UNITED STATES, Appellee
v.
Andrea L. REEVES, Staff Sergeant
U.S. Air Force, Appellant
No. 04-0145
Crim. App. No. 34730
United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces
Argued October 20, 2004
Decided May 17, 2005
BAKER, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which GIERKE,
C.J., and CRAWFORD, EFFRON, and ERDMANN, JJ., joined. EFFRON,
J., filed a separate concurring opinion.
Counsel
For Appellant: Frank J. Spinner, Esq. (argued); Major Terry L.
McElyea, Major Andrew S. Williams, and Captain Antony B.
Kolenc (on brief).
For Appellee: Major Michelle M. Lindo (argued); Colonel LeEllen
Coacher, Lieutenant Colonel Robert V. Combs, and Major James
K. Floyd (on brief); Lieutenant Colonel Gary F. Spencer.
Military Judge: Steven. A. Hatfield
THIS OPINION IS SUBJECT TO EDITORIAL CORRECTION BEFORE FINAL PUBLICATION
United States v. Reeves, No. 04-0145/AF
Judge BAKER delivered the opinion of the Court.
Appellant was tried before a general court-martial composed
of officer and enlisted members. In accordance with her pleas,
she was convicted of disobeying a general regulation (three
specifications) in violation of Article 92, Uniform Code of
Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. § 892 (2000). Appellant
contested the remaining allegations but was ultimately convicted
of two additional orders violations and obstruction of justice
in violation of Articles 92 and 134, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. §§ 892, 934
(2000), respectively. The adjudged sentence included a
dishonorable discharge, confinement for six years, forfeiture of
all pay and allowances, and reduction to grade E-1. The
convening authority approved the sentence as adjudged except for
the term of confinement, which was reduced to three years.
The specified issue before the Court requires us to resolve
whether as a matter of law, and under the circumstances of this
case, an accused may be convicted of obstruction of justice by
telling another not to speak to investigators and to seek
counsel. The granted issue questions whether, in any event, the
evidence is legally sufficient to sustain a conviction for
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obstruction of justice.1 We answer the specified question in the
affirmative and further hold that on this record, the evidence
is legally sufficient.
FACTS
Appellant was a technical school instructor at Lackland Air
Force Base (AFB).2 In June and July of 2000, she engaged in
consensual sexual activity with four trainees in violation of
applicable lawful general regulations. One of these trainees
was Airman Basic (AB) F. AB F completed technical school
training in July 2000 and then reported to her first duty
station at Minot AFB. On August 15, 2000, Appellant was
notified that the Office of Special Investigations (OSI) had
1
SPECIFIED ISSUE
WHETHER, AS A MATTER OF LAW, APPELLANT MAY BE FOUND GUILTY OF
OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE WHERE: (1) APPELLANT HAD BEEN ENGAGED IN
AN IMPROPER RELATIONSHIP WITH A JUNIOR ENLISTED MEMBER; (2)
APPELLANT ADVISED THE JUNIOR ENLISTED MEMBER NOT TO SPEAK WITH
LAW ENFORCEMENT PERSONNEL; (3) ALTHOUGH NOT ALLEGED IN THE
SPECIFICATION, APPELLANT ALSO ADVISED THE JUNIOR ENLISTED MEMBER
TO CONSULT WITH MILITARY DEFENSE COUNSEL; AND (4) ALTHOUGH NOT
ALLEGED IN THE SPECIFICATION, APPELLANT SENT THE JUNIOR ENLISTED
MEMBER $200 TO ASSIST HER WITH FINANCIAL DIFFICULTIES?
GRANTED ISSUE
WHETHER THE EVIDENCE WAS LEGALLY SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT A
CONVICTION FOR OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE WHERE: (1) APPELLANT HAD
BEEN ENGAGED IN AN IMPROPER RELATIONSHIP WITH A JUNIOR ENLISTED
MEMBER; (2) APPELLANT ADVISED THE JUNIOR ENLISTED MEMBER NOT TO
SPEAK WITH LAW ENFORCEMENT PERSONNEL; (3) ALTHOUGH NOT ALLEGED IN
THE SPECIFICATION, APPELLANT ALSO ADVISED THE JUNIOR ENLISTED
MEMBER TO CONSULT WITH MILITARY DEFENSE COUNSEL; AND (4) ALTHOUGH
NOT ALLEGED IN THE SPECIFICATION, APPELLANT SENT THE JUNIOR
ENLISTED MEMBER $200 TO ASSIST HER WITH FINANCIAL DIFFICULTIES?
2
Between the time of the offenses and trial, the Appellant changed her last
name from Dunn to Reeves.
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identified her as a target of an investigation into
unprofessional relationships at the Lackland technical school.
