United States v. Marandola

11-3809 United States v. Marandola UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. 1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals 2 for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall 3 Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 4 10th day of January, two thousand thirteen. 5 6 PRESENT: DENNIS JACOBS, 7 Chief Judge, 8 ROSEMARY S. POOLER, 9 DENNY CHIN, 10 Circuit Judges. 11 12 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -X 13 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 14 Appellee, 15 16 -v.- 11-3809 17 18 CHRISTOPHER MARANDOLA, 19 Defendant-Appellant. 20 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -X 21 22 FOR APPELLANT: JEREMY D. SCHWARTZ, Law Office 23 of Thomas J. Eoannou, Esq., 24 Buffalo, New York. 25 26 FOR APPELLEE: MICHAEL DIGIACOMO, Assistant 27 United States Attorney, for 28 Williams J. Hochul, United 1 1 States Attorney for the Western 2 District of New York, Buffalo, 3 New York. 4 5 Appeal from a judgment of the United States District 6 Court for the Western District of New York (Arcara, J.). 7 8 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED 9 AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court be 10 AFFIRMED. 11 12 Christopher Marandola appeals from the judgment of the 13 United States District Court for the Western District of New 14 York (Arcara, J.) convicting him of violating 18 U.S.C. § 15 2252A(a)(5)(B). He appeals based on the district court’s 16 denial of his motion to suppress evidence seized during a 17 search of his property in February 2008. We assume the 18 parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the 19 procedural history, and the issues presented for review. 20 21 On appeal from a suppression ruling, we review the 22 district court’s factual findings for clear error and its 23 conclusions of law de novo. United States v. Rodriguez, 356 24 F.3d 254, 257 (2d Cir. 2004); United States v. Awadallah, 25 349 F.3d 42, 71 (2d Cir. 2003). 26 27 Marandola challenges his wife’s authority to grant 28 third-party consent to search an Apple computer located 29 within the couple’s home. Lisa Marandola contacted the 30 police and provided such consent after discovering child 31 pornography on the computer on February 25, 2008. Marandola 32 points out that he was the primary user of the computer; his 33 wife could not recall using it in the eight months prior. 34 Marandola also emphasizes that he installed password 35 protection on the computer, which, he claims, evinces his 36 intent to exclude others from using it. Nevertheless, 37 following a hearing, Magistrate Judge Kenneth Schroeder 38 recommended denying the motion on the grounds that Lisa 39 Marandola had both actual and apparent authority to consent 40 to the search. Judge Arcara adopted this recommendation. 41 42 We agree. A third party has actual authority to 43 provide consent to search if “first, the third party had 44 access to the area searched, and second, either: (a) common 45 authority over the area; or (b) a substantial interest in 46 the area; or (c) permission to gain access.” United States 47 v. Davis, 967 F.2d 84, 87 (2d Cir. 1992). Marandola argues 2 1 that the relevant “area” is the Apple computer, rather than 2 the family living room in which the computer sat. While 3 Lisa Marandola admitted to using the Apple computer 4 sparingly, she still had access to it, as did her daughter. 5 The computer was located in a common area and was purchased 6 using joint funds. Mrs. Marandola paid for internet out of 7 her own personal account. Moreover, Mrs. Marandola 8 testified that her husband never told her that she was 9 prohibited from using the computer, and that password 10 protection was not enabled on the day in question. These 11 facts provide compelling evidence that Lisa Marandola had 12 common authority over the area, a substantial interest in 13 the area, and even tacit permission to gain access to the 14 area. 15 16 In any event, it was certainly reasonable for the 17 detectives to believe that she possessed such authority. 18 See Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 109 (2006) (“[T]he 19 exception for consent extends even to entries and searches 20 with the permission of a co-occupant whom the police 21 reasonably, but erroneously, believe to possess shared 22 authority as an occupant[.]”). 23 24 For the foregoing reasons, and finding no merit in 25 Marandola’s other arguments, we hereby AFFIRM the judgment 26 of the district court. 27 28 FOR THE COURT: 29 CATHERINE O’HAGAN WOLFE, CLERK 30 3