Slip Op. 05-145
UNITED STATES COURT OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE
___________________________________
:
INTERNATIONAL CUSTOM PRODUCTS, :
INC., :
:
Plaintiff, :
: Before: Richard K. Eaton,
: Judge
V. :
: Court No. 05-00509
:
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, :
:
Defendant. :
___________________________________:
MEMORANDUM OPINION
[Plaintiff’s Motion for a Preliminary Injunction and Judgment on
the Agency Record denied; defendant’s Motion to Dismiss for
mootness and lack of a justiciable controversy granted]
November 8, 2005
Mayer, Brown, Rowe & Maw, LLP (Andrew A. Nicely and Simeon
Munchick Kriesberg), for plaintiff.
Peter D. Keisler, Assistant Attorney General, Civil
Division, United States Department of Justice; David M. Cohen,
Director, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, United
States Department of Justice (Edward F. Kenny), for defendant.
Eaton, Judge: This matter is before the court on the Motion
for a Preliminary Injunction and Judgment on the Agency Record1
1
Plaintiff’s motion initially requested a preliminary
injunction in its prayer for relief. Following entry of its
white sauce on September 19 and 20, however, plaintiff abandoned
that request. See Letter from Mayer, Brown, Rowe & Maw LLP to
Court No. 05-00509 Page 2
of plaintiff International Custom Products, Inc. (“ICP”), and the
Motion to Dismiss of defendant United States. By its motion,
plaintiff asks the court to (1) grant specified relief with
respect to any future entries of its merchandise and (2) grant it
attorney’s fees and other costs. Defendant asks that plaintiff’s
motion be denied and makes its own motion to dismiss for mootness
and lack of a justiciable controversy. For the reasons set forth
below, the court denies plaintiff’s motion and grants defendant’s
motion to dismiss.
BACKGROUND
This dispute has a substantial history. See Int’l Custom
Prods., Inc. v. United States, 29 CIT __, 374 F. Supp. 2d 1311
(2005) (“ICP I”) and Int’l Custom Prods., Inc. v. United States,
29 CIT __, slip op. 05-117 (Sept. 1, 2005) (“ICP II”). Reference
is made to these previously issued opinions for a complete
rehearsal of that history. What follows is a brief outline of
the facts necessary to decide the instant motions.
Plaintiff is an importer of a milk-fat based white sauce
product used as an ingredient in sauces, salad dressings, and
U.S. Court of International Trade of 9/22/05 (“On behalf of
International Custom Products, Inc. (“ICP”), we write to inform
the Court that ICP is withdrawing its request for a preliminary
injunction.”).
Court No. 05-00509 Page 3
other food products. On January 20, 1999, the United States
Customs Service (now the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection)
issued New York ruling letter D86228 (“Ruling Letter”), which
classified the white sauce under HTSUS 2103.90.9060 (later
numbered 2103.90.9091) as “[s]auces and preparations therefor.”
Pl.’s Conf. Mem. of Points and Authorities in Supp. of Pl.’s App.
for a Temporary Restraining Order and Mot. for a Prelim.
Injunction (“Pl.’s Mem.”) at 4. The current duty rate for HTSUS
2103.90.9091 is 6.4%. Id.
As a result of the earlier litigation, on June 2, 2005, a
Declaratory Judgment was issued by this Court which, among other
things:
ORDERED that the Notice of Action2 issued to
the Plaintiff by the Bureau of Customs and
Border Protection (“Customs”) dated April 18,
2005, for entry number 180-05864154, and
including a number of entries, is declared
null and void, and it is further
ORDERED that Customs reliquidate no later than
June 27, 2005, any and all entries liquidated
pursuant to the above-referenced Notice of Action
at tariff classification item 2103.90.9091 and at
the rate of duty in effect for that tariff
classification item at the time of importation;
and it is further
2
The legality of the Notice of Action, which would have
effectively reclassified plaintiff’s white sauce under HTSUS
0405.20.3000 with a substantially higher duty, was the subject of
the litigation resulting in the June 2, 2005, Declaratory
Judgment. See ICP I, 29 CIT __, 374 F. Supp. 2d 1311.
Court No. 05-00509 Page 4
ORDERED that New York letter ruling number
D86228 dated January 20, 1999 remains in full
force and effect for the merchandise
described therein until such time as Customs
revokes or modifies the ruling in compliance
with the procedures set forth in 19 U.S.C. §
1625 and regulations relating thereto . . . .
Decl. J. Order of 6/2/05.
Thereafter, the United States sought to stay the effect of
the Declaratory Judgment both in this Court and, as it had
appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit (“CAFC”), in that Court as well. All stays have now
either expired by their terms or have been denied. See ICP I, 29
CIT __, 374 F. Supp. 2d 1311 (USCIT Order of 6/20/05 and CAFC
Order of 6/27/05). As a result, the Declaratory Judgment,
although on appeal, remains in effect.
