FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION DEC 27 2012
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
DAVID CODELL PRIDE, Jr., No. 10-56036
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 3:07-cv-01382-BEN-
JMA
v.
M. CORREA; LEVIN, Dr.; T. OCHOA, MEMORANDUM*
Warden; SANTIAGO, Dr.,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of California
Roger T. Benitez, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted December 6, 2012
Pasadena, California
Before: PREGERSON, NOONAN, and PAEZ, Circuit Judges.
Plaintiff-Appellant David Pride, a California prisoner, appeals from the
district court’s: (1) grant of Defendants-Appellees’ motion for summary judgment;
(2) denial of Pride’s motion for a continuance to conduct discovery; and (3) grant
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
of Defendants-Appellees’ motion to dismiss Pride’s claim for injunctive relief. We
have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
We hold that the district court erred by granting summary judgment in favor
of Defendants-Appellees Dr. Levin and Nurse Correa. We affirm the district
court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendants-Appellees Dr. Santiago
and Warden Ochoa. We find that the district court erred by denying Pride’s
motion to continue the hearing on Defendants-Appellees’ motion for summary
judgment pending further discovery. Finally, we hold that the district court erred
by granting Defendants-Appellees’ motion to dismiss Pride’s claim for injunctive
relief. We remand for further proceedings consistent with this disposition.
I. Defendants-Appellees’ Motion for Summary Judgment
A. Dr. Levin and Nurse Correa
We review a grant of summary judgment de novo. Citicorp Real Estate, Inc.
v. Smith, 155 F.3d 1097, 1103 (9th Cir. 1998). In light of Pride’s medical records
showing chronic and substantial pain resulting from a permanent shoulder injury
from a gunshot wound and a knee injury, Pride has established a genuine issue of
material fact on whether he has a serious medical need. Clement v. Gomez, 298
F.3d 898, 904 (9th Cir. 2002). Genuine issues of material fact also exist on
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whether Dr. Levin and Nurse Correa were deliberately indifferent to Pride’s
medical needs. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994).
There is no evidence in the record showing that the Chrono Committee’s
denial of Dr. Santiago’s requests for Pride was based on medical reasons. The
record also does not identify the names of the doctors who were on the Chrono
Committee, who purportedly denied Dr. Santiago’s requests. Viewing the
evidence in a light most favorable to Pride raises an inference that the Chrono
Committee’s decision was an inferior medical opinion compared to Dr. Santiago’s.
See e.g., Snow v. McDaniel, 681 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2012) (concluding triable issue
existed on deliberate indifference where a panel of doctors repeatedly denied the
recommendation made by plaintiff’s treating doctor and two orthopedic surgeons
that plaintiff undergo surgery); Hamilton v. Endell, 981 F.2d 1062 (9th Cir. 1992)
(holding defendants may have acted with deliberate indifference by choosing to
rely on a doctor’s “inferior” medical opinion, which was based solely on standard
medical protocol, instead of plaintiff’s treating physician and surgeon).
Moreover, it is undisputed that Nurse Correa was unqualified to be on the
Chrono Committee. But Dr. Levin sent Nurse Correa to the Chrono Committee as
his representative and Nurse Correa signed the denial on Dr. Levin’s behalf. See
Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1111-12 (9th Cir. 1986) (reversing
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summary judgment for defendants because if registered nurses provided “a number
of [medical] services which they [were] not qualified to perform,” this would
demonstrate deliberate indifference), abrogated in part on other grounds by Sandin
v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995).
Accordingly, triable issues of material fact exist on the question of deliberate
indifference: (1) whether the Chrono Committee’s decision was an inferior medical
opinion when compared to Dr. Santiago’s opinion; (2) whether Dr. Levin and
Nurse Correa acted with deliberate indifference in denying Pride’s Second Level
Review given the lack of medical reasons for the Chrono Committee’s decision;
and (3) whether Dr. Levin and Nurse Correa acted with deliberate indifference
when Nurse Correa attended the Chrono Committee for Dr. Levin.1
B. Dr. Santiago
The district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of Dr.
Santiago. At most, Dr. Santiago’s conduct amounts to negligence, not deliberate
indifference. Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 1334-35 (9th Cir. 1990) (gross
1
The government’s argument that Pride never followed up with treating
physicians is unpersuasive. Pride claims that he saw his doctor and spoke about
his appeal. He also went to additional doctors who issued the same chronos as Dr.
Santiago. Thus, whether Pride followed through with instruction to see treating
physicians is also a triable issue of material fact.
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negligence and mere medical malpractice do not constitute deliberate indifference).
C. Warden Ochoa
The district court also properly granted summary judgment in favor of
Warden Ochoa. Ochoa was neither personally involved with the alleged
constitutional violation nor was his policy sufficiently casually connected to the
violation. See Redman v. County of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1454-55 (9th Cir.