Also on August 15, 2000, OSI investigators conducted their first
interview with AB F. Appellant subsequently contacted AB F by
telephone inquiring whether AB F had talked to OSI and telling
her “not to talk to OSI, not to tell them anything.” Appellant
also told AB F that she needed to contact the area defense
counsel. AB F replied that she had spoken with OSI, but that
she “hadn’t told them anything.” Thereafter, AB F testified
that Appellant called her “[p]retty frequently” at home and “a
few times at work.” According to AB F, the substance of these
phone calls was similar to the first August call, again advising
AB F not to talk to OSI and inquiring whether she had gone to
see the area defense counsel.
During one of these conversations, AB F mentioned that she
was experiencing financial difficulty. Shortly thereafter, the
Appellant deposited $200 in AB F’s bank account. Although AB F
considered this deposit a gift, a few weeks later Appellant
asked that AB F return the money. After initially saying that
she would do so, AB F finally informed Appellant that she would
not make repayment and directed Appellant not to contact her
further.
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OBSTRUCTION AS A MATTER OF LAW
We begin with consideration of the specified question,
whether as a matter of law, Appellant may be convicted of
obstruction of justice under the circumstances of this case.
The elements of obstruction of justice are:
(1) That the accused wrongfully did a certain act;
(2) That the accused did so in the case of a certain
person against whom the accused had reason to believe
there were or would be criminal proceedings pending;
(3) That the act was done with the intent to
influence, impede, or otherwise obstruct the due
administration of justice; and
(4) That, under the circumstances, the conduct of the
accused was to the prejudice of good order and
discipline in the armed forces or was of a nature to
bring discredit upon the armed forces.
Manual for Courts-Martial, United States (2002 ed.), pt. IV,
para. 96.b.
The crux of Appellant’s argument is that an accused who
advises a witness to invoke her constitutional privilege against
self-incrimination or to exercise her right to seek counsel by
definition is not engaged in a wrongful act, therefore failing
to satisfy the first element of the offense, and thus cannot be
convicted of obstruction.
The constitutional privilege against self-incrimination and
the right to counsel are rights bestowed every witness. United
States v. Cole, 329 F.2d 437, 439-40 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
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377 U.S. 954 (1964). Thus, we generally agree with Appellant’s
assertion that the administration of justice is not criminally
obstructed by a witness exercising these rights. It is
Appellant’s conduct as an advisor and not that of a putative
witness that is at issue in this case, however. Without more, a
person’s advice to another to invoke certain rights, where the
advice given is honest and uncorrupt, should not as a matter of
law sustain a conviction. However, that does not mean, as a
matter of law, that reference to advice as “constitutional,”
precludes consideration as to whether that advice was indeed
constitutional in nature, uncorrupt, and thus protected conduct
for the purposes of obstruction under Article 134.
Whether an accused’s conduct was wrongful will turn on
contextual factors presenting questions of fact for the members,
including, among other things, the actor’s tone and manner of
delivery. As the court in Cole stated, “[i]t is the witness’
privilege which our inspired Constitution protects and which any
person in our courts may invoke . . . not someone else’s
privilege to capture by force or threat or bribe.” Id. at 440.
In those instances where the advice given is honest, uncorrupt,
and disinterested, we agree that giving such advice is not
wrongful. Id. But one who advises, with a corrupt motive, that
a witness exercise a constitutional right or privilege may
obstruct the administration of justice. Id. at 443. “The
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lawful behavior of the person invoking the [right] cannot be
used to protect the criminal behavior of the inducer.” United
States v. Cioffi, 493 F.2d 1111, 1119 (2d Cir. 1974). This is
the analytic approach taken by a majority of the federal
circuits. See, e.g., United States v. Peterson, 385 F.3d 127,
142 (2d Cir. 2004); United States v. Cintolo, 818 F.2d 980, 992-
93 (1st Cir. 1987); United States v. McComb, 744 F.2d 555, 563
(7th Cir. 1984); United States v. Baker, 611 F.2d 964, 967-68
(4th Cir. 1979). But see United States v. Farrell, 126 F.3d
484, 487-89 (3d Cir. 1997) (reversing obstruction conviction
where appellant had, without coercion, attempted to persuade
coconspirator to refrain from volunteering information to
investigators). We agree with the reasoning of the majority of
the federal circuits and adopt it for the purposes of reviewing
the application of Article 134 to the facts of Appellant’s case.
Therefore, we answer the specified question in the affirmative.
In doing so, however, we need not define the limits of this
constitutional framework, nor do we need to consider the
relationship between this Court’s decisions and that of the
service court in United States v. Asfeld, 30 M.J. 917 (A. Ct.
