United States v. Isaac Edwards

UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 12-4092 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff – Appellee, v. ISAAC EDWARDS, a/k/a Issac Edwards, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore. J. Frederick Motz, Senior District Judge. (1:10-cr-00497-JFM-1) Submitted: January 17, 2013 Decided: January 22, 2013 Before GREGORY, SHEDD, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. James Wyda, Federal Public Defender, Martin G. Bahl, Staff Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellant. Rod J. Rosenstein, United States Attorney, H. Brandis Marsh, Jr., Special Assistant United States Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. PER CURIAM: Isaac Edwards pled guilty to unlawfully possessing a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2006), and was sentenced under the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (2006), to 180 months’ imprisonment. On appeal, Edwards challenges the district court’s application of the ACCA. We affirm. We review a sentence for procedural and substantive reasonableness using the abuse-of-discretion standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007); United States v. Lynn, 592 F.3d 572, 575 (4th Cir. 2010). We review the legal issues involved in statutory interpretation de novo. United States v. Jenkins, 631 F.3d 680, 682 (4th Cir. 2011). Edwards first argues that the Maryland statute under which he had previously been convicted does not qualify as a crime of violence for purposes of the ACCA. We have held otherwise. See id. at 685; United States v. Wardrick, 350 F.3d 446, 455 (4th Cir. 2003). Edwards next argues that the ACCA is void for vagueness. Again, we have held otherwise. See United States v. Hudson, 673 F.3d 263, 268-69 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 207 (2012). These arguments are thus meritless. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials 2 before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process. AFFIRMED 3