On June 13, 2005, Customs’ Office of Finance, apparently
having been made aware of the Court’s Declaratory Judgment, sent
a letter to plaintiff requesting a continuous bond of $400,000 on
entries of the white sauce.3 See Pl.’s Ex. A-8. On June 17,
2005, however, when plaintiff sought to enter its merchandise, it
was informed that in addition to the $400,000 continuous entry
bond, it would be required to post a single entry bond for each
3
A continuous bond is intended to secure payment of
duties, taxes, or other charges on the imported merchandise. See
19 C.F.R. § 113.62.
Court No. 05-00509 Page 5
entry equal to three times the value of the merchandise entered.
Thus, for a typical entry valued at $2.1 million, plaintiff would
be required to post a single entry bond in the amount of $6.3
million, in addition to the $400,000 continuous entry bond.
Pl.’s Mem. at 11. As a result, plaintiff did not enter its
merchandise.
On September 12, 2005, plaintiff commenced the present
action “to challenge [the] prohibitive bond requirements that
were imposed for the unlawful purpose of preventing ICP from
importing white sauce in accordance with an advance
classification ruling that the company obtained more than six
years ago . . . .” Compl. at 1. Plaintiff claimed that by
imposing the single entry bond requirement, Customs sought to
nullify both this Court’s Declaratory Judgment and plaintiff’s
statutory due process protections by effectively reclassifying
plaintiff’s white sauce under a classification requiring a higher
duty.
On September 15, 2005, this court entered a temporary
restraining order which instructed Customs to rescind all single
entry bond requirements imposed on plaintiff’s white sauce. The
temporary restraining order was stayed pending the outcome of
court-ordered mediation, but came into full force and effect on
September 19, 2005, when the stay was lifted. Thereafter,
Court No. 05-00509 Page 6
Customs complied with the court’s order, and on September 19 and
20, 2005, all of plaintiff’s merchandise subject to the single
entry bond requirements was entered into the United States.
Plaintiff claims jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i).
Defendant does not dispute this claim.
DISCUSSION
Although all entries that were the subject of the single
entry bonds have now entered the United States, plaintiff still
insists that the court grant it relief. The essence of
plaintiff’s continuing claim is that when it seeks to enter its
white sauce in the future, it will be faced with a renewed demand
for single entry bonds or the imposition of other “requirements
or restrictions.” Compl. at 17. As set forth in the Request for
Judgment and Relief portion of the complaint, plaintiff seeks to
enlist the court on its behalf by seeking a judgment:
(1) declaring the Bond Requirements null and void ab
initio, both with respect to shipments of white sauce
currently in storage in ICP’s Customs bonded warehouse
and all future entries of white sauce;
(2) declaring that the continuous-entry bond of
$400,000 required by the Office of Finance is the
only bond that Customs may impose with respect to
ICP’s white sauce entries until such time as
Court No. 05-00509 Page 7
Defendant revokes NYRL D86228 in accordance with
19 U.S.C. § 1625(c), 19 C.F.R. § 177.12, the
“compelling reason” standard, the APA, and the
Constitution;
(3) enjoining Defendant from imposing any bond
requirement other than or in excess of the
$400,000 continuous-entry bond required by the
Office of Finance until such time as Defendant
revokes NYRL D86228 in accordance with 19 U.S.C. §
1625(c), 19 C.F.R. § 177.12, the “compelling
reason” standard, the APA, and the Constitution;
(4) enjoining Defendant from imposing requirements or
restrictions of any kind that would in any way
impede ICP’s ability to enter additional white
sauce, other than those requirements or
restrictions that were in place prior to March 1,
2005, until such time as Defendant revokes NYRL
D86228 in accordance with 19 U.S.C. § 1625(c), 19
C.F.R. § 177.12, the “compelling reason” standard,
the APA, and the Constitution;
(5) vacating all Notices and other actions carried out
in accordance with the Bond Requirements;
(6) ordering Defendant to pay to ICP the reasonable
attorney fees, expenses, and court costs incurred
Court No. 05-00509 Page 8
by ICP and as to which it is entitled under the
Equal Access to Justice Act;
(7) ordering that the revocation process for ICP’s
ruling, which Customs commenced by publishing a
notice of proposed revocation in the Customs
Bulletin on August 24, 2005, be stayed until
Customs rescinds the Bond Requirements, so that
ICP is able to import in reliance of its ruling
during the notice and comment period, as provided
for in Section 1625(c); and
(8) awarding ICP such other and further relief as the
Court deems appropriate.
Compl. at 16–18.
Defendant contends, however, that this court lacks subject
matter jurisdiction to hear plaintiff’s claims based on the
doctrines of mootness and justiciability.4 Defendant insists
4
The outer limits of the federal courts’ subject matter
jurisdiction are set forth in Article III, Section 2 of the U.S.
