FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION NOV 19 2012
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
RICHARD HENRY JOHNSON, Jr., No. 11-35930
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 6:10-cv-00005-AA
v.
MEMORANDUM *
RICK COURSEY; et al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Oregon
Ann L. Aiken, Chief Judge, Presiding
Submitted November 13, 2012 **
Before: CANBY, TROTT, and W. FLETCHER, Circuit Judges.
Oregon state prisoner Richard Henry Johnson, Jr., appeals pro se from the
district court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging
constitutional violations arising from a disciplinary hearing. We have jurisdiction
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Universal Health Servs., Inc. v.
Thompson, 363 F.3d 1013, 1019 (9th Cir. 2004). We affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Johnson’s double
jeopardy claim because the prohibition against double jeopardy does not apply to
prison disciplinary sanctions. See United States v. Brown, 59 F.3d 102, 104 (9th
Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (prison disciplinary sanctions “are not punishment for
purposes of double jeopardy because they are solely remedial”).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Johnson’s Eighth
Amendment claim because Johnson failed to raise a genuine dispute of material
fact as to whether he suffered a deprivation resulting in “the denial of ‘the minimal
civilized measure of life’s necessities.’” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834
(1994) (citation omitted).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Johnson’s
Fourteenth Amendment due process claims because Johnson failed to raise a
genuine dispute of material fact as to whether some evidence supports the
disciplinary decision, and prisoners have no constitutional right to cross-examine
witnesses in disciplinary hearings. See Superintendent, Mass. Corr. Inst.,
Waldpole v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455 (1985) (“[T]he requirements of due process
are satisfied if some evidence supports the decision by the prison disciplinary
2 11-35930
board.”); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 567-68 (1974) (no constitutional right
to cross-examine witnesses in prison disciplinary hearings).
AFFIRMED.
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