FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION DEC 24 2012
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
CHERYL L. ROBERTSON, No. 11-35836
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 3:10-cv-05571-RAJ
v.
MEMORANDUM *
MICHAEL J. ASTRUE,
Commissioner of the Social Security
Administration,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Washington
Richard A. Jones, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted December 7, 2012 **
Seattle, Washington
Before: TALLMAN and WATFORD, Circuit Judges, and FITZGERALD, District
Judge.***
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
***
The Honorable Michael W. Fitzgerald, United States District Judge
for the Central District of California, sitting by designation.
Cheryl L. Robertson (“Robertson”) appeals the district court’s decision
affirming an administrative law judge’s denial of disability insurance benefits and
supplemental social security income under Titles II and XVI of the Social Security
Act. Robertson contends that the administrative law judge erred in determining
that Robertson could perform jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national
economy when the effects of her substance abuse disorders were excluded. We
have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm the district court’s
decision.
“A decision to deny benefits will only be disturbed if it is not supported by
‘substantial evidence or it is based on legal error.’” Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d
676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 750 (9th
Cir. 1989)). “Substantial evidence is defined as ‘more than a mere scintilla but less
than a preponderance.’” Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1097 (9th Cir. 1999)
(citation omitted).
There is substantial evidence in the record to support the administrative law
judge’s conclusion that Robertson suffered from impairments but they did not fit
within a listing that is presumptively disabling when excluding the effects of her
drug addiction. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1535, 416.935. The ALJ did not improperly
disregard any medical or lay opinions because the evaluations on record establish
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that Robertson responded well to treatment for her addiction except when she
self-medicated through abuse of prescription drugs. These historical treatment
records provided a specific and legitimate reason for the ALJ to accord less weight
to isolated statements indicating Robertson would have trouble working in certain
environments. See Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1040-42 (9th Cir. 2008).
Despite according them less weight, the ALJ nonetheless incorporated those
statements into her determination of Robertson’s residual functional capacity.
Finally, the ALJ provided clear and convincing reasons to support her conclusion
that Robertson was not fully credible. See id. at 1039-40.
Accordingly, the district court correctly affirmed the final decision of the
Commissioner of the Social Security Administration. In light of these findings, we
AFFIRM the district court’s decision and dismissal of the action with prejudice.
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