UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 12-4257
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
CURTIS JERMAINE MALLOY, a/k/a Quest,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. Terrence W. Boyle,
District Judge. (5:10-cr-00362-BO-1)
Submitted: December 18, 2012 Decided: January 16, 2013
Before MOTZ, WYNN, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Robert L. Cooper, COOPER, DAVIS & COOPER, Fayetteville, North
Carolina, for Appellant. Jennifer P. May-Parker, Assistant
United States Attorney, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Curtis Jermaine Malloy pled guilty without a plea
agreement to distribution of a quantity of crack cocaine, 21
U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (2006). Subsequently, he pled guilty
pursuant to a plea agreement to distribution of five grams or
more of crack cocaine and witness tampering, 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)
(2006). Malloy was sentenced to 180 months on each count, to
run concurrently.
He now appeals. His attorney has filed a brief in
accordance with Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967),
claiming that Malloy should have received a reduction in his
offense level based upon acceptance of responsibility, but
stating that there are no meritorious issues for review. Malloy
has filed a pro se brief, also claiming entitlement to the
reduction. We affirm.
We review a sentence for reasonableness, applying an
abuse-of-discretion standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S.
38, 51 (2007). This review requires consideration of both the
procedural and substantive reasonableness of the sentence. Id.;
see United States v. Lynn, 592 F.3d 572, 575 (4th Cir. 2010).
We first decide whether the district court correctly calculated
the defendant’s advisory Guidelines range, considered the 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006) factors, analyzed the arguments
presented by the parties, and sufficiently explained the
2
selected sentence. Id. at 575-76; see United States v. Carter,
564 F.3d 325, 330 (4th Cir. 2009). If the sentence is free of
significant procedural error, we then review the substantive
reasonableness of the sentence. Lynn, 592 F.3d at 575.
Malloy contends that the district court erred when it
refused to reduce his offense level based on acceptance of
responsibility. We review the denial of the adjustment for
clear error. United States v. Dugger, 485 F.3d 236, 239 (4th
Cir. 2007). To receive a reduction, the defendant must
establish, “by a preponderance of the evidence that he has
clearly recognized and affirmatively accepted personal
responsibility for his criminal conduct.” United States v.
Nale, 101 F.3d 1000, 1005 (4th Cir. 1996). Because the
sentencing court “is in a unique position to evaluate a
defendant’s acceptance of responsibility,” USSG § 3E1.1 cmt.
n.5, we afford great deference to the district court’s
determination. Dugger, 485 F.3d at 239.
Testimony at sentencing established that, while
awaiting sentencing, Malloy wrote a letter to a friend,
instructing the friend to place two guns in an abandoned house.
Malloy stated his intention to inform authorities of the guns’
location and to place responsibility for the firearms upon
another individual who at the time was awaiting sentencing on
federal charges. Malloy confessed that his purpose was to
3
shorten his own sentence by providing this false information.
Such conduct is inconsistent with that of a defendant who has
recognized and accepted personal responsibility for his crimes.
Accordingly, we conclude that the district court did not clearly
err in denying the reduction for acceptance of responsibility.
We further find that Malloy’s sentence is procedurally and
substantively reasonable.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record
in this case and have found no meritorious issues for appeal.
We therefore affirm Malloy’s convictions and sentence. The
motion to dismiss the appeal is denied. This court requires
that counsel inform Malloy, in writing, of his right to petition
the Supreme Court of the United States for further relief. If
Malloy requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes
that such a petition would be frivolous, counsel may then move
in this court for leave to withdraw from representation.
Counsel’s motion must state that a copy of the motion was served
on Malloy.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before the court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
4