SLIP OP 11-91
UNITED STATES COURT OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE
CONSTANTINE N. POLITES,
Plaintiff,
v.
UNITED STATES,
Before: Pogue, Chief Judge
Defendant, Court No. 09-00387
and
THE AD HOC COALITION FOR FAIR
PIPE IMPORTS FROM CHINA, & THE
UNITED STEELWORKERS,
Defendant-
Intervenors
OPINION
[Department of Commerce’s Remand Results are sustained]
Dated: July 28, 2011
Peter S. Herrick, PA (Peter S. Herrick) for Plaintiff
Constantine N. Polites;
Tony West, Assistant Attorney General; Jeanne E. Davidson,
Director; Patricia M. McCarthy, Assistant Director, Commercial
Litigation Branch, Civil Division, U.S. Department of Justice
(Michael D. Panzera and John J. Todor); Reid P. Swayze, of
Counsel, Office of Chief Counsel for Import Administration, U.S.
Department of Commerce, for the United States Department of
Commerce;
King & Spalding LLP (Gilbert B. Kaplan, Brian E. McGill, &
Daniel L. Schneiderman) for Defendant-Intervenors Ad Hoc
Coalition for Fair Pipe Imports from China; and
Schagrin Associates (Roger B. Schagrin) for Defendant-
Intervenors United Steelworkers
Court No. 09-00387 Page 2
Pogue, Chief Judge: This matter returns to court following
remand in Constantine N. Polites v. United States, __ CIT __, 755
F. Supp. 2d 1352 (2011)(“Polites I”). At issue is whether
Plaintiff Polites’s imports of steel tubes, intended for use as
scaffolding, are exempt from countervailing and antidumping
duties, under an exclusion for “finished scaffolding.”1
On remand, the United States Department of Commerce
(“Commerce” or the “Department”) re-opened the record to obtain
evidence in support of its claim that “finished scaffolding”
refers to “scaffolding kits” that are or may be imported into the
United States. Polites now seeks review of Commerce’s
evidentiary determination. The court has jurisdiction pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1581(c) (2006).2
After a brief review of the relevant background and the
applicable standard of review, the court will explain why it
1
See Circular Welded Carbon Quality Steel Pipe from the
People’s Republic of China, 73 Fed. Reg. 42,547 (Dep’t Commerce
July 22, 2008) (notice of antidumping duty order); and Circular
Welded Carbon Quality Steel Pipe from the People’s Republic of
China, 73 Fed. Reg 42,545 (Dep’t Commerce July 22, 2008) (notice
of amended final affirmative countervailing duty determination
and notice of Countervailing Duty Order)(collectively, “CWP
Orders” or “orders”).
2
Commerce issues the Final Results pursuant to Section 705
of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, 19 U.S.C. § 1671d (2006).
Further citation to the Tariff Act of 1930 is to Title 19 of the
U.S. Code, 2006 edition. In addition, of course, the court has
jurisdiction to enforce its remand orders. Amanda Foods
(Vietnam) Ltd. v. United States, 2011 WL 1423125 at *3 (CIT Apr.
14, 2011)
Court No. 09-00387 Page 3
concludes that Commerce’s definition of “finished scaffolding” as
scaffolding kits is a reasonable interpretation of the CWP
Orders, and that Commerce’s factual finding that such kits are or
may be imported into the United States is supported by the
record. Accordingly, Commerce’s conclusion that Polites’s
scaffolding tubes are within the scope of the Orders must be
sustained.
BACKGROUND
This matter began with Plaintiff Constantine N. Polites’s
(“Plaintiff” or “Polites”) request that Commerce issue a scope
determination as to whether the steel tubes Polites imports are
subject to countervailing and antidumping duties.3 Polites Req.
For Scope Ruling 2, A-570-910 (February 3, 2009), Admin. R. Pub.
Doc. 1. Specifically, Polites urged Commerce to find that his
steel pipes, which he claimed are used exclusively as
scaffolding, are excluded from the scope of the Orders under the
exemption for “finished scaffolding.”
In its original scope determination,4 Commerce provided two
3
Plaintiff appeared in the administrative proceedings under
the name of his company, Constantine N. Polites & Co., though he
filed his complaint under his own name.
4
Commerce obtained a voluntary remand of its first scope
determination for the express purpose of defining “finished
scaffolding.” See Polites I, 755 F. Supp. 2d at 1353–54. For our
purposes, the scope determination pursuant to this voluntary
remand will be referred to as the original scope determination.