Crim. App. 1990) (finding that accused’s request that the victim
of his indecent language offense not report him was not wrongful
because victim has no duty to report such an offense). The
facts of this case indicate that Appellant was not, among other
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things, a disinterested party. She was aware of the
investigation into her conduct and that AB F was a potential
witness in that investigation. Moreover, for the reasons stated
below, the nature and manner of her “advice” takes Appellant’s
statements to AB F outside the zone of constitutional
protection.
LEGAL SUFFICIENCY
Appellant contends that the evidence is legally
insufficient to sustain her conviction for obstruction under
Article 134. This claim requires us to determine “whether,
considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, a reasonable factfinder could have found all the
essential elements [of the crime] beyond a reasonable doubt.”
United States v. Turner, 25 M.J. 324, 324 (C.M.A. 1987). We are
bound to draw every reasonable inference from the evidence of
record in favor of the prosecution in resolving questions of
legal sufficiency. United States v. Rogers, 54 M.J. 244, 246
(C.A.A.F. 2000); United States v. Blocker, 32 M.J. 281, 284
(C.M.A. 1991).
Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence as it
pertains to the wrongfulness of her acts and her intent.
Specifically, she maintains that “[i]t should not be ‘wrongful,’
as a matter of law, for an accused to ask a witness to do what
the witness can lawfully do anyway.” And, according to
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Appellant, “[t]he evidence was legally insufficient to infer
that [Appellant] had a ‘sinister purpose’ or subjective intent
to impede the due administration of justice.”
We have addressed Appellant’s first contention in our
discussion above. A wrongful act is one done without legal
justification or with some sinister purpose. United States v.
Barner, 56 M.J. 131, 136 (C.A.A.F. 2001). Advising a witness to
exercise certain constitutional rights and privileges may be
wrongful if accompanied by a corrupt motive to influence,
impede, or otherwise obstruct the due administration of justice.
With respect to Appellant’s second contention, the record
indicates that shortly after being apprised that she was under
investigation for her conduct with AB F, Appellant began calling
AB F at her workplace and at her home. According to AB F,
Appellant’s statements during these calls were to the effect
that, “[AB F] needed to go see the area defense [counsel], and
not to talk to OSI, not to tell them anything.” Furthermore, AB
F characterized these calls as frequent.
Appellant argues that her conduct in this respect “was no
different than the advice a first sergeant, supervisor or friend
would give to a military member under investigation.” The
court-martial members could rationally have concluded otherwise,
however. Even if one accepts for the sake of argument that
telling a witness not to speak to investigators is tantamount to
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advising a witness of his or her right to silence, the tone,
frequency, and background of Appellant’s calls raised legitimate
questions of fact for the members regarding the wrongfulness and
intent of the calls. In contrast to Appellant’s hypothetical
first sergeant, who provides advice to a servicemember under
investigation, Appellant was not a disinterested party.
Appellant was free to argue to the members that she was
advancing the welfare of a subordinate. We conclude, however,
that a rational trier of fact might also have found beyond a
reasonable doubt that Appellant’s statements under the
circumstances of this case were wrongful and indicative of an
intent to dissuade AB F from cooperating with the recently
initiated investigation.
The decision of the United States Air Force Court of
Criminal Appeals is affirmed.
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EFFRON, Judge (concurring):
I write separately to address several matters implicit in
the majority opinion.
A conviction for obstruction of justice under Article 134,
Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 934 (2000),
requires a showing that an accused wrongfully did a certain act.
Whether or not an act was wrongful is not dependent solely on
the accused’s interest in the pending investigation or criminal
proceeding. Article 134 does not permit the conviction of an
interested party who has given honest and uncorrupt advice;
likewise, Article 134 does not require proof that a person who
gave dishonest and corrupt advice also was an interested party
with respect to an investigation or litigation. Whether a
person’s advice was wrongful is dependent on contextual factors,
including, but not limited to, the nature of the person’s
interest in the subject of the inquiry or proceeding, the
circumstances of the conversation, and the person’s tone and
manner of delivery, which are all questions of fact for the
members to decide.
Appellant, who claims that the evidence was insufficient as
a matter of law, likens her admonitions to the advice a “first
sergeant, supervisor, or friend would give to a military member
under investigation.” This comparison is unpersuasive. In
United States v. Reeves, No. 04-0145/AF
contrast to the hypothetical circumstances suggested by
Appellant, a rational trier of fact could find that the
circumstances of the present case demonstrate that the advice
provided by Appellant was dishonest and corrupt. Appellant was
an accomplice who was aware of the progress of the investigation
into her own conduct. She had no personal relationship with
Airman Basic (AB) F beyond a one-time sexual encounter, and did
not contact AB F from the time of the sexual encounter until
after the investigation commenced. At that point, she began
calling frequently to give unsolicited advice. She knew that AB
F was a potential witness to the investigation, and she
deposited $200 into AB F’s bank account. In light of these
combined circumstances, a rational trier of fact could find
beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant’s statements were
wrongful.
2