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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 12-10101
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 1:09-cv-03228-WCO
JONATHAN HALL,
JOHN K. JACKSON,
lllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll l Plaintiffs-Appellants,
versus
DEKALB COUNTY GOVERNMENT,
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll l lDefendant-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
________________________
(January 9, 2013)
Before CARNES, BARKETT and FAY, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Jonathan Hall and John K. Jackson, who are African American, appeal the
district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the Dekalb County
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Government (“the County”), in their pro se employment action, under Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2, 2000e-3. On
appeal, Hall and Jackson argue that the County: (1) discriminated against them
based on their race by denying them access to equipment and benefits that were
provided to white employees; (2) retaliated against them for filing discrimination
charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”); and
(3) subjected them to a racially hostile work environment. For the reasons set
forth below, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the
County.
I.
At the time when they filed the instant complaint, Hall and Jackson were
both employed by the County as heating, ventilation, and air conditioning
(“HVAC”) mechanics. During their employment, George Smith was the Assistant
Director of Building and Maintenance Operations, and David Fisher was the
Director of Facility Management.
On November 13, 2009, Hall and Jackson filed a joint complaint against the
County, alleging violations of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2 and 2000e-3.
Specifically, they challenged “employment transfers, use of company facilities and
equipment[], fringe benefits and other terms and condition[s] of employment, [and
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the County’s] acts of harassment and retaliation” based on their race. In support,
they each submitted an EEOC complaint that had been filed on August 28, 2007.
In those complaints, Hall and Jackson alleged that they had been “subjected to
harassment, different terms and conditions of employment, and denied benefits.”
In an attachment to their complaint, Hall and Jackson specifically alleged
that the County denied them the opportunity to learn and operate its Building
Automated Systems (“BAS”), while other white employees, such as Rick Ricker,
were allowed unrestricted access to the BAS. After several complaints and
grievance meetings, the County permitted Hall and Jackson to learn the BAS with
limitations and restrictions. In 2006, Jackson was permitted to perform morning
BAS “checks,” but later, the County assigned Mike Jackson, a white employee, to
perform the checks. Eventually, the County allowed Hall to operate the BAS, but
it required him to be accompanied by Ron Pennington, a white employee, “for
training purposes.” After Hall spent months repairing the BAS and “educating
Pennington,” the County removed Hall from the BAS assignment, but allowed
Pennington to “work freely on the system.”
As to employment benefits, Hall and Jackson alleged that the County did
not allow them to earn the same amount of overtime and “comp time” benefits as
Ricker. After several complaints and grievance meetings, Hall and Jackson were
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allowed to receive some comp time with limitations and restrictions. Finally, Hall
and Jackson alleged that the County retaliated against them for filing their EEOC
complaints. Specifically, the County removed Jackson from the HVAC “crash
team,” and Hall was “written up for occurrences that happened three and four
weeks prior.” Hall and Jackson alleged that the County took these retaliatory
actions after receiving their EEOC complaints.
Following discovery, the County filed an amended motion for summary
judgment, arguing that the plaintiffs had failed to establish that they had
experienced an adverse employment action, as required to set forth a prima facie
case of discrimination or retaliation under Title VII. Further, as to the race
harassment or hostile work environment claim, the allegations in the complaint did
not establish the required level of severity or pervasiveness.
In support of its motion for summary judgment, the County submitted a
number of exhibits, including depositions of Hall and Jackson, affidavits from
Smith and Fisher, work assignment logs, and records of the overtime and comp
time benefits that were received by the County’s employees from 2006 to 2008.
In their response to the County’s motion for summary judgment, Hall and
Jackson asserted that Pennington, a white mechanic, referred to Hall as a “boy,”
and when Hall reported the incident, Smith created “a hostile working
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environment” by laughing in response. Additionally, they alleged that the County
hired an attorney to “tamper with witness testimony” in an effort to discredit
Hall’s version of the incident. These actions constituted “sufficiently severe or
pervasive” harassment to alter the terms and conditions of Hall’s and Jackson’s
employment.
