FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
January 24, 2013
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
KAREN HENNING, as Administrator
of the Estate of Derek Shockey,
Deceased,
Plaintiff–Appellant, No. 11-7021
v. (D.C. No. 6:04-CV-00044-KEW)
UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD (E.D. Okla.)
COMPANY,
Defendant–Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before KELLY, McKAY, and HOLMES, Circuit Judges.
This is an appeal from the district court’s denial of Plaintiff’s motion for a
new trial on remand from an earlier appeal. On October 27, 2002, Derek Shockey
was killed when the car he was driving collided with one of Defendant’s trains.
Mr. Shockey was fifteen years old at the time of his death. His estate sought
damages on various claims of negligence. 1 The federal jury returned a verdict for
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited,
however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th
Cir. R. 32.1.
1
Teresa Henning was Mr. Shockey’s mother. Ms. Henning passed away
(continued...)
Defendant, and the district court denied Plaintiff’s motion for a new trial under
Rule 59 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
On appeal, we held that the district court erroneously applied the more
stringent standard for judgment as a matter of law—Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure Rule 50(b)—rather than the standard for a motion for new trial under
Rule 59. Henning v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 530 F.3d 1206, 1216 (10th Cir. 2008).
We then concluded this error was not harmless because the district court could
have permissibly granted a new trial based on Plaintiff’s contention that the
district court erred by admitting evidence of Mr. Shockey’s age and lack of
permission to drive the car. Under the majority rule, which Oklahoma follows,
“the lack of a license is not relevant to whether a driver was negligent at the time
of the accident.” Id. at 1218. Although the district court did not permit
Defendant to directly offer such evidence, it did permit Defendant to offer
evidence that Mr. Shockey had just turned fifteen years old and did not have his
mother’s permission to drive the car. We held this was error: “Evidence that
Shockey was fifteen years old, combined with evidence that he was not permitted
to drive the car, is the equivalent of evidence that he did not possess a valid
driver’s license.” Id. We continued:
1
(...continued)
and her mother, Karen Henning, was substituted as the representative for the
Estate.
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The issue of Shockey’s contributory negligence was a central aspect of
the trial. Introducing Shockey’s age in conjunction with evidence that
he lacked permission to drive created the possibility that the jury relied
on this impermissible basis to conclude he was negligent. Whether this
error affected [Plaintiff’s] substantial rights, and thus warrants a new
trial, is a question we leave for the district court to consider on remand
under the proper standard. There is record evidence that Shockey was
driving over twenty miles an hour when his car collided with the train,
a speed inconsistent with stopping at the crossing. Thus, the district
court may conclude the jury did not improperly infer negligence from
impermissible evidence. Based on the posture of the case, however,
this is a determination that must be made by the district court, as it is
“uniquely able to assess the likelihood that the [evidence] was
prejudicial.”
Id. at 1218-19 (quoting Mayhue v. St. Francis Hosp. of Wichita, Inc., 969 F.2d
919, 922 (10th Cir. 1992)) (second alteration in original).
On remand, the district court cited Sanjuan v. IBP, Inc., 160 F.3d 1291
(10th Cir. 1998), for the proposition that a jury verdict will not be set aside unless
“‘the error prejudicially affects a substantial right of a party.’” Henning v. Union
Pac. R.R. Co., No. CIV-04-044-KEW, 2011 WL 782045, *2 (E.D. Okla. Feb. 28,
2011) (unpublished) (quoting Sanjuan, 160 F.3d at 1296). It further explained
that evidence erroneously admitted “‘can only be prejudicial if it can be
reasonably concluded that with or without such evidence, there would have been a
contrary result.’” Id. (quoting Sanjuan, 160 F.3d at 1296) (internal quotation
marks omitted). Under these standards, the district court held “that the resulting
jury verdict would not have been different had the evidence of Shockey’s age and
the lack of permission to use the vehicle at the time of the collision not been
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presented to the jury.” Id. In reaching this conclusion, the district court
identified “other overwhelmingly strong evidence at trial” that supported the
jury’s verdict. Id. The district court therefore denied Plaintiff’s motion for a new
trial. Plaintiff then filed this appeal.
