UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 12-4125
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
MARCUS RICHARDSON, a/k/a Dank,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at New Bern. Louise W. Flanagan,
District Judge. (5:11-cr-00121-FL-2)
Submitted: November 20, 2012 Decided: November 26, 2012
Before TRAXLER, Chief Judge, and SHEDD and FLOYD, Circuit
Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Thomas P. McNamara, Federal Public Defender, Stephen C. Gordon,
Assistant Federal Public Defender, Raleigh, North Carolina, for
Appellant. Thomas G. Walker, United States Attorney, Jennifer
P. May-Parker, Yvonne V. Watford-McKinney, Assistant United
States Attorneys, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Marcus Richardson, who pled guilty without a plea
agreement to one count of possession of a firearm by a felon, in
violation of 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 922(g)(1), 924 (West 2000 & Supp.
2012), appeals his seventy-four-month upward variant sentence.
Richardson argues on appeal that the district court erred when
it imposed his sentence because he asserts that his prior
criminal conduct was adequately considered in his criminal
history score, and that the district court abused its discretion
with regard to the extent of the variance from his Guidelines
range. Finding no error, we affirm.
We review any criminal sentence, “whether inside, just
outside, or significantly outside the Guidelines range,” for
reasonableness, “under a deferential abuse-of-discretion
standard.” United States v. King, 673 F.3d 274, 283 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, ___ S. Ct. ____, 2012 WL 2154910 (2012); see Gall
v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). When the district
court imposes a departure or variant sentence, we consider
“whether the sentencing court acted reasonably both with respect
to its decision to impose such a sentence and with respect to
the extent of the divergence from the sentencing range.” United
States v. Hernandez–Villanueva, 473 F.3d 118, 123 (4th Cir.
2007). The district court “has flexibility in fashioning a
sentence outside of the Guidelines range,” and need only “‘set
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forth enough to satisfy the appellate court that it has
considered the parties’ arguments and has a reasoned basis’” for
its decision. United States v. Diosdado–Star, 630 F.3d 359, 364
(4th Cir.) (quoting Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 356
(2007)) (alteration omitted), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 2946
(2011).
“The fact that the appellate court might reasonably
have concluded that a different sentence was appropriate is
insufficient to justify reversal of the district court.” Gall,
552 U.S. at 51. “This deference is due in part because the
sentencing judge is in a superior position to find facts and
judge their import and the judge sees and hears the evidence,
makes credibility determinations, has full knowledge of the
facts and gains insights not conveyed by the record.” Diosdado–
Star, 630 F.3d at 366 (internal quotation marks, brackets and
citation omitted); see Rita, 551 U.S. at 357–58 (recognizing
that the district court also “has access to, and greater
familiarity with, the individual case and the individual
defendant before [the court] than the Commission or the appeals
court”).
Because the district court identified its reasons for
the above-Guidelines sentence, which was based on the Sentencing
Guidelines, the 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(a) (West 2000 & Supp. 2012)
factors, and related to the particular facts of Richardson’s
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case, we conclude that Richardson’s sentence is reasonable. See
King, 673 F.3d at 284 (concluding that upward variant sentence
was reasonable as it was adequately supported by reference to
the § 3553(a) factors that “the court determined required the
sentence ultimately imposed”); Diosdado–Star, 630 F.3d at 366–67
(holding that a more than six-year upward variant sentence was
substantively reasonable because district court expressly relied
on the § 3553(a) factors to support the variance).
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
Court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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