The magistrate judge issued a report and recommendation that the district
court grant the County’s motion for summary judgment. As to racial
discrimination, the magistrate found that, even if Hall and Jackson were denied the
opportunity to work or train on the BAS, the denial did not constitute a “materially
adverse” employment action. Although the plaintiffs believed that assigning them
to work with the BAS would be more efficient and would increase their
marketability, Title VII does not require an employer to be efficient or make its
employees marketable. Additionally, an alternative conclusion would potentially
give rise to a variety of unfair work assignment claims that should not be litigated
in federal court. In sum, their lack of access to the BAS did not constitute “a
serious and material change in the terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment.”
Further, the magistrate found that the plaintiffs failed to establish that the
denial of overtime or comp time benefits constituted a materially adverse
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employment action. Hall and Jackson acknowledged that they had consistently
earned comp time and overtime while employed with the County, and personnel
records showed that they did not receive significantly less comp time or overtime
than white employees. Thus, the occasional denial of comp time or overtime did
not constitute an adverse employment action. Because they did not experience a
materially adverse employment action, Hall and Jackson failed to establish a
prima facie case of race discrimination.
As to retaliation, the magistrate found that Jackson’s reassignment from the
crash team to the preventative maintenance team (“PM team”) did not constitute
an adverse employment action because his preventative maintenance duties were
within his responsibilities as an HVAC mechanic, and the reassignment did not
result in a reduction in pay or any changes in work hours or benefits. As to Hall’s
retaliation claims, his October 2007 counseling letter did not constitute an adverse
employment action because the letter did not result in a reduction in salary, work
hours, or responsibilities. As to Hall’s 2008 suspension, he established a
materially adverse employment action, but he failed to show a causal connection
between the 2008 suspension and his EEOC charge, which was filed a year earlier.
Finally, as to Hall’s claim of racial harassment, the magistrate found that he
failed to establish a prima facie case of a racially hostile work environment.
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Hall’s reliance on the incident, during which another employee called him a “boy,”
could not form the basis of a claim for racially hostile work environment because
it occurred in December 2009, more than a month after he filed the instant
complaint. Even considering this slur, the single incident, while improper, does
not rise to the level of severity or pervasiveness necessary to raise a Title VII
racial harassment claim. For these reasons, the magistrate recommended that the
court grant the County’s motion for summary judgment.
Hall and Jackson objected to the magistrate’s report, reasserting their prior
arguments. Additionally, as to the racial harassment claim, Hall referenced:
(1) the “Pennington ‘Boy’ incident” that occurred on December 16, 2009, (2) a
termination letter for Hall that Fisher drafted the day before the incident; and
(3) the County’s action in hiring an attorney, who created a fraudulent report
regarding Hall’s and Jackson’s Title VII claims.
After the County’s response, the district court adopted the magistrate’s
report and recommendation. The court noted that Hall and Jackson had not sought
permission to supplement their complaint to add allegations regarding the 2009
termination letter or the attorney’s investigation. Moreover, even considering the
additional allegations, Hall and Jackson failed to establish a prima facie case of
retaliation or a racially hostile work environment. Hall and Jackson repeatedly
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argued that evidence would show that they were subjected to discrimination and
retaliation, but their conclusory allegations were insufficient to establish a genuine
dispute as to any material fact. Based on these findings, the district court granted
the County’s motion for summary judgment.
II.
We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, “applying
the same legal standards as the district court.” Chapman v. AI Transport, 229 F.3d
1012, 1023 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc). “[S]ummary judgment is appropriate if the
evidence before the court shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact.” Id. (quotation omitted). “A genuine issue of material fact does not exist
unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a reasonable
jury to return a verdict in its favor.” Id. (quotation omitted). In making this
determination, we “make all reasonable inferences in favor of the” nonmoving
party. Id. (quotation omitted). Moreover, mere conclusions, unsupported factual
allegations, and statements that are based on belief, as opposed to personal
knowledge, are insufficient to overcome a summary judgment motion. Ellis v.
England, 432 F.3d 1321, 1326-27 (11th Cir. 2005). In general, pro se pleadings
are held to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by attorneys and will be
liberally construed. Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir.
