FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION JAN 24 2013
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
MICHAEL IZELL SEALS, No. 11-16356
Plaintiff - Appellant, DC No. 1:04 cv-03764 NJV
v.
MEMORANDUM *
RODNEY K. MITCHELL; et al.,
and
JOHN RYNHART, Officer; LYLE
THOMAS, Officer, Lake County Sheriff’s
Department,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California
Nandor J. Vadas, Magistrate Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted January 14, 2013
San Francisco, California
Before: NOONAN, TASHIMA, and GRABER, Circuit Judges.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
Michael Izell Seals claims that Lake County, California, Sheriff’s
Department Officers John Rynhart and Lyle Thomas used excessive force during
Seals’ arrest for cocaine possession. The officers maintain that they used
reasonable force to prevent Seals from swallowing a bag of cocaine. The arrest led
to Seals’ conviction, affirmed on appeal, for possession and transportation of
cocaine base. People v. Seals, 2006 WL 1613986, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006).
Seals brought action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that his right
shoulder sustained injury during the arrest. The officers’ medical expert, an
orthopaedic surgeon, reviewed Seals’ medical records and testified that Seals
suffered a congenital shoulder abnormality, documented in medical records
predating his arrest, that made him vulnerable to the condition he suffered: an
“impingement” of the shoulder. Accordingly, the physician opined that Seals’
shoulder pain was not caused by the arrest. Following a three-day trial during
which Seals was represented by appointed counsel, the jury returned a verdict in
favor of the officers. Seals’ motion for a new trial was denied.
Seals now appeals. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we
affirm.
1. The court discharged its duty under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm.,
Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993), by conducting a full gateway hearing – outside the
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jury’s presence – in which it considered the bases of the physician’s opinion and
the method by which he formed it. It is of no consequence that the physician was
unsure, at the time of his deposition, whether, in this particular lawsuit, Seals was
alleging injury arising from his arrest or from an incident that occurred two months
later while Seals was in prison. The physician’s opinion rested on a review of
Seals’ medical records – most of which predated both incidents – indicating that
Seals had complained of right shoulder pain before the arrest and that a congenital
condition made his shoulder susceptible to impingement. At the Daubert hearing,
the physician also testified that he understood the difference between the two
incidents. We conclude that the district court had ample reason to find this
testimony reliable under Daubert. See Mukhtar v. Cal. State Univ., 299 F.3d 1053,
1064 (9th Cir. 2002), amended by 319 F.3d 1073 (9th Cir. 2003).
2. The district court did not err in denying Seals’ motion for a new trial.
Whether Seals possessed cocaine on the night of his arrest was a question highly
relevant to the officers’ qualified immunity defense that their use of force was
reasonable, in part, because Seals was about to swallow a bag of narcotics.
Nothing in the district court’s order on the parties’ motions in limine prevented the
officers from introducing evidence concerning the facts and circumstances of the
arrest. Moreover, Seals opened the door to this line of questioning by denying that
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he possessed cocaine on the night of his arrest despite his admission, on direct
examination, that this arrest led to his conviction for cocaine possession and
transportation. We conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in
permitting the challenged line of questioning and denying Seals’ Rule 59 motion
for a new trial.
3. Because there was not even a single evidentiary error, Seals’
contention of cumulative error must fail.
AFFIRMED.
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