the administrative record. See
Fisher v. INS, 79 F.3d 955, 963 (9th Cir. 1996) (en banc) (this court’s review is
limited to the administrative record). In light of our conclusions, we deny the
government’s motion to strike as unnecessary.
Finally, contrary to the government’s contention that Sanchez-Garcia’s
period of voluntary departure was terminated, the temporary stay of removal,
confirmed by Ninth Circuit General Order 6.4(c), tolled the voluntary departure
period from June 8, 2009, the date that Sanchez-Garcia filed his motion for a stay
of removal. See Desta v. Ashcroft, 365 F.3d 741, 750 (9th Cir. 2004). Sanchez-
Garcia’s current voluntary departure period will continue to run upon issuance of
the mandate. See id. at 747. We deny Sanchez-Garcia’s request for a remand to
consider a new grant of voluntary departure.
PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED in part; DISMISSED in part.
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