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1998).
As a preliminary matter, Hall and Jackson raise issues and discuss facts on
appeal that (1) are irrelevant to their Title VII claims, or (2) were not presented to
the district court. For example, they allege numerous incidents of misconduct by
various coworkers, and they assert that the County failed to discipline “similar
non-protected employees” for “constant violations” of the County’s policies.
Further, they allege that the County discriminated against Hall by failing to
promote him or accommodate his knee injury.
We generally will not consider on appeal issues which a party failed to raise
before the district court. Access Now, Inc. v. Southwest Airlines Co., 385 F.3d
1324, 1331 (11th Cir. 2004). To properly preserve an issue for appeal, a party
must first clearly present it to the district court in such a way as to afford the
district court an opportunity to recognize and rule on it. United States v. Land,
Winston Cnty., 163 F.3d 1295, 1302 (11th Cir. 1998). To the extent that Hall and
Jackson raise issues that were not clearly presented to the district court, we do not
address those issues.
Additionally, Hall and Jackson raise arguments related to incidents that
occurred after they filed the instant Title VII action on November 13, 2009.
Specifically, they allege that on December 16, 2009, Pennington, a white
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coworker, referred to Hall by using a racial slur, when he called him “boy.”
Further, they allege that the County hired an attorney to investigate their racial
discrimination claims and that the attorney produced a fraudulent report. Finally,
they assert that, on December 15, 2009, Fisher drafted a letter terminating Hall,
which was later withdrawn, for the purpose of intimidating Hall.
At the summary judgment stage, the proper procedure for plaintiffs to assert
a new claim is to amend the complaint in accordance with Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a).
Gilmour v. Gates, McDonald & Co., 382 F.3d 1312, 1315 (11th Cir. 2004). A
plaintiff may not amend his complaint through argument in a brief opposing
summary judgment. Id.
As noted by the district court, Hall and Jackson never filed a Rule 15(a)
motion to amend their complaint to include allegations regarding the December
2009 incidents. Instead, they asserted these claims in response to the County’s
motion for summary judgment and in their objections to the magistrate’s report.
As such, these claims were not properly before the district court. Gilmour, 382
F.3d at 1315. Regardless, the claims were insufficient to survive summary
judgment. As discussed below, the district court properly determined that a single
racial slur does not establish a racially hostile work environment. Further, Hall’s
and Jackson’s claims regarding the attorney’s allegedly fraudulent investigation
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are unsupported by any evidence, and appear to be based solely on their subjective
beliefs. As such, those claims are also insufficient to survive summary judgment.
See Ellis, 432 F.3d at 1326-27. Finally, even if Fisher drafted a termination letter
in December 2009, Hall concedes that the letter was later withdrawn.
III.
Under Title VII, it is unlawful for an employer “to fail or refuse to hire or to
discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with
respect to [her] compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual’s race . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). As to any
Title VII claim, the plaintiff bears the ultimate burden of proving discriminatory
treatment by a preponderance of the evidence. Crawford v. Carroll, 529 F.3d 961,
975 (11th Cir. 2008). When a claim is supported by circumstantial evidence, the
district court analyzes the case using the burden-shifting framework set out in
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668
(1973). Under McDonnell Douglas, the plaintiff has the initial burden to establish
a prima facie case of disparate treatment by showing that: (1) he is a member of a
protected class; (2) he was subjected to adverse employment action; (3) his
employer treated similarly situated employees outside of his class more favorably;
and (4) he was qualified to do the job. McCann v. Tillman, 526 F.3d 1370, 1373
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(11th Cir.2008). If the plaintiff presents a prima facie case, the employer must
offer a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the adverse employment action.
Id. If the employer does so, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the
stated reason is a mere pretext for unlawful discrimination. Id.
To qualify as an adverse employment action, an employer’s action that falls
short of an ultimate employment decision, “must, in some substantial way, alter
the employee’s compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
deprive him or her of employment opportunities, or adversely affect his or her
status as an employee.” Crawford, 529 F.3d at 970 (alterations omitted).
