FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION DEC 28 2012
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
MARITZA MARQUEZ-VILLATORO, No. 11-70103
a.k.a. Maritza Villatoro Ruiz,
Agency No. A097-315-376
Petitioner,
v. MEMORANDUM *
ERIC H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted December 19, 2012 **
Before: GOODWIN, WALLACE, and FISHER, Circuit Judges.
Maritza Marquez-Villatoro, a native and citizen of El Salvador, petitions pro
se for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order dismissing her
appeal from an immigration judge’s decision denying her application for asylum,
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture
(“CAT”). Our jurisdiction is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for
substantial evidence the agency’s factual findings, applying the new standards
governing adverse credibility determinations created by the REAL ID Act.
Shrestha v. Holder, 590 F.3d 1034, 1039-40 (9th Cir. 2010). We deny in part and
dismiss in part the petition for review.
The record does not compel the conclusion that Marquez-Villatoro
established extraordinary circumstances to excuse her untimely asylum application.
See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.4(a)(5). We lack jurisdiction to review Marquez-Villatoro’s
contention related to equitable tolling of the one-year filing requirement, because
she failed to raise it to the BIA. See Barron v. Ashcroft, 358 F.3d 674, 678 (9th
Cir. 2004). Accordingly, her asylum claim fails.
Substantial evidence supports the agency’s adverse credibility determination
based on multiple inconsistencies within Marquez-Villatoro’s testimony, and
between her testimony, application and written statement, regarding significant
aspects of her claim. See Shrestha, 590 F.3d at 1048 (adverse credibility
determination was reasonable under the REAL ID Act’s ‘totality of the
circumstances’ standard). Marquez-Villatoro’s explanations for the inconsistencies
do not compel a contrary conclusion. See Lata v. INS, 204 F.3d 1241, 1245 (9th
2 11-70103
Cir.2000). In the absence of credible testimony, Marquez-Villatoro’s withholding
of removal claim fails. See Farah v. Ashcroft, 348 F.3d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir.
2003).
Marquez-Villatoro’s CAT claim fails because it is based on the same
statements found not credible, and the record does not otherwise compel the
finding that it is more likely than not she would be tortured if returned to El
Salvador. See id. at 1156-57.
Finally, we lack jurisdiction to review Marquez-Villatoro’s contentions
related to the government’s burden of proving deportability, her fear of future harm
from gangs and police, and her cancellation of removal claim because she failed to
raise them to the agency. See Barron, 358 F.3d at 678.
We deny as moot Marquez-Villatoro’s motion to reconsider her request for a
stay of removal. See 9th Cir. R. 27-10.
PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED in part; DISMISSED in part.
3 11-70103