NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 12-3183
___________
ALEX DANIEL RUIZ-DE LA CRUZ,
Petitioner
v.
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES,
Respondent
____________________________________
Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
(Agency No. A088-742-107)
Immigration Judge: Honorable Henry S. Dogin
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
January 23, 2013
Before: RENDELL, ALDISERT and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: January 28, 2013)
___________
OPINION OF THE COURT
___________
PER CURIAM
Petitioner, Alex Daniel Ruiz-De La Cruz, seeks review of the Board of
Immigration Appeals’ (BIA or Board) order denying his untimely motion to reopen
removal proceedings. For the reasons that follow, we will deny the petition for review.
I.
Ruiz is a native and citizen of Guatemala who was admitted to the United States in
1995 as a non-immigrant visitor and overstayed his visa. In 2008, the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) charged him with removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(B) for
remaining in the United States longer than permitted. Ruiz, represented by counsel,
conceded removability as charged, but sought cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1229b(b). Following a hearing, the Immigration Judge (IJ) denied Ruiz’s application
for cancellation on the ground that he had failed to show that his removal would result in
“exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” to a qualifying relative under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1229b(b)(1)(D). The BIA agreed with the IJ, and, by order entered December 4, 2009,
dismissed the appeal. Ruiz subsequently petitioned this Court for review of the BIA’s
order, but we dismissed his petition for lack of jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(a)(2)(B). Ruiz-De La Cruz v. Att’y Gen., 423 F. App’x 219 (3d Cir. 2011) (non-
precedential) (explaining that this Court lacks authority to review such discretionary
agency decisions).
In December 2011, Ruiz filed a motion to reopen with the BIA. Ruiz claimed that
the attorney who represented him during his removal proceedings had provided
ineffective assistance by failing to adequately investigate his three year-old citizen son’s
medical needs in order to establish the requisite “exceptional and extremely unusual
hardship” for cancellation of removal. Ruiz recognized that his motion to reopen was
filed out of time, see 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i), but argued that the 90-day limitation
2
period should be equitably tolled because he “was unaware of the possibility of filing a
motion to reopen until [he] consulted another attorney.” (AR000017.) The BIA denied
the motion on the ground that, even if it were timely, Ruiz would not be entitled to relief
because he failed to establish that his attorney rendered ineffective assistance.1 This
petition for review followed.
II.
We have jurisdiction to review the BIA’s denial of Ruiz’s motion to reopen
pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a). We review the BIA’s decision denying a motion to
reopen for an abuse of discretion, and will not disturb the decision unless it is “arbitrary,
irrational, or contrary to law.” Guo v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 556, 562 (3d Cir. 2004)
(citation omitted). An alien generally must file a motion to reopen with the BIA “no later
than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered.” 8
C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). An alien seeking to equitably toll the limitation period based on
ineffective assistance of counsel must demonstrate that he has exercised due diligence in
raising the claim, and that prejudice resulted from counsel’s alleged errors. Mahmood v.
Gonzales, 427 F.3d 248, 251-52 (3d Cir. 2005); Fadiga v. Att’y Gen., 488 F.3d 142, 159
(3d Cir. 2007).
1
The BIA declined to exercise its authority to reopen the proceedings sua sponte. Ruiz
does not challenge this ruling in his petition for review. Therefore, it has been waived.
See United States v. Pelullo, 399 F.3d 197, 222 (3d Cir. 2005) (“It is well settled that an
appellant’s failure to identify or argue an issue in his opening brief constitutes waiver of
that issue on appeal.”). In any event, we lack jurisdiction to review it. See Calle-Vujiles
v. Ashcroft, 320 F.3d 472, 475 (3d Cir. 2003).
3
We will deny the petition for review. In his motion to reopen, Ruiz argued that the
filing deadline should be equitably tolled because, “[d]ue to ineffective assistance of
counsel, [he] was unaware of the possibility of filing a motion to reopen . . . until [he]
consulted another attorney” in 2011. (AR000017.) Importantly, however, Ruiz did not
allege that he was prevented in some way from discovering former counsel’s alleged
errors, and there is no indication that those errors could not have been discovered well
before 2011 had he pursued his case diligently. See Rashid v. Mukasey, 533 F.3d 127,
132 (2d Cir. 2008) (explaining that due diligence must be exercised over the entire period
for which tolling is desired, including the period during which the ineffectiveness should
have been discovered). Furthermore, to the extent that Ruiz argued that counsel’s alleged
ineffectiveness in failing to inquire into his son’s medical needs also provided a basis for
tolling, we fail to see how the attorney’s alleged misconduct in this regard prevented Ruiz
from filing a motion on time.
Because Ruiz has failed to show that the BIA abused its discretion in determining
that he was not entitled to equitable tolling of the limitation period for his motion to
reopen, we need not reach his other arguments on appeal.
III.
For these reasons, we will deny the petition for review.
4