UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 12-4588
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
SENA LARRANTE EASTERLING,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Florence. R. Bryan Harwell, District Judge.
(4:09-cr-01041-RBH-2)
Submitted: December 20, 2012 Decided: December 31, 2012
Before GREGORY, DUNCAN, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Michael A. Meetze, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Florence,
South Carolina, for Appellant. Jean Marie Popowski, OFFICE OF
THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Florence, South Carolina, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
In 2010, Sena Larrante Easterling pled guilty pursuant
to a plea agreement to one count of possession with intent to
distribute cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C.A.
§§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(C), 846 (West 1999 & Supp. 2012), and
was sentenced to three years probation. Easterling appeals the
district court’s judgment revoking her probation and imposing a
four-month sentence. Easterling’s counsel filed a brief
pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), stating
there are no meritorious grounds for appeal and determining that
Easterling’s sentence is not plainly unreasonable. Easterling
did not file a pro se supplemental brief despite receiving
notice of her right to do so, and the Government has declined to
file a responsive brief. Finding no error, we affirm.
An appellate court reviews a district court’s judgment
revoking probation and imposing a term of imprisonment for abuse
of discretion. United States v. Levine, 983 F.2d 785, 787 (7th
Cir. 1993). To revoke probation, a district court need only be
“reasonably satisfied” that a probation violation has occurred.
In re Morrissey, 305 F.3d 211, 218 (4th Cir. 2002).
Easterling’s probation violations provided a basis for
revocation. Easterling tested positive for marijuana use on
fifteen occasions; was involved in new criminal conduct; failed
to report for drug testing, submit monthly reports and attend
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substance abuse counseling; and left the district without
permission. Moreover, Easterling fully admitted her guilt to
all violations alleged. Consequently, we discern no error in
the district court’s decision to revoke Easterling’s probation.
Upon a finding of a probation violation, the district
court may revoke probation and resentence a defendant to any
sentence within the statutory maximum for the original offense.
18 U.S.C. § 3565(a) (2006); United States v. Schaefer, 120 F.3d
505, 507 (4th Cir. 1997). We apply the same standard of review
for probation revocation as for supervised release revocation.
United States v. Moulden, 478 F.3d 652, 656 (4th Cir. 2007).
Thus, a probation revocation sentence should be affirmed if it
is within the applicable statutory maximum and is not plainly
unreasonable. United States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 438-40
(4th Cir. 2006).
To determine whether a sentence is plainly
unreasonable, we first consider whether the sentence is
unreasonable. Id. at 438. In reviewing for reasonableness,
this court “follow[s] generally the procedural and substantive
considerations that [are] employ[ed] in [the] review of original
sentences, . . . with some necessary modifications to take into
account the unique nature of . . . revocation sentences.” Id.
at 438-39. A sentence imposed upon revocation of probation is
procedurally reasonable if the district court considered the
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Chapter Seven policy statements and the applicable 18 U.S.C.A.
§ 3553(a) (West 2000 & Supp. 2012) factors. Moulden, 478 F.3d
at 656.
A revocation sentence is substantively reasonable if
the district court stated a proper basis for concluding that the
defendant should receive the sentence imposed, up to the
statutory maximum. Crudup, 461 F.3d at 440. Ultimately, the
court has broad discretion to revoke probation and impose a
sentence up to that maximum. Moulden, 478 F.3d at 657. Only if
a sentence is found procedurally or substantively unreasonable
will we “decide whether the sentence is plainly unreasonable[.]”
Crudup, 461 F.3d at 439. With these principles in mind, we
conclude that the four-month sentence is not plainly
unreasonable.
We have examined the entire record in accordance with
our obligations under Anders and have found no meritorious
issues for appeal. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s
judgment. This court requires that counsel inform Easterling,
in writing, of the right to petition the Supreme Court of the
United States for further review. If Easterling requests that a
petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition
would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for
leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel's motion must
state that a copy thereof was served on Easterling. We dispense
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with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before this court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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