We review the district court’s denial of a motion for a new trial for abuse
of discretion. Sanjuan, 160 F.3d at 1296. We “will reverse the denial of a motion
for a new trial only if the trial court made a clear error of judgment or exceeded
the bounds of permissible choice in the circumstances.” Minshall v. McGraw Hill
Broad. Co., 323 F.3d 1273, 1283 (10th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
Although Plaintiff agrees this is the appropriate standard of review, she
urges us to review the district court’s denial of her motion for a new trial de novo
because of the circumstances surrounding the issuance of the district court’s
order. Specifically, Plaintiff argues there is no indication in the district court’s
order that its decision was based on anything other than an “examination of a
written record.” (Appellant’s Opening Br. at 32.) Accordingly, Plaintiff
maintains “there is no reason the district court’s findings should enjoy particular
deference.” (Id.) In support of this position, Plaintiff relies primarily on our
decision in United States v. Chanthadara, 230 F.3d 1237 (10th Cir. 2000), in
which we reviewed de novo the district court’s decision to excuse a juror for
cause based solely on the juror’s written responses to a juror questionnaire. We
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noted that while we ordinarily “review the district court’s decisions concerning
the seating or excusing of jurors for abuse of discretion,” our heightened
deference “is based almost exclusively on the trial judge’s unique ability to
observe demeanor and assess credibility.” Id. at 1269. Because the district
court’s decision was based solely on the written response to the questionnaire and
it, therefore, had no opportunity to observe the juror’s demeanor and credibility,
we concluded it was appropriate to review the district court’s decision de novo.
Id. at 1270.
Unlike the district court in Chanthadara, here, the district court was in a
unique position to assess the prejudicial nature, if any, of the erroneously
admitted evidence; the district court presided over the four-day jury trial and
heard the testimony of, and observed, the approximately thirty witnesses who
testified. Indeed, this was precisely the reason we remanded for the district court
to determine whether the erroneously admitted evidence prejudicially affected
Plaintiff’s substantial rights. Henning, 530 F.3d at 1218-19 (“Based on the
posture of the case, however, this is a determination that must be made by the
district court, as it is uniquely able to assess the likelihood that the [evidence]
was prejudicial.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original)).
There is, therefore, no reason to depart from our well-established precedent that
we review a district court’s denial of a motion for a new trial for abuse of
discretion. We decline to impose a formalistic requirement that, for a district
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court to be entitled to this level of deference, it must explicitly state its decision
is based on, or informed by, its experience and observations during trial.
We now turn to the merits of Plaintiff’s appeal. Plaintiff first argues that
even though the district court stated the proper standard for evaluating her motion
for a new trial in its most recent order, it nevertheless again applied the incorrect,
and more stringent, Rule 50 standard. Specifically, Plaintiff argues the fact the
district court only cited evidence favoring Defendant demonstrates that the
district court’s order is based on an evaluation of the evidence viewed in the light
most favorable to Defendant, as is required under Rule 50, and was applied in the
initial order denying Plaintiff’s motion for a new trial. However, Plaintiff is
unable to identify any portion of the district court’s order which indicates it
evaluated the evidence in this manner or applied a different standard than what it
stated. To the contrary, the district court’s order mirrored our opinion in its
discussion of both the scope and purpose of remand and the appropriate standard
to be applied to a motion for a new trial, indicating it fully understood our
mandate. Furthermore, the district court’s order makes clear it followed our
mandate—after evaluating the testimony and evidence it had observed during
trial, the district court concluded there was “overwhelmingly strong evidence” on
seven issues that supported the jury’s determination Defendant was not negligent.
Short of the district court explicitly evaluating each piece of evidence and
justifying its decision on the weight to assign each piece, it appears Plaintiff
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would not be satisfied the district court had properly applied the standard for a
Rule 59 motion for a new trial. Again, we decline to impose such a formalistic
requirement on the district courts.