1991) (holding for a supervisor to be individually liable he must be personally
involved in the constitutional deprivation, or his policy must be sufficiently
casually connected to the constitutional violation).
II. Pride’s Motion for Continuance to Conduct Discovery
We review for abuse of discretion the district court’s denial of a motion to
continue a summary judgment hearing pending further discovery. Michelman v.
Lincoln Nat. Life Ins. Co., 685 F.3d 887, 892 (9th Cir. 2012). The district court
abused its discretion by requiring the discovery sought by Pride under Rule 56(d)
to be obtained from Defendants, rather than from a third-party. See Koon v. United
States, 518 U.S. 81, 100 (1996) (“A district court by definition abuses its discretion
when it makes an error of law.”).
Moreover, Pride demonstrated that the additional discovery would have
precluded summary judgment, thus, the district court’s denial of Pride’s motion
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was an abuse of discretion. See VISA Int’l Serv. Ass’n v. Bankcard Holders of Am.,
784 F.2d 1472, 1475 (9th Cir. 1986) (stating denial is disfavored when plaintiff
specifically identifies relevant information and points to “some basis” for its
existence). Specifically, Pride’s requested information from Nurse Garcia on his
appointments with doctors would have disproved Defendants-Appellees’ claim that
Pride did not go back to his doctors as instructed. Pride’s requested information
regarding attempts by Defendants-Appellees to fabricate documentation during
Pride’s appeal would have demonstrated personal animosity, which bears on the
issue of deliberate indifference. See Jackson v. McIntosh, 90 F.3d 330, 332 (9th
Cir. 1996) (holding “personal animosity” may establish deliberate indifference). In
his motion, Pride substantiated that Garcia would have the requested discovery
because she interviewed Pride on issues raised in his inmate appeal, was involved
in the grievance process, and filled out one of the appeal forms.
Thus, on remand, Pride must be allowed additional discovery.2
2
Pride did not seek discovery relating to Dr. Santiago. Although Pride
sought information from Garcia on Ochoa’s prison mattress policy, that discovery
would not have precluded summary judgment. Thus, summary judgment for Dr.
Santiago and Warden Ochoa is not subject to reversal because of the district
court’s erroneous ruling on Pride’s motion for a continuance.
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III. Defendants-Appellees’ Motion to Dismiss
The district court’s dismissal of Pride’s injunctive relief claim is properly
before us. See, e.g., Meehan v. County of Los Angeles, 856 F.2d 102, 105-06 (9th
Cir. 1988) (holding that when an issue is not designated in the notice of appeal, the
issue is properly before the court when both parties fully brief the issue).
The district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) is reviewed de novo. Vestron, Inc. v. Home
Box Office, Inc., 839 F.2d 1380, 1381 (9th Cir. 1988).
The district court dismissed Pride’s injunctive relief claim on the ground that
the relief Pride sought was already provided for in the pending class action Plata v.
Schwarzenegger, No. 01-1351, 2005 WL 2932253 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 2005). The
Plata stipulation states that California prison officials may “assert issue preclusion
and res judicata in other litigation seeking class or systemic relief.”
The dismissal of an individual complaint is proper when the plaintiff “is a
member in a class action seeking the same relief.” Crawford v. Bell, 599 F.2d 890,
892 (9th Cir. 1979). Here, however, Pride seeks an injunction preventing
Defendants from denying him his medical treatment and accommodations. Unlike
Plata, he does not seek systemic relief. Thus, the district court erred by dismissing
Pride’s claim for injunctive relief. See id. at 893 (holding the district court
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correctly dismissed only those portions of plaintiff’s complaint “which duplicate
the . . . allegations and prayer for relief” in a pending class action in which plaintiff
is a member); Tillis v. Lamarque, No. C 04-3763 SI, 2006 WL 644876 (N.D. Cal.
Mar. 9, 2006) (holding Plata does not bar plaintiff’s claim for injunctive relief
because plaintiff “seek[s] relief solely on his own behalf”); Burnett v. Dugan, 618
F. Supp. 2d 1232, 1235-37 (S.D. Cal. 2009).
Pride’s claim for injunctive relief is moot as to Dr. Santiago and Warden
Ochoa because summary judgment was properly granted in their favor. On
remand, the district court should address whether Dr. Levin’s transfer mooted
Pride’s claim for injunctive relief against Dr. Levin.
IV. Conclusion
The district court’s order granting summary judgment for Defendants-
Appellees is REVERSED in part and AFFIRMED in part. The district court’s
order denying Pride’s motion for discovery is REVERSED; on remand, Pride must
be allowed additional discovery. The district court’s grant of Defendants-
Appellees’ motion to dismiss Pride’s claim for injunctive relief is REVERSED.
Pride shall recover his costs on appeal.
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