UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 12-4351
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
FRANK DAMON SNYDER, a/k/a Frank Damon Snider,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Greenbelt. Deborah K. Chasanow, Chief District
Judge. (8:03-cr-00194-DKC-5)
Submitted: December 3, 2012 Decided: December 14, 2012
Before MOTZ and KING, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Elita C. Amato, LAW OFFICE OF ELITA C. AMATO, Arlington,
Virginia, for Appellant. Deborah A. Johnston, Chan Park,
Assistant United States Attorneys, Greenbelt, Maryland, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Frank Damon Snyder was convicted by a jury in 2004 of
conspiracy to distribute powder cocaine, cocaine base (crack),
and PCP, and was initially sentenced to 360 months’
imprisonment. Snyder appealed his conviction and sentence. We
affirmed his conviction, but vacated the sentence and remanded
for resentencing in light of United States v. Booker, 543 U.S.
220 (2005). On remand, the district court reimposed the 360-
month sentence. Snyder again appealed his sentence; however,
before appellate briefs were filed, he moved for a remand and
resentencing in light of Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S.
85, 108 (2007). We granted a limited remand for this purpose.
While Snyder was awaiting resentencing, the district court
reduced his sentence to 324 months on its own motion pursuant to
18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) (2006).
For reasons that are not clear from the record, Snyder
was not resentenced until April 2012, when the district court
rejected his attempt to challenge the determination of his
offense level and criminal history category, finding
relitigation of those issues barred by the mandate rule. United
States v. Bell, 5 F.3d 64, 66 (4th Cir. 1993). In recognition
of Snyder’s rehabilitative conduct while incarcerated and the
remaining disparity in sentencing for crack offenses, the
district court varied below the Guidelines range and imposed a
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sentence of 300 months. The court declined to impose a lower
sentence because of the large quantities of drugs involved in
the offense and stated that it would impose the same sentence
even if Snyder were in criminal history category III rather than
category IV.
Snyder now appeals his 300-month sentence. Snyder’s
attorney has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386
U.S. 738 (1967), asserting that, in her opinion, there are no
meritorious issues for appeal, but questioning whether the
district court unconstitutionally considered certain facts,
misapplied the Sentencing Guidelines, or failed to comply with
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006). Snyder was advised of his right to
file a pro se supplemental brief, but did not file one.
We review a sentence under a deferential abuse-of-
discretion standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51
(2007). The first step in this review requires the court to
ensure that the district court committed no significant
procedural error, such as improperly calculating the Guidelines
range, failing to consider the § 3553(a) factors, or failing to
adequately explain the sentence. United States v. Carter, 564
F.3d 325, 328 (4th Cir. 2009). If the sentence is procedurally
reasonable, we consider the substantive reasonableness of the
sentence, taking into account the totality of the circumstances.
Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. A sentence within or below a properly
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calculated Guidelines range is substantively reasonable. United
States v. Susi, 674 F.3d 278, 289 (4th Cir. 2012). We have
reviewed the record and conclude that Snyder’s sentence is both
procedurally and substantively reasonable.
In accordance with Anders, having reviewed the entire
record in this case and having found no meritorious issues for
appeal, we affirm the sentence. This court requires that
counsel inform Snyder, in writing, of his right to petition the
Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If
Snyder requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes
that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move
in this court for leave to withdraw from representation.
Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof was served on
Snyder. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before this court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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