Court No. 09-00387 Page 4
definitions for “finished scaffolding:” 1) completed, fully
assembled scaffolding, or 2) scaffolding kits. Final Results of
Redetermination Pursuant to Voluntary Remand 8–9, June 25, 2010,
ECF No. 50 (“2010 Remand”).
Polites sought review of Commerce’s definition, and the
court held in Polites I that the first definition, which
encompassed fully assembled scaffolding, was not in accordance
with the law because it rendered the exclusion a nullity as there
was no evidence which could demonstrate that fully assembled
scaffolding was or could be imported into the United States. The
court also held there was no evidence on the record that
scaffolding kits were or could be imported into the United
States. Polites I, 755 F. Supp. 2d at 1357–58. Accordingly, the
court remanded for Commerce to obtain evidence that scaffolding
kits “are or may be imported into the United States” or,
alternately, to consider the factors listed in 19 C.F.R.
§ 351.225(k)(2) when defining “finished scaffolding.” Polites I,
755 F. Supp. 2d at 1359.
On remand, Commerce chose the first option and modified its
definition of “finished scaffolding” to be “component parts of .
. . final, finished scaffolding that enter the United States
unassembled as a ‘kit’” which is a “packaged combination of
component parts that contains, at the time of importation, all of
the necessary component parts to fully assemble a final, finished
Court No. 09-00387 Page 5
scaffolding.” Final Results of Redetermination Pursuant to
Remand 9, Mar. 23, 2011, ECF No. 63 (“Remand Results”).5
In addition, Commerce has placed evidence on the record
which it claims establishes that scaffolding kits are or may be
imported into the United States. Commerce’s evidence consists of
1) at least eight web-site excerpts from Chinese manufacturers
offering scaffolding kits for sale and claiming the United States
as a primary export market, 2) import data from ship manifests
showing that Eternal Star International Industry Company Limited
(“Eternal Star”) imported scaffolding kits into the United States
in 2009, and 3) a tariff classification ruling from the United
States Customs and Border Protection in which the importer states
its intention to import scaffolding rollers “both alone and with
the complete unassembled steel scaffolding.”6 Remand Results
5–7. Commerce also asserts that evidence of “substantial
entries” of Chinese origin goods, classified in the Harmonized
Tariff Schedule of the United States (“HTSUS”) category which
includes scaffolding kits, establishes that scaffolding kits are
or may be imported into the United States. Remand Results 7–9.
5
Commerce also removed fully assembled scaffolding from the
“finished scaffolding” definition. Remand Results 8—9.
6
The Eternal Star evidence and the tariff classification
ruling were among evidence submitted to the record by Defendant-
Intervenors. Commerce relied on and incorporated these two
evidentiary submissions in its remand results. Remand Results 7.
Court No. 09-00387 Page 6
Consequently, Commerce continues to find that the steel
tubes Polites imports meet the physical description of the
merchandise covered by the Orders and do not fall under the
“finished scaffolding” exemption.7 Remand Results 10–11. While
Commerce concedes that a scaffolding tube could be one component
of a kit, it asserts that the Polites’s tubes still fail to meet
the definition of a “scaffolding kit” because they require the
addition of other components after importation before they can be
used as scaffolding. See Remand Results 10. Commerce therefore
finds that the tubes Polites imports are subject to antidumping
and countervailing duties. See Remand Results 10–11.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Department, in its remand redetermination must comply
with the terms of the court’s remand order. See Amanda Foods
(Vietnam) Ltd. v. United States, 2011 WL 1423125 at *3 (Apr. 14,
2011). In addition, the court “shall hold unlawful any
determination, finding, or conclusion found ... to be unsupported
by substantial evidence on the record, or otherwise not in
accordance with law.” 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(1)(B)(i); Koyo Seiko
Co. v. United States, 20 F.3d 1160, 1164 (Fed.Cir. 1994).
7
The parties do not dispute whether the size and chemical
composition of the tubes that Polites imports fall within the
scope of the CWP Orders. The size of Polites’s tubes falls
within the specified diameter and wall thickness requirements,
and the steel used to construct them is no more than 2% carbon,
1.8% manganese, and 2.25% silicon, by weight, which also places
them within the scope of the Orders. See 2010 Remand Results 14.
Court No. 09-00387 Page 7
Substantial evidence is relevant evidence that, given the
record as a whole, “a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion.” Consol. Edison Co. v. N.L.R.B., 305 U.S.
197, 229 (1938) (citations omitted). Commerce's factual
conclusions in a scope ruling are not precluded from being
supported by substantial evidence when two different conclusions
may be drawn from the same evidence and need only be reasonable
to be upheld. See id.; Novosteel SA v. United States, 25 CIT 2,
12, 128 F. Supp. 2d 720, 730 (2001).
