UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 12-4312
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
WOODROW WILSON BROWN, II,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Greenville. James C. Fox, Senior
District Judge. (4:06-cr-00026-F-1)
Submitted: December 20, 2012 Decided: December 26, 2012
Before KING and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
J. Michael McGuinness, THE MCGUINNESS LAW FIRM, Elizabethtown,
North Carolina, for Appellant. Jennifer P. May-Parker, Assistant
United States Attorney, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Woodrow Wilson Brown, II, appeals from the revocation
of his supervised release and the resulting sixty-month
sentence. Brown’s counsel has filed an Anders v. California,
386 U.S. 738 (1967) brief, stating that there are no meritorious
issues for appeal. The Government did not file a brief. Brown
filed a pro se supplemental brief. We affirm.
This court reviews the district court’s revocation of
supervised release for abuse of discretion. See United
States v. Pregent, 190 F.3d 279, 282 (4th Cir. 1999). The
district court need only find a violation of a term of
supervised release by a preponderance of the evidence. 18
U.S.C.A. § 3583(e)(3) (West Supp. 2012); see United States v.
Armstrong, 187 F.3d 392, 394 (4th Cir. 1999). We have reviewed
the record and conclude that the district court did not abuse
its discretion in determining by a preponderance of the evidence
that Brown violated the terms of his supervised release.
In his pro se supplemental brief, Brown contends that
his sixty-month sentence is exponentially higher than the
Sentencing Guidelines range applicable to the revocation. A
district court has broad discretion to impose a sentence upon
revoking a defendant’s supervised release. United States v.
Thompson, 595 F.3d 544, 547 (4th Cir. 2010). We will affirm a
sentence imposed after revocation of supervised release if it is
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within the applicable statutory maximum and is not “plainly
unreasonable.” United States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 439-40
(4th Cir. 2006). In determining whether a revocation sentence
is plainly unreasonable, we first assess the sentence for
reasonableness, “follow[ing] generally the procedural and
substantive considerations that we employ in our review of
original sentences.” Id. at 438. A supervised release
revocation sentence is procedurally reasonable if the district
court considered the Sentencing Guidelines’ Chapter 7 advisory
policy statements and the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006) factors
that it is permitted to consider in a supervised release
revocation case. See Crudup, 461 F.3d at 439. Although the
court need not explain the reasons for imposing a revocation
sentence in as much detail as when it imposes an original
sentence, “it still must provide a statement of reasons for the
sentence imposed.” Thompson, 595 F.3d at 547 (internal
quotation marks omitted). A revocation sentence is
substantively reasonable if the district court stated a proper
basis for concluding the defendant should receive the sentence
imposed, up to the statutory maximum. Crudup, 461 F.3d at 440.
Only if a sentence is found procedurally or substantively
unreasonable will we “then decide whether the sentence is
plainly unreasonable.” Id. at 439.
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After review of the record, we conclude that the
revocation sentence is not plainly unreasonable. The
sixty-month prison term does not exceed the applicable maximum
allowed by statute and was supported by the district court’s
reasoning. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3583(h) (West Supp. 2012). The
district court considered the argument of Brown’s counsel, the
Guidelines advisory range, and relevant § 3553(a) factors,
addressing on the record Brown’s complete disregard for the
court, the revocation system, and the probation office. See 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(B)-(C); U.S. Sentencing Guidelines
Manual Ch. 7, Pt. A, introductory cmt. 3(b) (2011). The
district court adequately explained its rationale for imposing
the sentence, and the reasons relied upon are proper bases for
the sentence imposed.
Accordingly, we conclude that Brown’s sentence was
reasonable, and we affirm the district court’s order revoking
supervised release and imposing the sixty-month prison sentence.
We have reviewed Brown’s remaining claims in his pro se informal
brief and conclude that they are without merit. In accordance
with Anders, we have reviewed the record in this case and have
found no meritorious issues for appeal. This court requires
that counsel inform Brown, in writing, of the right to petition
the Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If
Brown requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes
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that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move
in this court for leave to withdraw from representation.
Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof was served on
Brown. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before this court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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