UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 12-4235
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
JONATHAN CLINGMAN LOGAN,
Defendant – Appellant.
No. 12-4236
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
JONATHAN CLINGMAN LOGAN,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Asheville. Martin K. Reidinger,
District Judge. (1:11-cr-00001-MR-DLH-1; 1:10-cr-00089-MR-DLH-
1)
Submitted: November 29, 2012 Decided: December 13, 2012
Before MOTZ, KING, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Henderson Hill, Executive Director, Ann L. Hester, FEDERAL
DEFENDERS OF WESTERN NORTH CAROLINA, INC., Charlotte, North
Carolina, for Appellant. Anne M. Tompkins, United States
Attorney, Melissa L. Rikard, Assistant United States Attorney,
Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
In No. 12-4235, Jonathan Logan appeals the eighteen-
month sentence imposed upon revocation of supervised release.
In No. 12-4236, he appeals the consecutive eighteen-month
sentence imposed pursuant to his guilty plea to four counts of
bank fraud. We affirm.
I
Logan’s Guidelines range for the bank fraud
convictions was 12-18 months. During argument at sentencing,
defense counsel discussed Logan’s medical problems and urged the
court to consider splitting the sentence between a period of
incarceration and one of community placement.
The district court sentenced Logan to eighteen months
on each count, to run concurrently. In imposing the sentence,
the court took into consideration the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006)
sentencing factors. The court expressed its concern that the
offenses had occurred relatively soon after Logan’s release from
prison on other charges. The court also noted that defrauding
banks was the equivalent of stealing from the banks’ customers.
Logan claims that the sentence is unreasonable
because, when imposing the sentence, the court did not mention
either his medical condition or his request that the sentence be
split between incarceration and community placement. We review
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the reasonableness of the sentence for abuse of discretion.
United States v. Diosdado-Star, 630 F.3d 359, 363 (4th Cir.
2011).
We find that the district court did not abuse its
discretion. The district court’s explanation of the selected
sentence was adequate under established circuit law. See United
States v. Carter, 564 F.3d 325, 330 (4th Cir. 2009).
II
In 2009, Logan was sentenced to forty-six months for
wire fraud, bank fraud, and aggravated identity theft. He
appealed, and the parties jointly moved to remand for
resentencing in light of Flores-Figueroa v. United States, 556
U.S. 646 (2009). Logan was resentenced to twenty-five months in
prison. He had already served approximately thirty months in
prison by the time of his resentencing. Logan was released from
incarceration and placed on supervised release. He then
admitted to violating certain terms of his release, which was
revoked.
Logan was sentenced for both the release violation and
bank fraud at the same proceeding. With respect to the release
violation, defense counsel asked the court to take into account
Logan’s over-service of his original sentence. The district
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court replied that it could not consider such over-service when
fashioning an appropriate revocation sentence.
Logan claims that his sentence is procedurally
unreasonable because the district court refused to consider
over-service of the previous sentence when selecting the
revocation sentence. “This Court reviews whether or not
sentences imposed upon revocation of supervised release are
within the prescribed statutory range and are not plainly
unreasonable.” United States v. Thompson, 595 F.3d 544, 546
(4th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted).
We conclude that Logan has not established that his
sentence is plainly unreasonable. Counsel has not identified,
and we have not located, any case law holding that over-service
of a sentence may be taken into consideration when imposing a
revocation sentence, and there is reason to be wary of allowing
over-service to “establish[] . . . a line of credit” to be used
against future violations of the law. See Miller v. Cox, 443
F.2d 1019, 1021 (4th Cir. 1971) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
III
We therefore affirm. We dispense with oral argument
because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented
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in the materials before this court and argument would not aid
the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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