DISCUSSION
Commerce’s definition of “finished scaffolding.”
The primary issue here is whether the record supports
Commerce’s claim that scaffolding kits are or may be imported
into the United States. Polites asserts that the court should
disregard the lone “fugitive” sale of scaffolding kits to the
United States which Commerce identified because the entry for the
kit was not placed on record. Pl.’s Reply to the Department of
Commerce’s Final Results of Redetermination Pursuant to Remand 2,
May 20, 2011, ECF No. 65 (“Polites Reply”). Polites also argues
that Commerce has found multiple websites offering sales, but no
substantial evidence that sales have actually taken place.
The evidence placed on the record, however, shows that
scaffolding kits have been and may be imported into the United
States. This evidence consists, in part, of 1) import data from
Court No. 09-00387 Page 8
ship manifests showing that Eternal Star imported scaffolding
kits from China into the United States in 2009, and 2) a tariff
classification ruling wherein the importer states its intention
to import scaffolding rollers “‘both alone and with the complete
unassembled steel scaffolding.’”8 Remand Results 5–7 (citing
Def.-Int. Letter 2, April 6, 2011, ECF No. 64-4).
Polites argues that the Eternal Star evidence should be
disregarded because the entry document for the scaffolding kit
sale was not produced.9 Polites Reply 2. However, there is
nothing on the record to suggest that the ship manifests are
inaccurate or misleading. In the absence of any evidence showing
irregularity in the ship manifests, Commerce’s decision that the
data contained therein is accurate and that Eternal Star did,
indeed, bring scaffolding kits into the United States is
reasonable. See, e.g., 19 U.S.C. § 1431(b).10
As further evidence, Defendant-Intervenors provided a tariff
8
Defendant-Intervenors submitted additional evidence in
support of Commerce’s argument that scaffolding kits are or may
be imported into the United States. Because Commerce did not
rely on or incorporate this evidence into the remand results, the
court will not address its sufficiency.
9
The entry document referred to is the documentation
required by Customs before imported merchandise will be released
from Customs’ custody. See 19 C.F.R. § 141.0a(a).
10
Commerce’s directions on remand were to provide
substantial evidence that scaffolding kits are or may be imported
into the United States and this is evidence that at least one
company brought scaffolding kits from China into the United
States.
Court No. 09-00387 Page 9
ruling in which the importer stated its intention to import
scaffolding rollers with “complete unassembled steel
scaffolding.” Remand Results 7 (citing Def.-Int. Letter 2, April
6, 2011, ECF No. 64-4). The stated intent of an importer to
import scaffolding kits supports the reasonable inference that
scaffolding kits may be imported into the United States. See
Consol. Edison, 305 U.S. at 229. Therefore, the tariff ruling
provided by Defendant-Intervenors is further evidence that
scaffolding kits are or may be imported into the United States.
Together, these two pieces of evidence support the
conclusion that scaffolding kits have been imported in the past
and that some importers at least intend to import scaffolding
kits into the United States.11 Commerce’s definition of
11
Commerce argues that web-page excerpts from Chinese
companies claiming to export scaffolding kits primarily to the
United States, support its assertion that scaffolding kits may be
imported. See Remand Results 5–7. While it is possible that
these companies produce and export scaffolding kits, the court
need not decide whether copies from an internet web-site, put up
to advertise and solicit business, are substantial evidence that
scaffolding kits may be imported into the United States. There
is, at the least, a possibility that the statements on these
advertising web-sites, claiming the United States as a “primary
export market,” constitute mere puffery and not actual fact. See
Cook, Perkiss and Liehe, Inc. v. Northern Cal. Collection
Service, Inc., 911 F.2d 242, 246 (9th Cir. 1990) (defining
“puffing” as generalized advertising claims that cannot be relied
upon).
Commerce also claims that because scaffolding kits are
classified under HTSUS 7308.40.00.00 and a “significant quantity”
of Chinese products classified under this HTSUS number have been
imported into the United States, there is substantial evidence
that scaffolding kits are imported into the United States.
Remand Results at 7–8. Commerce’s reasoning is not entirely
Court No. 09-00387 Page 10
“finished scaffolding” to incorporate scaffolding kits is
therefore supported by the record.
Polites’s merchandise
Although the parties do not contest whether the steel tubes
imported by Polites fit the physical description of the
merchandise covered by the Orders, see 2010 Remand Results 8–9.
