FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION JAN 03 2013
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
MARCUS BENJAMIN WARD, No. 12-15084
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 2:10-cv-01942-MCE-
DAD
v.
SHERMAN CHAMPEN, N.P.; et al., MEMORANDUM*
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
Morrison C. England, Jr., Chief Judge, Presiding
Submitted December 19, 2012**
Before: GOODWIN, WALLACE, and FISHER, Circuit Judges.
California state prisoner Marcus Benjamin Ward appeals pro se from the
district court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging
deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. We have jurisdiction under 28
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1056 (9th
Cir. 2004). We affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment because Ward failed
to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether defendants were
deliberately indifferent to his shoulder pain. See id. at 1057-58 (a prison official is
deliberately indifferent only if he or she knows of and disregards an excessive risk
to an inmate’s health and safety; neither negligence in diagnosing or treating a
medical need, nor a prisoner’s difference of opinion concerning the course of
treatment, amounts to deliberate indifference).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Ward’s motion for a
continuance of summary judgment because Ward failed to identify particular facts
he hoped to discover to raise a genuine dispute of material fact. See Hancock v.
Montgomery Ward Long Term Disability Trust, 787 F.2d 1302, 1306 & n.1 (9th
Cir. 1986) (setting forth standard of review and explaining that a party seeking to
continue summary judgment has the burden of showing what facts he or she hopes
to discover to raise a triable dispute).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Ward’s motion to
extend discovery because Ward failed to show good cause to amend the scheduling
order. See Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 607-08 (9th Cir.
2 12-15084
1992) (setting forth standard of review and explaining that a party seeking to
amend a scheduling order must show good cause).
We reject Ward’s contention that the district court erred in denying his
motion to certify counsel.
AFFIRMED.
3 12-15084