Specifically, a Title VII claim requires the employee to establish that he
experienced “a serious and material change in the terms, conditions, or privileges
of employment.” Id. at 970-71. Although Title VII does not require proof of
direct economic consequences, the asserted impact cannot be speculative and must
at least have a tangible adverse effect on the plaintiff’s employment as “viewed by
a reasonable person in the circumstances,” regardless of the employee’s subjective
view. Davis v. Town of Lake Park, Fla., 245 F.3d 1232, 1239 (11th Cir. 2001).
Federal courts do not sit as “super-personnel department[s]” that reexamine
an employer’s business decisions. Id. at 1244. “Work assignment claims strike at
the very heart of an employer’s business judgment and expertise because they
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challenge an employer’s ability to allocate its assets in response to shifting and
competing market priorities.” Id. As such, applying the adverse action
requirement is “especially important” when a claim is predicated on an employee’s
disagreement with his employer’s reassignment of job tasks. Id. In the majority of
instances, an employee alleging a change in work assignments, without any
tangible harm, will be outside the protection provided by Title VII’s
anti-discrimination clause. Id. at 1244-45 (rejecting an employee’s claim that a
change in his work assignments, resulting in a “loss of prestige,” constituted a
materially adverse employment action).
To show pretext, the plaintiff must come forward with evidence sufficient to
permit a reasonable factfinder to conclude that the reasons given by the employer
were not the real reasons for the adverse employment decision. Wascura v. City of
South Miami, 257 F.3d 1238, 1243 (11th Cir. 2001). A reason is not pretext for
discrimination unless it is shown both that the reason was false and that
discrimination was the real reason. St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S.
502, 515, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 2752, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993).
As an initial matter, it is undisputed that Hall and Jackson, who are African
American, are members of a protected class, and that they are qualified for their
positions as HVAC mechanics. Thus, the only issues in determining whether they
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have established a prima facie case of race discrimination are whether they
experienced an adverse employment action and whether similarly situated
employees outside their protected class were treated more favorably. See
McCann, 526 F.3d at 1373.
The district court did not err in concluding that Hall’s and Jackson’s
allegedly limited use of the BAS was not an adverse employment action. They put
forth no evidence that any limitations of their ability to train on and use the BAS
affected the terms, conditions, or privileges of their employment as HVAC
mechanics, or that limited access to the BAS constituted a “serious and material”
change in their employment. See Crawford, 529 F.3d at 970-71. Notably, it is
undisputed that Hall and Jackson were not denied all access to the BAS. In his
deposition, Jackson admitted that, prior to transferring to the PM team, he was
permitted to use the BAS with limitations, and he testified that, during his time
working for the County, he had never experienced a reduction in pay or any
change in his work hours or benefits. As to the benefits of using the BAS, Hall
asserted that additional experience with the BAS would make him more
marketable as a mechanic. However, he also asserted that he was certified to
operate the BAS, he trained another employee on the system, and he was more
skilled at using the BAS than other employees. Further, Hall and Jackson both
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testified that working with the BAS was not required for HVAC mechanics. As to
the County’s process for assigning work, Smith stated in his affidavit that work
assignments were based on the County’s daily needs, and as such, no employee
could consistently receive the same assignment. Even if Hall’s and Jackson’s use
of the BAS was more limited than other employees, they failed to demonstrate any
tangible harm resulting from these limitations, and we will not reexamine the
County’s business decisions regarding how to allocate its resources in assigning
work. See Davis, 245 F.3d at 1244-45.
The district court also did not err in finding that Hall and Jackson failed to
establish that a limitation on their overtime and comp time benefits was an adverse
employment action, and regardless, they failed to show that similarly situated
white employees were treated more favorably. Because overtime and comp time
opportunities affected compensation, a denial of such opportunities could
constitute an adverse action. See Crawford, 529 F.3d at 970. However, it is
undisputed that Hall and Jackson received these benefits throughout their
employment with the County. To support their race discrimination claim, they
alleged that they received less overtime and comp time benefits than Ricker, a
white HVAC mechanic. In his affidavit, Smith conceded that, in 2006 and 2007,
Ricker earned more comp time than Hall and Jackson. However, even though
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Ricker earned more comp time during these two years, the evidence did not
support Hall’s and Jackson’s claim that they were treated less favorably than white
employees.
