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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 12-10042
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 8:07-cr-00220-MSS-TGW-7
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
TRICIA N. MURPHY,
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
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(December 21, 2012)
Before HULL, MARTIN and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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Tricia Murphy appeals her conviction and sentence for conspiracy to
distribute and possess with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of
methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and 841(b)(1)(A)(viii).
Murphy pled guilty pursuant to a written plea agreement, which contained a
sentence-appeal waiver that foreclosed her right to appeal her sentence, subject to
four limited exceptions. First, she argues that her conviction should be vacated
because the government breached an agreement not to prosecute her for the
offense of conviction. Second, she challenges her 120-month sentence on
substantive reasonableness grounds.
I.
Generally, “a guilty plea waives all non-jurisdictional challenges to a
conviction.” United States v. Smith, 532 F.3d 1125, 1127 (11th Cir. 2008). A
defendant who enters a guilty plea can only attack the “voluntary and knowing
nature of the plea.” United States v. De La Garza, 516 F.3d 1266, 1271 (11th Cir.
2008). Guilty pleas, if made freely, voluntarily, and with full understanding of all
rights and consequences, constitute a “waiver of a previously attained immunity.”
Burns v. United States, 323 F.2d 269, 272-73 (5th Cir. 1963).
Murphy cannot argue that the government breached an agreement not to
prosecute her for the offense to which she pled guilty. Because her guilty plea was
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knowing and voluntary, she waived all non-jurisdictional challenges to her
conviction, including any defense of immunity. Thus, we affirm her conviction.
II.
The validity of a sentence-appeal waiver is reviewed de novo. United States
v. Bushert, 997 F.2d 1343, 1352 (11th Cir. 1993). We will enforce a
sentence-appeal waiver if the defendant made the waiver knowingly and
voluntarily. Id. at 1350-51. To establish that the waiver was made knowingly and
voluntarily, “[t]he government must show that either (1) the district court
specifically questioned the defendant concerning the sentence appeal waiver
during the Rule 11 colloquy, or (2) it is manifestly clear from the record that the
defendant otherwise understood the full significance of the waiver.” Id. at 1351.
We have consistently enforced appeal waivers according to their terms when the
district court specifically questioned the defendant during the plea colloquy about
the appeal waiver, adequately explained the significance of the appeal waiver, and
confirmed that the defendant understood the full significance of the appeal waiver.
United States v. Grinard-Henry, 399 F.3d 1294, 1296 (11th Cir. 2005). An appeal
waiver “cannot be vitiated or altered by comments the court makes during
sentencing.” United States v. Bascomb, 451 F.3d 1292, 1297 (11th Cir. 2006).
Moreover, there is a strong presumption that statements made during a plea
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colloquy are true. United States v. Medlock, 12 F.3d 185, 187 (11th Cir. 1994).
Murphy knowingly and voluntarily waived her right to appeal as part of her
plea agreement. During the plea hearing, the court specifically questioned her
about the appeal waiver, and fully described its significance and exceptions. In
response, she unambiguously indicated that she understood the waiver. Thus, we
do not address Murphy’s reasonableness argument and dismiss her appeal of her
sentence.
AFFIRMED IN PART, DISMISSED IN PART.
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