UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 12-4514
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
EDWARD WASHINGTON,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. Thomas D. Schroeder,
District Judge. (1:11-cr-00388-TDS-1)
Submitted: December 5, 2012 Decided: December 13, 2012
Before MOTZ, KING, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Louis C. Allen, Federal Public Defender, John A. Dusenbury, Jr.,
Assistant Federal Public Defender, Greensboro, North Carolina,
for Appellant. Ripley Rand, United States Attorney, Stephen T.
Inman, Assistant United States Attorney, Greensboro, North
Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Edward Washington appeals his sentence of ten months’
imprisonment after pleading guilty pursuant to a plea agreement
to the theft of Government funds, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 641 (2006). Washington challenges only the substantive
reasonableness of his sentence. We affirm.
We review the substantive reasonableness of a sentence
using the abuse-of-discretion standard. Gall v. United States,
552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007); United States v. Lynn, 592 F.3d 572, 575
(4th Cir. 2010). A sentence below the applicable Guidelines
range is presumptively reasonable. United States v. Susi, 674
F.3d 278, 289 (4th Cir. 2012). Such presumption is rebutted
only by a showing that the sentence is unreasonable when
measured against the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006) factors. United
States v. Montes-Pineda, 445 F.3d 375, 379 (4th Cir. 2006).
Washington has failed to overcome the presumption of
reasonableness. Washington received a sentence below the
applicable Guidelines range. The district court thoroughly
explained its selected sentence, citing the lengthy period
during which Washington’s crime was ongoing and the need for
deterrence. We conclude that the district court did not abuse
its discretion in selecting the sentence.
Accordingly, we affirm. We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately
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presented in the materials before this court and argument would
not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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