UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
For the Fifth Circuit
No. 95-20222
Summary Calendar
EARNEST EDWARD DACUS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
VERSUS
MARVIN T. RUNYON, Postmaster General,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
For the Southern District of Texas
(CA-H-93-2309)
November 28, 1995
Before HIGGINBOTHAM, DUHÉ, and EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:1
Appellant was employed by the Postal Service and was fired
after being indicted for a drug offense. He filed a claim with the
EEOC and the Merit Systems Protection Board seeking reinstatement,
to no avail. Appellant then filed this suit alleging race
discrimination as the reason he was not reinstated. The Appellee
moved for summary judgment which the district court granted.
1
Local Rule 47.5 provides: “The publication of opinions that have
no precedential value and merely decide particular cases on the
basis of well-settled principles of law imposes needless expense on
the public and burdens on the legal profession.” Pursuant to that
Rule, the Court has determined that this opinion should not be
published.
Appellant appeals. We affirm.
In this Court, Appellant first complains that the district
court’s consideration of prior EEOC proceedings relating to his
firing and attempted reinstatement deprived him of his right to
trial de novo under Title VII. His position is wrong as a matter
of law. The United States Supreme Court decision which recognizes
the right to de novo trial in federal Title VII actions also
declared that “[p]rior administrative findings made with respect to
an employment discrimination claim may, of course, be admitted as
evidence at a federal sector trial de novo,”. Chandler v.
Roudebush, 425 U.S. 840, 863 n.39. See also Fed. R. of Evid.
803(8)(c). Cortes v. Maxus Exploration Co., 977 F.2d 195 (5th Cir.
1992). The documented proceedings were submitted in support of
Appellee’s motion for summary judgment and were properly
considered. There is no rule which makes summary judgment
procedures inapplicable in federal Title VII proceedings.
Appellant also complains that the district court deprived him
of discovery. The record shows, however, that the parties were
afforded by the pretrial order the period from October 15, 1993 to
October 14, 1994 for discovery. During this period, Appellant did
no discovery. He first sought discovery five days after the
discovery period ended. The Appellee objected and the district
court sustained the objection. We find no abuse of discretion in
that action.
AFFIRMED.
2