NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 11-4539
___________
JEFFREY P. DATTO, Ph.D.
v.
BRIAN HARRISON; THOMAS LEWIS;
THOMAS KLEIN, M.D.; MARK GRAHAM, M.D.;
THOMAS JEFFERSON UNIVERSITY; THOMAS
JEFFERSON UNIVERSITY HOSPITALS, INC.;
JOHN DOE 1; JOHN DOE 2; JOHN DOE 3;
JOHN DOE 4; JOHN DOE 5
(2-09-cv-02064)
_____________
JEFFREY P. DATTO, Ph.D.
v.
THOMAS JEFFERSON UNIVERSITY;
DR. THOMAS KLEIN; DR. THOMAS NASCA;
DR. JAMES FINK; DR. ARTHUR FELDMAN;
DR. MARK GRAHAM; DR. NORA SANFORFI;
DR. CHARLES POHL; DR. CLARA CALLAHAN;
DR. GEORGE PEREIRA-OGAN; DR. JOHN CARUSO;
DR. BRIAN HARRISON; DR. ROBERT BARCHI; JOHN DOES 1-5
(2-09-cv-02549)
Jeffrey P. Datto, Ph.D,
Appellant
____________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civ. Nos. 09-cv-02064 and 09-cv-02549)
District Judge: Honorable Mary A. McLaughlin
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
December 3, 2012
Before: RENDELL, FISHER and GARTH, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: December 7, 2012 )
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OPINION OF THE COURT
___________
PER CURIAM.
Jeffrey P. Datto appeals an order of the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania denying his motion for relief under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 60(b). For the reasons that follow, we will affirm.
I.
Because we write primarily for the benefit of the parties, who in their briefing
have displayed in-depth familiarity with the history of this case, we set forth only a brief
summary of the relevant background. In 2005, appellee Thomas Jefferson University
(“Jefferson”) dismissed Datto from its M.D./Ph.D. program during Datto’s final year of
medical school, which prevented Datto from attaining an M.D. degree. The parties
disputed the reasons why Jefferson dismissed Datto. In 2007, Datto filed three suits
against Jefferson and other defendants in Pennsylvania state court, seeking, among other
things, reinstatement to the M.D. program. Two of Datto’s suits were removed to federal
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court, ultimately docketed as E.D. Pa. Civ. Nos. 09-cv-02549 and 09-cv-02064, and
consolidated for all purposes.
The parties agreed to participate in settlement discussions, which were mediated
by Magistrate Judge Elizabeth T. Hey. After lengthy negotiations, the parties reached an
agreement calling for Datto to dismiss his three suits in exchange for a monetary payment
from Jefferson. The agreement did not include any opportunity for Datto to gain
readmission to Jefferson. On June 2, 2010, Datto signed the settlement agreement during
a conference before Judge Hey, acknowledging on the record that he had reviewed the
agreement and intended to be bound by it. Datto voluntarily dismissed with prejudice his
suits against the defendants.
Thereafter, on November 30, 2010, Datto submitted a letter to the District Court
seeking to vacate the dismissal and reopen his cases. He argued that he had been unable
to appreciate the binding nature of the settlement agreement because he was mentally
impaired at the time of signing and hindered by his inability to discuss the settlement
with his treating psychiatrists. Datto submitted a letter from a psychiatrist, Dr. Thase,
who opined that, “on the basis of [Datto’s] description of the events that occurred on the
day of signing the settlement agreement and the severity of the depression that has
followed, … he was in the midst of an episode of bipolar disorder and had diminished
capacity to understand the binding nature of the settlement agreement.” Datto further
argued that he was unduly pressured to settle due to several factors, including: Judge
Hey’s assurances that the settlement was fair; an allegedly biased mediation process; the
3
District Court’s refusal to appoint counsel and address Datto’s request for preliminary
injunctive relief; defendants’ alleged discovery abuses; and the financial hardship that
Datto allegedly suffered following his dismissal from Jefferson.
