UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 12-4485
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
JOSE JESUS MIRANDA-MARTINEZ,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. Catherine C. Eagles,
District Judge. (1:11-cr-00385-CCE-1)
Submitted: January 18, 2013 Decided: January 24, 2013
Before DUNCAN, DAVIS, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Anne R. Littlejohn, LAW OFFICE OF ANNE R. LITTLEJOHN,
Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellant. Ripley Rand, United
States Attorney, Joanna G. McFadden, Assistant United States
Attorney, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Jose Jesus Miranda-Martinez (“Miranda”) pled guilty to
illegally reentering the United States after having been removed
following conviction for a felony, in violation of 8 U.S.C.
§ 1326(a), (b)(1) (2006). The district court sentenced Miranda
to thirty-nine months’ imprisonment, a sentence resulting from
the court granting an upward departure under U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines Manual (“USSG”) § 4A1.3(a), p.s. (2011), from his
advisory Guidelines range of thirty to thirty-seven months’
imprisonment. On appeal, Miranda challenges this sentence,
arguing that the district court abused its discretion in
imposing it. We affirm.
As we have explained, “no matter what provides the
basis for a deviation from the Guidelines range[,] we review the
resulting sentence only for reasonableness.” United States v.
Evans, 526 F.3d 155, 164 (4th Cir. 2008). In doing so, we apply
an abuse-of-discretion standard. Gall v. United States,
552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). In assessing a sentencing court’s
decision to depart from a defendant’s Guidelines range, we
consider “whether the sentencing court acted reasonably both
with respect to its decision to impose such a sentence and with
respect to the extent of the divergence from the sentencing
range.” United States v. Hernandez-Villanueva, 473 F.3d 118,
123 (4th Cir. 2007). We will find a sentence to be unreasonable
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if the sentencing court “provides an inadequate statement of
reasons or relies on improper factors in imposing a sentence
outside the properly calculated advisory sentencing range.” Id.
Miranda argues that the district court erred in
imposing the upward departure because there is nothing “unusual”
in his criminal history warranting imposition of the departure
and because the court erroneously considered his prior arrest
record, in violation of USSG § 4A1.3(a)(3), p.s. However,
because Miranda fails to present these arguments in accordance
with Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(9)(A) (“[T]he [appellant’s]
argument . . . must contain . . . appellant’s contentions and
the reasons for them, with citations to the authorities and
parts of the record on which the appellant relies.”), we deem
them waived. Wahi v. Charleston Area Med. Ctr., Inc., 562 F.3d
599, 607 (4th Cir. 2009).
Next, we reject on review for plain error Miranda’s
challenge—premised on the district court’s consideration of
sentences for his prior misdemeanor convictions not assigned
criminal history points on account of the age and nature of the
convictions—to the court’s imposition of the upward departure.
The district court properly relied on the sentences Miranda
received for misdemeanor offenses for which he was assigned no
criminal history points in determining that an upward departure
was warranted. USSG § 4A1.3(a)(2)(A), p.s.
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Finally, Miranda challenges the reasonableness of the
district court’s decision to impose the thirty-nine-month
sentence. However, we conclude after review of the record that
the court’s sentencing decision is reasonable in light of
Miranda’s long history of recidivism, which reflects his
disrespect for the law, and the need for the sentence to protect
the public. The court’s consideration of relevant 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a) (2006) factors and articulation of its reasons for
departing from the Guidelines range support our decision to
defer to the district court’s determination as to the extent of
the departure. See United States v. Diosdado-Star, 630 F.3d
359, 366-67 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 2946 (2011)
(affirming substantive reasonableness of variance sentence six
years greater than the Guidelines range because it was based on
the district court’s examination of relevant § 3553(a) factors);
see also United States v. Angle, 598 F.3d 352, 359 (7th Cir.
2010) (“All that matters is that the sentence imposed be
reasonable in relation to the ‘package’ of reasons given by the
court.”).
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
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contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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