FILED
JAN 02 2013
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 11-30268
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 4:10-CR-00193-EJL
v.
MEMORANDUM *
KORIE L. CLEMENS,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Idaho
Edward J. Lodge, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted October 12, 2012 **
Portland, Oregon
Before: SILVERMAN, CLIFTON, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
Korie L. Clemens appeals his 188 month sentence for unlawful possession
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
of firearms in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).1 We affirm.
Clemens does not contend that the district court committed any procedural
error in the calculation of the guidelines sentencing range but challenges only the
substantive reasonableness of the sentence. We examine the totality of the
circumstances, applying the “abuse of discretion” standard. Gall v. United States,
552 U.S. 38, 46, 56 (2007); United States v. Ressam, 679 F.3d 1069, 1086 (9th Cir.
2012) (en banc). A sentence may be set aside on appeal as substantively
unreasonable only if we have “a definite and firm conviction that the district court
committed a clear error of judgment in the conclusion it reached upon weighing the
relevant factors.” Id. at 1087. As we noted in Ressam, id. at 1087 n. 8, we adopted
a two-part objective test in United States v. Hinkson, 585 F.3d 1247, 1260 (9th Cir.
2009) (en banc), to define in more precise terms what is required to support a
conclusion that there was an abuse of discretion by the district court. That test
“requires us first to consider whether the district court identified the correct legal
standard for decision of the issue before it. Second, the test then requires us to
determine whether the district court's findings of fact, and its application of those
findings of fact to the correct legal standard, were illogical, implausible, or without
1
The appeal waiver contained in the plea agreement does not preclude
this appeal because it was premised on the incorrect assumption that the sentence
could not exceed 10 years.
2
support in inferences that may be drawn from facts in the record.” Hinkson, 585
F.3d at 1251.
Clemens’ argument is based on the incorrect impression, shared by the
government and the district court at the times that he entered into a plea agreement
and pled guilty, that he faced a maximum sentence of ten years. But his past
criminal record meant that under the Armed Career Criminal Act he faced a longer
maximum sentence and, indeed, a statutory minimum sentence of fifteen years.
The presentence report made that clear. Thereafter Clemens declined opportunities
to rescind the plea agreement and to withdraw his guilty plea. The sentence
imposed by the district court was consistent with Clemens’ prior record and the
ACCA. The plea agreement, as it stated itself, did not bind the district court.
Clemens does not challenge the legal standard identified and applied by the
district court in sentencing him. Nor does he contend that any factual findings by
the sentencing court, including the determination that he was a career criminal
under the ACCA, were illogical, implausible, or without support in the record.
That Clemens may have hoped that his past would not catch up with him, and that
he may have been encouraged in that hope by the understandings of the prosecutor
and the magistrate judge at the time the plea agreement was entered and the change
of plea accepted, is not a reason to require the district court to disregard his actual
3
criminal history and the ACCA. The sentence imposed by the district court was
not substantively unreasonable.
AFFIRMED.
4