After holding an evidentiary hearing, which included testimony from Judge Hey as
well as from Datto, the District Court rendered factual determinations and denied the
Rule 60(b) motion. Applying Rule 60(b)(3), which affords relief due to fraud,
misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party, the District Court concluded that
defendants did not misrepresent to Datto their position regarding his inability to gain
readmission to Jefferson’s medical school.1 Applying the “catchall” provision of Rule
60(b)(6), the District Court held that Datto’s communications with defendants leading up
to his signing of the settlement, including his proposed amendments to the agreement,
show that Datto understood the agreement’s terms and that the settlement would prevent
him from further association with Jefferson. The District Court also found that Datto was
not subjected to undue influence or pressure to settle, and that no extraordinary
1
Because Datto does not challenge the denial of Rule 60(b)(3) relief on this appeal, we
deem that issue waived. See Skretvedt v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours, 372 F.3d 193, 202-
03 (3d Cir. 2004) (“[A]n issue is waived unless a party raises it in its opening brief, and
for those purposes a passing reference to an issue will not suffice to bring that issue
before this court.”). In addition, we note that, while the District Court did not specifically
address Datto’s contention that Rule 60(b)(1) provides a basis for relief because Datto
made a “mistake” in accepting the settlement, any such contention is without merit. See
Coltec Indus., Inc. v. Hobgood, 280 F.3d 262, 275 (3d Cir. 2002) (holding that, even if
party’s decision to settle “was improvident in hindsight, the decision is made and cannot
be revisited”). Likewise, Datto’s alleged mistaken belief that the law would allow him to
unilaterally revoke the settlement agreement did not warrant Rule 60(b)(1) relief.
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circumstance warranted reopening the cases. After denying Datto’s motion for
reconsideration (a ruling that Datto does not challenge), Datto timely filed this appeal.
II.
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review the denial of a
Rule 60(b) motion for abuse of discretion. Budget Blinds, Inc. v. White, 536 F.3d 244,
251 (3d Cir. 2008). Because the District Court held an evidentiary hearing, its “exercise
of discretion in light of supportable findings of fact will not be disturbed unless there was
a clear abuse.” Inmates of Allegheny Cnty. Jail v. Wecht, 754 F.2d 120, 127 (3d Cir.
1985). “An abuse of discretion may be found when the district court’s decision rests
upon a clearly erroneous finding of fact, an errant conclusion of law or an improper
application of law to fact.” Reform Party of Allegheny Cnty. v. Allegheny Cnty. Dep’t
of Elections, 174 F.3d 305, 311 (3d Cir.1999) (quotation marks omitted).
The District Court considered Datto’s allegations of mental impairment and undue
influence under Rule 60(b)(6), which permits relief from judgment only in “extraordinary
circumstances.” Budget Blinds, 536 F.3d at 255. Extraordinary circumstances “rarely
exist when a party seeks relief from a judgment that resulted from the party’s deliberate
choices.” Id. Furthermore, Rule 60(b)(6) is not a means “to escape the effects of a
bargain [the movant] regretted in hindsight.” Coltec Indus., 280 F.3d at 273.
After considering the testimony presented at the evidentiary hearing, the parties’
arguments and submissions, and Datto’s emails and other communications leading up to
the settlement agreement, the District Court concluded that Datto was not incompetent,
5
that he was not subjected to undue influence when he agreed to the settlement, and that
he was able to appreciate the binding nature of the agreement. In so holding, the District
Court found it significant that: Judge Hey observed Datto on the day of the signing and
concluded that he was capable of deciding whether to settle; Datto initiated sophisticated
changes to the settlement terms, including on the day he entered into the agreement;
Datto’s communications with defendants show that he understood the consequences of
settling, including that he would be precluded from further association with Jefferson;
Datto testified on the record that he made the decision to settle intending to be bound;
Judge Hey reiterated to Datto throughout the process that he was free to discontinue
negotiations and elect not to settle; and Datto had consulted with his psychiatrist, Dr.
Thase, prior to accepting the settlement terms. 2
Under Pennsylvania law, which governs the issue of Datto’s capacity to enter into
the settlement agreement, “it is presumed that an adult is competent to execute a release,
and thus, a signed document yields the presumption that it accurately expresses the state
of mind of the signing party.” Taylor v. Avi, 415 A.2d 894, 896 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1979).
The party alleging incompetence has “the burden of showing the invalidity of the
agreement by clear, precise, and indubitable evidence.” Id. at 898. “[M]ere weakness of
2
Dr. Thase had advised Datto not to enter into the settlement agreement – advice that
Datto elected not to follow. While Datto now claims prejudice in the fact that he was
prohibited from discussing the settlement terms with anyone other than his parents, his
tax advisor, and Dr. Thase, there is no basis in the record to conclude that Datto would
not have signed the agreement had he been permitted to consult others.
