11-5063
Youssef v. Halcrow, Inc.
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER
FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY
ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit, held at the Daniel Patrick Moynihan United
States Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, in the City of New York, on
the 29th day of November, two thousand twelve.
PRESENT:
AMALYA L. KEARSE,
CHESTER J. STRAUB,
ROSEMARY S. POOLER,
Circuit Judges.
_____________________________________
Magdy Youssef,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. 11-5063
Halcrow, Inc., a Delaware
Corporation, Halcrow Holdings
Limited, company organized under
the laws of the United Kingdom,
Halcrow Group Limited, company
organized under the laws of the
United Kingdom,
Defendants-Appellees.
_____________________________________
FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT: Magdy Youssef, pro se, Wanaque, NJ.
FOR DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES: David Abramovitz, (Carol J.
Patterson, on the brief) , Zetlin &
De Chiara, LLP, New York, NY.
Appeal from the judgment of the United States District Court
for the Southern District of New York (Castel, J.).
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND
DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
Plaintiff-Appellant Magdy Youssef, pro se, appeals from the
district court’s order dismissing, on the defendants’ Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion, Youssef’s diversity complaint. We
assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the
procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.
“We review the district court’s grant of a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion to dismiss de novo, accepting all factual claims in the
complaint as true, and drawing all reasonable inferences in the
plaintiff’s favor.” Famous Horse Inc. v. 5th Ave. Photo Inc.,
624 F.3d 106, 108 (2d Cir. 2010). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion to dismiss, the complaint must plead “enough facts to
state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007); see also
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Although all
factual allegations contained in the complaint are assumed to be
true, this tenet is “inapplicable to legal conclusions.” Iqbal,
556 U.S. at 678. A claim will have “facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw
the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Id.
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Having conducted an independent and de novo review of the
record in light of the above principles, we now affirm for
substantially the same reasons set forth by the district court in
its November 1, 2011 memorandum and order. Youssef’s argument on
appeal that the district court erred by refusing to credit as
true the assertion in his complaint that he was the sole owner of
an engineering design “to the exclusion of any other person or
entity,” is meritless as that assertion was merely a “legal
conclusion[] masquerading as [a] factual conclusion[],” which is
insufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss. Kirch v. Liberty
Media Corp., 449 F.3d 388, 398 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting Smith v.
Local 819 I.B.T. Pension Plan, 291 F.3d 236, 240 (2d. Cir.
2002)). The complaint’s factual allegations belie that legal
conclusion as the complaint alleges that when plaintiff was
Director of Structural Systems for his employer Tishman, Tishman
“requested Plaintiff, Mr. Youseff, to review the Halcrow
Defendants’ proposed structural design to see if he could find a
solution to the constructability and cost problems” (Complaint ¶
20), and thus under New York law, as the district court ruled,
Youssef’s work product belonged to his employer, see, e.g.,
Pullman Grp. LLC v. Prudential Ins. Co. Of Am., 288 A.D.2d 2, 3
(1st Dep’t 2001). Moreover, in assessing the defendant’s motion
to dismiss, the district court properly considered an addendum to
Youssef’s employment application, which Youssef attached as an
exhibit to his opposition, as that document was “integral” to
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Youssef’s allegation that he, and not his employer, was the owner
of the engineering design. See DiFolco v. MSNBC Cable L.L.C.,
622 F.3d 104, 111 (2d Cir. 2010) (holding that a court may
consider a document not incorporated by reference into the
complaint “where the complaint ‘relies heavily upon its terms and
effect,’ thereby rendering the document ‘integral’ to the
complaint” (quoting Mangiafico v. Blumenthal, 471 F.3d 391, 398
(2d Cir. 2006))).
We have considered all of Youssef’s remaining arguments and
find them to be without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the
judgment of the district court.
FOR THE COURT:
Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
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