FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION JAN 30 2013
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
GUOPING ZHANG No. 08-74518
Petitioner, Agency No. A097-881-443
v.
ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., U.S. Attorney MEMORANDUM *
General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted January 11, 2013 **
Pasadena, California
Before: McKEOWN and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges, and BELL,*** District Judge.
Petitioner Guoping Zhang, a native and citizen of the People’s Republic of
China, petitions for review of a decision by the Board of Immigration Appeals
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36–3.
**
The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
***
The Honorable Robert Holmes Bell, United States District Judge for the
Western District of Michigan, sitting by designation.
(BIA) affirming the Immigration Judge’s (IJ) denial of asylum, withholding of
removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). This petition is
denied.
Petitioner did not raise arguments before the BIA regarding the IJ’s findings
on withholding of removal or protection under the CAT. Therefore, Petitioner did
not exhaust his administrative remedies in regard to those claims, and we lack
jurisdiction to review them. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d). See also Barron v. Ashcroft, 358
F.3d 674, 677 (9th Cir. 2004).
We do have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1) to review the denial of
asylum. We review BIA decisions on eligibility for asylum under the substantial
evidence standard. Singh v. INS, 134 F.3d 962, 966 (9th Cir. 1998). Under this
standard, “a petitioner contending that the Board’s findings are erroneous must
establish that the evidence not only supports that conclusion, but compels it.”
Ghaly v. INS, 58 F.3d 1425, 1431 (9th Cir. 1995).
The applicant for asylum bears the burden of establishing that he is a refugee
entitled to asylum within the meaning of section 101(a)(42) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act (INA),1 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42). 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i). The
applicant must demonstrate that he “is unable or unwilling to return to . . . [the
1
Because Petitioner filed his initial application for asylum in October 2004,
The REAL ID Act of 2005 is inapplicable to this petition.
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country of his nationality] because of persecution or a well-founded fear of
persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular
social group, or political opinion.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A).
To show past persecution, a petitioner must show, inter alia, an incident that
rises to the level of persecution. Chand v. INS, 222 F.3d 1066, 1073 (9th Cir.
2000). The IJ found that Petitioner’s single instance of detention in China on
account of his whistleblowing did not rise to the level of persecution, and that
Petitioner failed to demonstrate a connection between his past mistreatment and a
protected ground under the INA. The BIA affirmed these findings. We agree. A
single instance of detention and beating, which results in non-serious injuries, does
not constitute persecution. See Gu v. Gonzales, 454 F.3d 1014, 1020 (9th Cir.
2006); Prasad v. INS, 47 F.3d 336, 339 (9th Cir. 1995). Petitioner’s testimony was
vague as to the extent of the injuries he suffered. Such undetailed testimony, in the
absence of corroborating evidence that the beating resulted in serious injuries, does
not compel a finding that Petitioner suffered past persecution.
In the absence of past persecution, an applicant must show a well-founded
fear of future persecution that is both subjectively genuine and objectively
reasonable. Duarte de Guinac v. INS, 179 F.3d 1156, 1159 (9th Cir. 1999). A fear
is objectively reasonable if there is “a ‘reasonable possibility’ that [the applicant]
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will be persecuted” on account of a statutorily-protected ground. INS v. Elias-
Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 489–90 (1992) (quoting INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480
U.S. 421, 440 (1987)). The IJ found that Petitioner’s fear of persecution on
account of his Christianity was not objectively reasonable. The BIA affirmed this
finding and additionally concluded that Petitioner lacked an objectively reasonable
fear of persecution based on his past whistleblowing, an issue the IJ did not
explicitly reach. We agree. The evidence Petitioner presented on his behalf was
minimal and nonspecific. Moreover, the record contains substantial evidence
undermining Petitioner’s claim that he would be persecuted. In total, the evidence
does not compel a finding that there is a reasonable possibility Petitioner would be
persecuted upon his return to China, either on account of his Christianity or his
past whistleblowing.
PETITION DENIED.
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