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intellect resulting from sickness or old age is not legal grounds to set aside an executed
contract if sufficient intelligence remains to comprehend the nature and character of the
transaction, and no evidence of fraud, mutual mistake or undue influence is present.” Id.
at 897. In addition, “[t]he testimony of persons who observed the alleged incompetent on
the date in question is generally superior to testimony as to observations made prior to
and subsequent to that date.” Weir v. Estate of Ciao, 556 A.2d 819, 824 (Pa. 1989).
Applying these standards, we conclude that the record fully supports the
determination that Datto knowingly and voluntarily entered into the settlement
agreement. Although Dr. Thase opined that Datto was suffering from bipolar disorder
and “had diminished capacity to understand the binding nature of the settlement
agreement,” the District Court carefully considered the testimony of individuals who
observed Datto when he signed the agreement, particularly Judge Hey, as well as Datto’s
communications preceding the settlement. Given the nature of this evidence, Datto’s
capacity to enter into the settlement agreement cannot reasonably be questioned, and we
thus cannot say that the District Court committed a clear abuse of discretion by denying
Rule 60(b) relief.
Datto raises several contentions on appeal, none of which warrant a different
result. Datto contends that the District Court abused its discretion by not appointing an
attorney to represent him in the proceedings prior to settlement. 3 Datto argues that the
3
Datto was represented by counsel at various times before the District Court. In 2008,
prior to his counsel filing a motion to withdraw, Datto requested court-appointed counsel
7
District Court should have appointed counsel sua sponte under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1),
which provides that “[t]he court may request an attorney to represent any person unable
to afford counsel.” (Emphasis added.) Datto never demonstrated an inability to afford
counsel, and there is no evidence that he qualified for counsel under § 1915(e)(1). See
Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 191-92 (3d Cir. 2011). Because the District Court
was under no obligation to appoint counsel for Datto, its failure to do so provides no
basis to relieve Datto from his decision to enter into the settlement agreement.
Datto also argues that the District Court erred by failing promptly to address his
motion for preliminary injunctive relief. 4 Any delay in addressing the preliminary
injunction motion, however, does not amount to an extraordinary circumstance that
would allow Datto to be relieved from his decision to settle and dismiss these cases.
Finally, Datto argues that the District Court’s evidentiary hearing on the Rule
60(b) motion was improper because he was unprepared to question Judge Hey, he was
under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5. The District Court denied the request because Datto was still
represented by counsel, Datto was not entitled to appointed counsel under Title VII, and
no program existed to provide counsel for Datto. Datto’s counsel then withdrew, and
Datto proceeded pro se until February 2010, when he obtained new counsel. After that
lawyer was granted leave to withdraw, Datto again elected to proceed pro se. Datto did
not request appointed counsel any time thereafter, and he does not argue that the District
Court should have appointed counsel in connection with the Rule 60(b) proceeding.
4
In June 2009, Datto moved for a preliminary injunction, requesting that the District
Court order Jefferson to reinstate him immediately to the M.D. program. The District
Court scheduled an evidentiary hearing on that motion for January 2010, but due to
scheduling issues, the parties’ desire for prehearing discovery, and the need for
supplemental briefing, the preliminary injunction hearing was rescheduled several times.
Ultimately, the parties settled before a hearing was held.
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not permitted to review Judge Hey’s personal notes, and he did not have an opportunity
to present testimony from other witnesses, including Judge Hey’s law clerk and court
reporter. A district court has discretion to set parameters on the conduct of proceedings,
and this Court “will not interfere ... except upon the clearest showing that the procedures
have resulted in actual and substantial prejudice to the complaining litigant.” In re Fine
Paper Antitrust Litig., 685 F.2d 810, 817 (3d Cir. 1982) (quotation marks omitted). Datto
has made no showing of actual and substantial prejudice. He plainly had no entitlement
to review Judge Hey’s personal notes, and he has demonstrated no prejudice from failing
to present the law clerk or court reporter. Our review of the record reveals no reversible
error in the District Court’s conduct of the evidentiary hearing.
III.
We have carefully considered Datto’s remaining arguments, but we conclude that
those arguments are without merit and warrant no separate discussion. We will affirm
the District Court’s order denying the Rule 60(b) motion. Datto’s motion for
reconsideration of the Clerk’s order granting appellees’ request to file a supplemental
appendix is denied.
9