To the contrary, Smith submitted personnel records showing that, in several
instances, Jackson and Hall earned more benefits than white HVAC mechanics.
For example, in 2006, Jackson earned 57 hours of overtime and 44.75 hours of
comp time, while Ricker earned only 4.75 hours of overtime and Mike Jackson, a
white HVAC mechanic, earned only 17.75 hours of overtime and no comp time.
Further, in 2007, Hall earned 54.75 hours of comp time and Jackson earned 89.25
hours of comp time, while Pennington, a white HVAC mechanic, earned no comp
time. Additionally, in 2008, Hall earned more comp time than both Ricker and
Mike Jackson. Accordingly, the district court properly found that Hall and
Jackson consistently received overtime and comp time benefits, and the occasional
denial of additional benefits did not constitute a serious and material change in
their employment. Crawford, 529 F.3dat 970-71. Moreover, they failed to show
that white HVAC mechanics were treated more favorably with regard to these
benefits. McCann, 526 F.3d at 1373.
Finally, as to the County’s asserted legitimate, non-discriminatory reason
for Ricker’s large amount of comp time in 2007, Smith declared that Ricker earned
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more comp time due to his assistance with an installation project. Hall and
Jackson presented no evidence to suggest that the installation project was asserted
as pretext for race discrimination. See Wascura, 257 F.3d at 1243; St. Mary’s
Honor Center, 509 U.S. at 515, 113 S.Ct. at 2752. In fact, Jackson testified that he
did not know of any other employees who received as much comp time as Ricker,
which suggests that Ricker also earned more comp time than other white
employees. Accordingly, the district court properly granted summary judgment to
the County as to Hall’s and Jackson’s race discrimination claim.
IV.
To establish a claim of retaliation under Title VII, a plaintiff mUST prove
that: (1) he engaged in statutorily protected activity; (2) he suffered a materially
adverse action; and (3) there was a causal connection between the protected
activity and the adverse action. See Butler v. Ala. Dep’t of Transp., 536 F.3d
1209, 1212-13 (11th Cir. 2008); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e. In a retaliation case, a
materially adverse action is one that “might have dissuaded a reasonable worker
from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.” Burlington N. and Santa
Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68, 126 S.Ct. 2405, 2415, 165 L.Ed.2d 345
(2006). The acts must be significant and not trivial. Id.
A plaintiff may satisfy the causation element by showing that the protected
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activity and the adverse action were not “completely unrelated.” Higdon v.
Jackson, 393 F.3d 1211, 1220 (11th Cir. 2004). A plaintiff can establish causation
by showing a close temporal proximity between the statutorily protected activity
and the adverse action, “[b]ut mere temporal proximity, without more, must be
very close.” Thomas v. Cooper Lighting, Inc., 506 F.3d 1361, 1364 (11th Cir.
2007). (quotation omitted). Accordingly, when a plaintiff relies on temporal
proximity alone to show causation, “if there is a substantial delay between the
protected expression and the adverse action, the complaint of retaliation fails as a
matter of law.” Id. A three to fourth month gap is insufficiently proximate to
establish causation. Id.
Finally, under the McDonnell Douglas framework, if a plaintiff employee
makes out a prima facie case of retaliation, and the employer articulates a
legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the action, the plaintiff must then show,
by a preponderance of the evidence, that the reason is pretextual. Crawford, 529
F.3d at 976 (citation and quotation marks omitted). “The plaintiff must meet the
reason proffered [by his employer] head on and rebut it.” Crawford v. City of
Fairburn, Ga., 482 F.3d 1305, 1308 (11th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted).
