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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 12-10389
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket Nos. 1:11-cv-21428-PCH,
1:09-cr-20138-PCH-5
ALEXIS CARRAZANA,
Petitioner-Appellant,
versus
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent-Appellee.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
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(January 17, 2013)
Before DUBINA, Chief Judge, WILSON and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Appellant Alexis Carrazana, a federal prisoner, appeals the district court’s
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denial of his motion to vacate brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. In his
motion, Carrazana contended that his attorney provided ineffective assistance by
misinforming him that he had withdrawn from the conspiracy at a certain point,
and, therefore, the district court could not consider the actions of his
co-conspirators after that point as relevant conduct for sentencing purposes. Thus,
he argued, his guilty plea was rendered involuntary. We granted a certificate of
appealability as to “whether the district court properly denied petitioner’s § 2255
motion alleging ineffective assistance of counsel in advising Carrazana about his
decision to enter a plea of guilty.” On appeal, Carrazana argues that the district
court improperly denied his § 2255 motion without an evidentiary hearing because
he alleged facts that, if true, would have entitled him to relief.
In a proceeding under § 2255, we review the district court’s legal
conclusions de novo and factual findings for clear error. Devine v. United States,
520 F.3d 1286, 1287 (11th Cir. 2008). In an appeal brought by an unsuccessful
habeas petitioner, our review is limited to the issues specified in the certificate of
appealability. Murray v. United States, 145 F.3d 1249, 1250-51 (11th Cir. 1998).
“A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is a mixed question of law and fact
that we review de novo.” Devine, 520 F.3d at 1287. Where the movant “alleges
facts that, if true, would entitle him to relief,” the district court should hold an
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evidentiary hearing to determine the merits of his claim. Aron v. United States,
291 F.3d 708, 714-15 (11th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Nevertheless, the district court need not do so if the record affirmatively
contradicts the movant’s allegations or the claims are patently frivolous.
Id. at 715.
To prove ineffective assistance of counsel, the movant must show the
following: (1) that the attorney made errors so serious that she ceased to function
as the counsel that the Sixth Amendment guarantees; and (2) that the errors
prejudiced the defense. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.
Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984). This two-prong test applies to
challenges of guilty pleas based on ineffective assistance of counsel. Hill v.
Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58, 106 S. Ct. 366, 370, 88 L. Ed. 2d 203 (1985). A plea is
voluntary so long as counsel’s advice falls “within the range of competence
demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.” Id. at 56, 106 S. Ct. at 369 (internal
quotation marks omitted). A court’s review of an attorney’s performance is highly
deferential, and it must employ a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls
within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. Strickland,
466 U.S. at 689, 104 S. Ct. at 2065. The movant must demonstrate that counsel’s
performance was objectively unreasonable. Id. at 688, 104 S. Ct. at 2064. To
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prove prejudice in the context of a guilty plea, a defendant must show a reasonable
probability that, but for his attorney’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and
would have insisted on going to trial. Hill, 474 U.S. at 59, 106 S. Ct. at 370.
In United States v. Pease, the defendant argued that his attorney’s
ineffectiveness rendered his plea involuntary where the attorney did not conduct
an investigation into his criminal history, but rather merely asked the defendant if
he had prior convictions. 240 F.3d 938, 941 (11th Cir. 2001). The defendant did
not tell the attorney of a prior conviction, and the attorney did not independently
discover the conviction. Id. at 941 & n.3. Consequently, the attorney
miscalculated the defendant’s potential sentence under his plea agreement. See
id. at 940-41. We held that the defendant had not proven that his attorney’s
performance was deficient under the circumstances, stressing that whether an
attorney’s reliance on a client’s statement of his own criminal history is deficient
performance depends on the peculiar facts of each case. Id. at 941-42.
Our review of the record persuades us that Carrazana has not shown that his
attorney’s performance was objectively unreasonable, nor did he show a
reasonable probability that, but for his attorney’s erroneous advice, he would have
pleaded not guilty and insisted on going to trial. Accordingly, we affirm the
district court’s order denying Carrazana’s § 2255 motion.
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AFFIRMED.
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