FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION NOV 20 2012
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
HERMONGENES CUBANGBANG No. 08-72037
RAMOS, Jr.,
Agency No. A072-120-801
Petitioner,
v. MEMORANDUM *
MICHAEL B. MUKASEY, Attorney
General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Argued and Submitted November 8, 2012
San Francisco, California
Before: FARRIS, FERNANDEZ, and BYBEE, Circuit Judges.
Hermongenes Cubangbang Ramos, Jr. petitions for review of the denial by
the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) of his application for asylum and
withholding of removal. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we
deny review.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
To grant review, we would need to find that “the evidence not only supports
a contrary conclusion [to that reached by the BIA], but compels it.” Sangha v. INS,
103 F.3d 1482, 1487 (9th Cir. 1997); see also INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478,
483–84 (1992) (asserting that the petitioner must show “that the evidence [the
petitioner] presented was so compelling that no reasonable factfinder could fail to
find the requisite fear of persecution”).
With regard to asylum, the BIA determined that Ramos did not establish
either past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution. Our
precedents “characterize[ ] persecution as an extreme concept, marked by the
infliction of suffering or harm . . . in a way regarded as offensive.” Li v. Ashcroft,
356 F.3d 1153, 1158 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(alteration in original). The cases cited by the BIA to support its conclusion that
the brief detention and threats suffered by Ramos at the hands of the New People’s
Army (NPA) do not rise to the level of past persecution adequately demonstrate
that the record in this case does not compel a contrary conclusion. See Marcos v.
Gonzales, 410 F.3d 1112, 1115–16, 1118–19 (9th Cir. 2005); Hoxha v. Ashcroft,
319 F.3d 1179, 1181–82 (9th Cir. 2003); Prasad v. INS, 47 F.3d 336, 339–40 (9th
Cir. 1995). Detention and threats may be central components of valid persecution
claims, but the facts here do not compel a finding of past persecution.
2
Though “[e]ven a ten percent chance that the applicant will be persecuted in
the future is enough to establish a well-founded fear” of future persecution,
Knezevic v. Ashcroft, 367 F.3d 1206, 1212 (9th Cir. 2004), the record does not
compel us to conclude that Ramos has a well-founded fear of being persecuted if
he returns to the Philippines. Ramos remained in the Philippines for more than
five months after his brief detention and was not confronted or directly threatened
again. See Lim v. INS, 224 F.3d 929, 935 (9th Cir. 2000) (acknowledging that a
“post-threat harmless period” in the country of persecution is “relevant” to whether
an applicant’s fear is reasonable). The only threat during those five months came
secondhand and suggested that Ramos might be harmed if he returned to his
hometown in the future, not necessarily that he would be harmed for remaining
elsewhere in the country. Moreover, almost twenty years elapsed between when
the NPA detained and threatened Ramos and the BIA’s decision in his case. See
Canales-Vargas v. Gonzales, 441 F.3d 739, 746 (9th Cir. 2006) (“The age of the
threats that [the petitioner] received are relevant to our evaluation of the
reasonableness of [the petitioner’s] fear.”). Even though Ramos did not fulfill all
of his promises to the NPA, we find it unlikely that the NPA has continued interest
in harming him. Thus, we are not compelled to find that Ramos has a well-
founded fear of future persecution.
3
With regard to withholding of removal, for us to grant review of the BIA’s
denial, the evidence would need to compel us to find a “‘clear probability’ of the
threat to life or freedom if [Ramos were] deported to his . . . country of
nationality.” Tamang v. Holder, 598 F.3d 1083, 1091 (9th Cir. 2010). “The clear
probability standard is more stringent than the well-founded fear standard for
asylum,” id., and thus is not satisfied in Ramos’s case either.
PETITION DENIED.
4