Polites makes several remaining arguments. None are availing.
First, Polites asserts that a change in wording, between the
petition and the CWP Orders, demonstrates Commerce’s intent to
exclude his merchandise from the scope of the final Orders.
The petition stated that “pipe used for the production of
scaffolding . . . are included within the scope of this
investigation.” Circular Welded Carbon Quality Steel Pipe from
the People’s Republic of China, 72 Fed. Reg. 36,663 (Dep’t
Commerce July 5, 2007) (initiation of antidumping duty
investigation); Circular Welded Carbon Quality Steel Pipe from
the People’s Republic of China, 72 Fed. Reg. 36,668 (Dep’t
convincing. HTSUS 7308.40.00.00 is not limited to scaffolding
kits, but rather, by its own definition, encompasses “equipment
for scaffolding, shuttering, propping or pit-propping.” Remand
Results at 8 (citing HTSUS 7308.40.00.00). Commerce apparently
ignores the other items classified under HTSUS 7308.40.00.00 and
infers that all or most of the items imported under this
classification code are scaffolding kits, despite the absence of
evidence showing that these imports actually were scaffolding
kits. The court need not address whether Commerce’s inference is
reasonable because it has already determined, based on other
evidence, that the record supports Commerce’s finding.
Court No. 09-00387 Page 11
Commerce July 5, 2007) (notice of initiation of countervailing
duty investigation). Polites argues that his merchandise is
outside the scope of the CWP Orders because Commerce removed this
language which would have otherwise incorporated his merchandise.
Commerce responds that it removed the identified language because
of its longstanding preference against relying on end-use in the
CWP Orders.
Commerce’s explanation is sufficient. While Polites notes
correctly that countervailing duty and antidumping investigations
are initiated by Commerce based on petitions filed by a domestic
interested party, 19 C.F.R. § 351.202(a), Commerce is
responsible for determining the language in the final order. See
19 C.F.R. § 351.211(a). When determining whether merchandise
falls within the scope of an antidumping or countervailing duty
order, Commerce first examines the language of the order. If
the terms of the order are dispositive, then the order governs.
See Tak Fat Trading Co. v. United States, 396 F.3d 1378, 1383
(Fed.Cir. 2005) (The “predicate for the interpretive process is
language in the order that is subject to interpretation”). The
petition and investigation may inform Commerce’s determination,
but “they cannot substitute for language in the order itself.”
Duferco Steel, Inc. v. United States, 296 F.3d 1087, 1097 (Fed.
Cir. 2002).
In addition, here, Commerce stated in the notice of
Court No. 09-00387 Page 12
investigation that it has a preference for relying on physical
characteristics, as opposed to end-use, when determining the
scope of product coverage. Circular Welded Carbon Quality Steel
Pipe from the People’s Republic of China, 72 Fed. Reg. 36,663
(Dep’t Commerce July 5, 2007) (initiation of antidumping duty
investigation); Circular Welded Carbon Quality Steel Pipe from
the People’s Republic of China, 72 Fed. Reg. 36,668 (Dep’t
Commerce July 5, 2007) (notice of initiation of countervailing
duty investigation). Subsequently, Commerce modified the
language in the final orders to reflect this preference, removing
all reference to end-use. See Final Orders. This determination
was not unreasonable; the language of the petition cannot prevail
over the language in the final order.12 Duferco, 296 F.3d at
1097.13
12
Polites further contends that Commerce should take the
factors listed in 19 C.F.R. § 351.225(k)(2), particularly end-
use, into consideration. This argument is unavailing because
consideration of the § 351.225(k)(2) factors is a last step that
Commerce uses only if it cannot otherwise determine whether
merchandise fits within the scope of an order. See 19 C.F.R.
§ 351.225(k)(2); Diversified Prods. Corp. v. United States, 6 CIT
155, 162, 572 F.Supp. 883, 889 (1983). Here, as the record
contains substantial evidence supporting Commerce’s definition of
“finished scaffolding,” the Department need not proceed to the
§ 351.225(k)(2) factors. Id.
13
Polites finally asserts that his merchandise is properly
classified under HTSUS 7308.40.00.00 along with scaffolding kits.
However, as the court held in Polites I, the classification of
Polites’s merchandise is not currently before the court. Polites
I, 755 F. Supp. 2d at 1358 n.8.
Court No. 09-00387 Page 13
Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, Commerce’s final
redetermination on remand is sustained. Judgment will be entered
accordingly.
/s/ Donald C. Pogue
Donald C. Pogue, Judge
Dated: July 28, 2011
New York, New York