The district court did not err in finding that Hall and Jackson failed to
establish a prima facie case of retaliation. Specifically, Hall’s written counseling,
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in October 2007, was not materially adverse because he failed to allege that it had
any significant impact on his employment. According to Hall, he received the
written counseling for working with Jackson, even though he had been given
permission to do so. Although Hall argued that the counseling was unjustified, he
failed to explain how it negatively impacted his employment. As such, the
counseling was not an action that might have “dissuaded a reasonable worker from
making or supporting a charge of discrimination.” See Burlington, 548 U.S. at 68,
126 S.Ct. at 2415. Further, as to Hall’s suspension, he failed to establish a causal
connection by temporal proximity because there was a substantial delay between
the EEOC complaint, in August 2007, and Hall’s suspension a year later, in
September 2008. See Thomas, 506 F.3d at 1364. Further, he failed to point to any
other evidence to suggest that his suspension was based on the EEOC complaint.
Finally, Jackson’s reassignment to the PM team in November 2007 did not
constitute an adverse employment action. In his deposition, Jackson testified that
the County’s asserted reason for the transfer was that he did not have a “warm air
license.” Further, he stated that Mike Jackson, who did not have such a license,
was also transferred to the PM team. As to his position as an HVAC mechanic,
Jackson noted that his work duties changed daily, and he never received a
reduction in pay or a change in his work hours or benefits. Accordingly, Jackson
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failed to present any evidence to suggest that his reassignment to the PM team, as
opposed to the crash team, negatively and materially impacted the conditions of
his employment. Thus, the reassignment was not an action that might have
“dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of
discrimination.” See Burlington, 548 U.S. at 68, 126 S.Ct. at 2415.
Regardless, even if the reassignment constituted a materially adverse
employment action, the County asserted that Jackson was reassigned because he
lacked a certain commercial licence, and he failed to directly rebut this legitimate,
non-discriminatory reason. See Crawford, 482 F.3d at 1308. In fact, Jackson
conceded that he was transferred along with another employee, Mike Jackson, who
also lacked the same license. He now alleges that another mechanic, who lacked a
license, was not transferred. However, he failed to raise this claim before the
district court, and in any event, unsupported factual allegations are insufficient to
survive summary judgment. See Access Now, 385 F.3d at 1331; Ellis, 432 F.3d at
1326-27. Accordingly, the district court properly granted summary judgment as to
Hall’s and Jackson’s retaliation claims.
V.
Title VII prohibits a racially hostile work environment where “a series of
separate acts . . . collectively constitute one ‘unlawful employment practice.’”
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McCann, 526 F.3d at 1378. To establish a hostile work environment claim, an
employee must show, among other things, that the harassment was sufficiently
severe or pervasive to alter the terms and conditions of employment and create a
discriminatorily abusive working environment. Miller v. Kenworth of Dothan,
Inc., 277 F.3d 1269, 1275 (11th Cir. 2002). Further, “Title VII is only implicated
in the case of a workplace that is permeated with discriminatory intimidation,
ridicule and insult, not where there is the mere utterance of an epithet.” Id. at
1276-77 (quotations and alteration omitted). In McCann, we found that a black
employee’s allegations that a white employee called her “girl” and two male black
employees “boys,” and that another coworker referred to a former black employee
as a “nigger bitch” did not amount to severe or pervasive harassment. McCann,
526 F.3d at 1378-79. We stated that “[a]lthough offensive, such instances of
racially derogatory language alone, extending over a period of more than two
years, [were] too sporadic and isolated to establish that her employers’ conduct
was so objectively severe and pervasive as to alter the terms and conditions of her
employment.” Id. at 1379.
The district court did not err in finding that Hall and Jackson failed to
establish a hostile work environment or racial harassment claim. Their complaint
failed to allege a single specific instance of racially harassing conduct in the
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workplace. Moreover, even considering Pennington’s racial slur, which was not
alleged in the complaint, Hall’s allegations reference “the mere utterance of an
epithet,” not a workplace that was permeated with discriminatory intimidation.
See Miller, 277 F.3d at 1276-77. Although Hall and Jackson allege that they were
subjected to years of daily harassment, they fail to provide any specific examples
of racial harassment to support their claim. Their conclusory, unsupported
allegations are insufficient to survive a motion for summary judgment. See Ellis,
432 F.3d at 1326-27.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary
judgment to the County.
AFFIRMED.
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