Case: 12-11523 Date Filed: 01/16/2013 Page: 1 of 4
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 12-11523
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 3:11-cv-00445-JBT
BRANDY FORSYTH,
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll Defendant-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
________________________
(January 16, 2013)
Before BARKETT, JORDAN and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Brandy Forsyth appeals the magistrate judge’s order affirming the Social
Case: 12-11523 Date Filed: 01/16/2013 Page: 2 of 4
Security Administration’s denial of her applications for disability insurance
benefits and supplemental security income.1 On appeal, Forsyth argues that the
Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) improperly afforded greater weight to the
opinion of a nonexamining doctor than to her treating physicians, and erroneously
found her not disabled despite the opinion of an examining doctor that she would
be unable to work up to 30 percent of the time when her multiple sclerosis (“MS”)
was relapsing.
We review a Social Security case to “determine whether the
Commissioner’s decision is supported by substantial evidence and based on proper
legal standards.” Winschel v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 1176, 1178 (11th
Cir. 2011) (quotations omitted). “Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla and
is such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to
support a conclusion.” Id. (quotations omitted). “We may not decide the facts
anew, reweigh the evidence, or substitute our judgment for that of the
Commissioner.” Id. (quotations and alteration omitted).
The ALJ is to consider a number of factors in determining how much weight
to give to each medical opinion: (1) whether the doctor has examined the claimant;
(2) the length, nature, and extent of a treating doctor’s relationship with the
1
The parties consented to the exercise of jurisdiction by a magistrate judge.
2
Case: 12-11523 Date Filed: 01/16/2013 Page: 3 of 4
claimant; (3) the medical evidence and explanation supporting the doctor’s
opinion; (4) how consistent the doctor’s “opinion is with the record as a whole”;
and (5) the doctor’s specialization. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c), 416.927(c).
The ALJ must give a treating physician’s opinion “substantial or
considerable weight unless ‘good cause’ is shown to the contrary.” Phillips v.
Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232, 1240 (11th Cir. 2004) (quotation omitted). Good cause
exists where the: “(1) treating physician’s opinion was not bolstered by the
evidence; (2) evidence supported a contrary finding; or (3) treating physician’s
opinion was conclusory or inconsistent with the doctor’s own medical records.”
Id. at 1241.
Here, there is substantial evidence supporting the ALJ’s conclusion that
there was good cause to afford more weight to the opinion of Dr. Goren, a
nonexamining board-certified neurologist, than to the opinions of Dr. Vernacchio
and Dr. Kantor, who were Forsyth’s treating physicians. As explained by the ALJ
and the magistrate judge, Vernacchio did not conduct a proper neurological exam
of Forsyth, and Kantor relied too significantly on Forsyth’s subjective reports.
Additionally, Kantor’s own observations of Forsyth were materially inconsistent.
Goren had expertise in this field, had studied the entire record, and was subjected
to questioning by the ALJ and Forsyth’s attorney. Given all of these facts, the
3
Case: 12-11523 Date Filed: 01/16/2013 Page: 4 of 4
ALJ did not err by giving more credence to Goren’s conclusions than to those of
Vernacchio and Kantor. See Phillips, 357 F.3d at 1241.
While Vernacchio and Kantor both offered conclusory opinions that Forsyth
was disabled and unable to work, the resolution of that issue is reserved for the
Commissioner. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d), 416.927(d). “A statement by a
medical source that [a claimant is] ‘disabled’ or ‘unable to work’ does not mean
that [the Commissioner] will determine that [the claimant is] disabled.” Id.
§§ 404.1527(d)(1), 416.927(d)(1).
Forsyth also claims that the ALJ erred by rejecting Dr. Chodosh’s opinion
that Forsyth would be unable to work up to 30 percent of the time when her MS
was relapsing. Chodosh did not explain how he came to this conclusion, and his
own examination of Forsyth revealed that she had normal motor function, strength,
balance, and gait and that she was able to squat and rise. The ALJ did not err by
concluding that Chodosh’s opinion was not supported by his treatment records.
See id. §§ 404.1527(c), 416.927(c); Phillips, 357 F.3d at 1241.
Accordingly, we affirm.
AFFIRMED.
4