UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
For the Fifth Circuit
No. 95-10472
Summary Calendar
Kenneth E. Smith,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
VERSUS
Rockwell International Corporation,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
For the Northern District of Texas Dallas Division
(3:93CV00331)
December 13, 1995
Before HIGGINBOTHAM, DUHÉ, AND EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:1
Kenneth E. Smith appeals the district court’s grant of summary
judgment to his employer, Rockwell International Corporation
(Rockwell). Smith sought relief under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act, the Texas Worker’s Compensation Act, and the Americans
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Pursuant to that Rule, the Court has determined that this opinion
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with Disabilities Act (ADA) for his medical layoff and Rockwell’s
refusal to reinstate him. The district court granted summary
judgment in favor of Rockwell. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
After sustaining ankle and back injuries, Smith received
workers’ compensation benefits in March of 1992. Shortly
thereafter, Rockwell placed Smith on medical layoff, because
Smith’s medical restrictions prevented him from performing the
essential duties of his Facilities and Maintenance II position.
Smith then filed a grievance with his labor union.
In response to Smith’s union grievance, Smith and Rockwell
entered into an agreement governing the conditions under which
Smith might be reinstated. The agreement gave Rockwell the right
to send Smith to a doctor of Rockwell’s choice for a work
evaluation examination. If this evaluation conflicted with the
evaluation of Smith’s personal doctor, then Rockwell and the union
would choose a doctor to perform an independent evaluation.
In November of 1992, Smith requested reinstatement into an
open position. Appellant submitted a report from his personal
physician stating that with some accommodations, Smith could
perform the position’s functions. However, Rockwell’s physician
concluded that it would be dangerous for Smith to perform the job.
As a result of these conflicting reports, a third physician
evaluated Smith and determined that he was fit to resume his normal
duties. Thus, in May of 1994, Rockwell reinstated Smith.
Smith sued Rockwell, claiming that Rockwell (1) violated Title
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VII by placing him on medical layoff because of his race; (2)
violated Article 8307(c) of the Texas Worker’s Compensation Act by
discharging him in retaliation for his workers’ compensation claim.
(3) violated the ADA when Rockwell refused to reinstate Smith in
his former position due to his disability.
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of
Rockwell. This appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de
novo. Summary judgment is appropriate if the record discloses
“that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The pleadings, depositions, admissions, and
answers to interrogatories, together with affidavits, must
demonstrate that no genuine issue of material fact remains.
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986). To that end we must
“review the facts drawing all inferences most favorable to the
party opposing the motion.” Reid v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co., 784 F.2d 577, 578 (5th Cir. 1986).
I. Retaliatory Discharge Claim
Smith argues that he was discharged in retaliation for
pursuing his workers’ compensation benefits. To establish a prima
facie case of discrimination under Article 8307(c) of the Texas
Worker’s Compensation Act, an employee bears the burden of proving
that his workers’ compensation claim was a “determining factor” in
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the discharge.2 Burfield v. Brown, Moore & Flint, Inc., 51 F.3d
583, 590 (5th Cir. 1995). The employer may then rebut by showing
a legitimate reason for the discharge. Id.
Although Appellant created a fact issue as to whether his
workers’ compensation claim played a determinative role in his
discharge, he did not rebut Rockwell’s reason for his discharge.
Rockwell avers that it placed Smith on medical layoff pursuant to
its neutrally applied accommodation policy. Under the policy, if
permanent medical restrictions prevent an employee from performing
his job duties, Rockwell does not accommodate that employee with
another position. Smith has not presented any evidence refuting
the existence or neutral application of this company policy.
Therefore, Rockwell is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of
law.
II. Title VII Claim
Smith argues that Rockwell placed him on medical layoff
because he is African-American, thereby violating Title VII. To
establish a violation of Title VII, the plaintiff first must prove
a prima facie case by a preponderance of the evidence; once
established, the prima facie case raises an inference of unlawful
discrimination. St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742,
2747 (1993); Texas Dep’t of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S.
248, 252-53 (1981); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792,
802 (1973). The burden of production then shifts to the defendant
Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 8307(c) was recodified as
Chapter 451 of the Texas Labor Code on September 1, 1993.
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to proffer a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the
challenged employment action. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2747; Burdine,
450 U.S. at 253; McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. If the
defendant meets its burden, the presumption raised by the
plaintiff’s prima facie case disappears. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255
& n.10. However, the plaintiff is then accorded the opportunity to
demonstrate that the defendant’s articulated rationale was merely
a pretext for discrimination. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2748-49;
Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253; McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804-05.
Pursuant to the McDonnell Douglas-Burdine procedural scheme,
Rockwell offered a legitimate reason for placing Smith on medical
layoff: Smith’s physicians had imposed permanent medical
restrictions on his activities that precluded him from performing
the material duties of his position. To discredit the employer’s
reason, Smith alleged that he was treated differently than injured
white employees at Rockwell. The evidence, however, indicates that
Smith was not comparably situated to these employees. Thus,
because Appellant has not introduced any evidence to rebut
Rockwell’s nondiscriminatory reason, Rockwell is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.
III. ADA Claim
Smith also argues that Rockwell violated the ADA when Rockwell
refused to reinstate him to his former position due to his
disability. The ADA prohibits discrimination “against a qualified
individual with a disability because of the disability of such
individual in regard to job application procedures, the hiring,
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advancement or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job
training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of
employment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). As a threshold requirement in
an ADA action, a plaintiff must establish that he has a disability.
de la Torres v. Bolger, 781 F.2d 1134, 1136 (5th Cir. 1986).
The ADA defines an individual’s “disability” as:
(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially
limits one or more of the major life activities of such
individual;
(B) a record of such an impairment; or
(C) being regarded as having such an impairment.
42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). Our inquiry, therefore, is whether Appellant
has a physical or mental impairment, and whether that impairment
substantially limits one or more of his major life activities.
Rockwell does not dispute that Smith had a physical impairment, so
we turn to the second part of the inquiry.
Smith argues that his impairment substantially limits the
major life activity of working. In determining whether an
impairment substantially limits an individual’s employment
potential, we look to “the number and type of jobs from which the
individual was disqualified, the geographic area to which he has
reasonable access, and the individual’s employment qualifications.”
Chandler v. City of Dallas, 2 F.3d 1385, 1392 (5th Cir. 1993),
cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1386 (1994). Appellant failed to present
any evidence demonstrating that his impairment significantly
decreases his ability to obtain satisfactory employment. The
physicians who examined Smith restricted only his ability to lift
or do heavy duty work. Although this restriction prevented Smith
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from performing an essential function of the Facilities and
Maintenance II position, “an impairment that affects only a narrow
range of jobs can be regarded either as not reaching a major life
activity or as not substantially limiting one.” Jasany v. United
States Postal Service, 755 F.2d 1244, 1249 n.3 (6th Cir. 1985).
Therefore, summary judgment was appropriate.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s
granting of summary judgment in favor of Rockwell.
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