Plaintiff alternatively argues that even if the district court applied the
appropriate standard, its conclusion—that the other evidence was sufficiently
strong that it could not be reasonably concluded the jury verdict would have been
different had evidence of Mr. Shockey’s age and lack of permission to drive not
been admitted—was clearly erroneous. In support of this argument, Plaintiff
details the testimony and evidence she introduced that contradicted what the
district court described as “overwhelmingly strong evidence” favoring Defendant.
She argues that in light of this conflicting evidence and the district court’s failure
to address and reconcile the conflict, the denial of her motion for a new trial was
clearly erroneous.
“We give the trial judge wide latitude with respect to [Plaintiff’s] motion
for a new trial because [s]he was uniquely able to assess the likelihood that the
extraneous information was prejudicial.” Mayhue, 969 F.2d at 922. Indeed,
“[t]he trial judge presided over the proceedings from start to finish; thus, [s]he
knows better than we how the [evidence of Mr. Shockey’s age] might have
diverted the jurors’ attention away from the theories presented at trial and the
instructions that were to govern their deliberations.” Id. This is precisely the
reason we remanded for the district court to determine whether a new trial was
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warranted.
After carefully reviewing the record and the parties’ various filings on
appeal, we see no error in the district court’s decision. Indeed, we previously
noted there was evidence in the record from which “the district court may
conclude the jury did not improperly infer negligence from impermissible
evidence.” Henning, 530 F.3d at 1218. The district court reached this very
conclusion, but only after reviewing all of the evidence in the record, taking into
consideration its experiences and observations during trial, and identifying seven
issues on which there was “overwhelmingly persuasive” evidence favoring
Defendant. Henning, 2011 WL 782045 at *2. Although Plaintiff offered
conflicting evidence during trial, on which she focuses our attention, that
evidence is not so clearly on point and irrefutable as to render the district court’s
conclusion beyond the “bounds of permissible choice.” Minshall, 323 F.3d at
1283.
Furthermore, the fact that the jury unanimously found Defendant not liable
and therefore never reached the issue of Mr. Shockey’s contributory negligence
supports the district court’s conclusion that the verdict would not have been
different had the evidence of Mr. Shockey’s age and his lack of permission to
drive not been presented to the jury. Because the jury instructions made clear the
jury could find Defendant negligent even if it also found Mr. Shockey negligent,
the verdict form set out the jury’s task in discrete steps, and the jury found
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Defendant not to be negligent, we “assume the jury [did so] independent of its
consideration of any contributory negligence on the part of [Mr. Shockey].”
Wofford v. Bonilla, 326 F. App’x 475, 478 (10th Cir. 2009). Thus, concern that
the erroneous admission of evidence of Mr. Shockey’s age and lack of permission
to drive—which related to the issue of Mr. Shockey’s contributory negligence and
not Defendant’s negligence—prejudiced Plaintiff’s substantial rights is
significantly diminished, if not eliminated. See, e.g., Allen v. Minnstar, Inc., 97
F.3d 1365, 1369 (10th Cir. 1996) (explaining any error in admitting evidence of
misuse was harmless in part because “the jury responded ‘NO’ to the first
question on the verdict form, which asked whether the boat was unreasonably
dangerous. This negative response to the first question ended the deliberations,
and the jury never reached the issue of whether plaintiff had misused the boat”);
Osteguin v. S. Pac. Transp. Co., 144 F.3d 1293, 1295 (10th Cir. 1998) (“The jury
specifically found that the railroad was not negligent; thus, even if one were to
assume that the district court erred in instructing the jury as to contributory
negligence, . . . [the plaintiff] has suffered no prejudice . . . .”). Accordingly, the
district court did not abuse its discretion when it held that its earlier error did not
“prejudicially affect[] a substantial right of [Plaintiff].” Sanjuan, 160 F.3d at
1296.
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For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s denial of
Plaintiff’s motion for a new trial.
Entered for the Court
Monroe G. McKay
Circuit Judge
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