Constitution, which states:
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law
and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws
of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall
be made, under their Authority;—to all Cases affecting
Ambassadors, other public Minister and Consuls;—to all
Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;—to
Controversies to which the United States shall be a
Party;—to Controversies between two or more
States;—between and State and Citizens of another
Court No. 05-00509 Page 9
that:
In this case, the only entries belonging to ICP which
are actually located in the United States and/or for
which ICP was required to post single entry bonds were
the eleven warehouse entries. No other entries were
subject to these single entry bond requirements; no
other entries were in fact subject to any type of
increased bonding requirements (other than, of course,
the [$400,000] continuous entry bond requirement).
Indeed, ICP has not even attempted to enter any other
merchandise into the United States other than that in
the eleven warehouse entries.
Because the temporary restraining order required
Customs to permit entry of these eleven warehouse
entries without single entry bonds, and Customs did so,
no entry of any nature exists which can be the subject
of ICP’s present action, and consequently, this action
should be dismissed for lack of justiciable issue and
mootness.
Def.’s Resp. to Pl.’s Mots. for Prelim. Injunction and for J. on
the Agency R. (“Def.’s Resp.”) at 9 (emphasis in original).
With respect to any claim plaintiff might concerning future
entries, defendant states:
As to the other claims made by ICP in its complaint
regarding possible future entries, jurisdiction does
not lie over these claims. As noted previously, in
order to plead a justiciable case or controversy, ICP
must have alleged “a real and substantial controversy
admitting of specific relief through a decree of a
State;—between Citizens of different States;—between
Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants
of different States, and between a State, or the
Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or
Subjects.
U.S. Const., Art. III; § 2, cl. 1.
Court No. 05-00509 Page 10
conclusive character, as distinguished from an opinion
advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical
state of facts.”
Here, ICP has not attempted to make any other entries
other than the eleven warehouse entries. It indeed
claims that the remainder of its merchandise is in a
warehouse in New Zealand. Similarly, Customs has not
required ICP to provide single entry bonds for any
other entry. Therefore, entry by ICP of any other
merchandise other than that in the eleven warehouse
entries is purely speculative. Whether Customs would
require single entry bonds for these speculative
entries is hypothetical.
Def.’s Resp. at 12 (citation omitted)(emphasis in original).
I. Plaintiff’s Claims Under Paragraphs (1), (5), and (7) of the
Request for Judgment and Relief5 are Moot
Defendant insists that, at least with respect to plaintiff’s
merchandise that has been entered into the United States, this
case is moot.
In this case, the final relief sought by ICP was entry
of its eleven warehouse entries without having to post
single entry bonds, and protection for its future
entries. In having its application for a temporary
restraining order granted, ICP received all of the
relief it sought regarding the eleven warehouse entries
– its entries were admitted without single entry bonds.
ICP received permanent relief on this issue as well
through the temporary restraining order, because once
its entries were made without single entry bonds, even
5
While the court references paragraphs from the
complaint’s Request for Judgment and Relief, these paragraphs
correspond to the counts found in the complaint as follows: Count
I, paragraphs 1, 5, and 7 of the Request for Judgment and Relief;
Count II, paragraphs 1, 5, and 7; Count III, paragraphs 1, 2, 3,
4, and 8; Count IV, paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, and 8; Count V,
paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, and 8; and Count VI, paragraphs 1,
2, 3, 4, 5, 7, and 8.
Court No. 05-00509 Page 11
if [defendant] were to prevail on the merits of the
preliminary injunction or ICP’s motion for judgment on
the administrative record, Customs cannot retroactively
seek a higher entry bond because the entries were
already made.
Def.’s Resp. at 11-12.
Generally, a case is moot when the relief sought has been
attained. In order for a case to escape dismissal for mootness,
“[i]t must be a real and substantial controversy admitting of
specific relief through a decree of a conclusive character, as
distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be upon
a hypothetical state of facts.” Aetna Life Ins Co. v. Haworth,
300 U.S. 227, 241 (1937)(emphasis added). Here, because all of
the white sauce subject to the single entry bond requirements has
been entered, and there is no present demand for single entry
bonds, the relief sought in paragraphs (1)(declaring the single
entry bond requirements null and void) and (5) (vacating notices
and other actions relating to the single entry bond requirements)
of the Request for Judgment and Relief has been attained.
Likewise, the relief sought in paragraph (7) (seeking a stay of
the administrative action to revoke the Ruling Letter until the
single entry bond requirements were rescinded) has been attained
as well. Plaintiff’s case, therefore, insofar as it is contained
in those paragraphs, is moot. Because “[m]oot cases do not
present live controversies . . . federal courts have no
Court No. 05-00509 Page 12
jurisdiction to decide them.” Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Procter &
Gamble Distrib. Co., Inc., 973 F.2d 911, 913 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
As a result, this court finds that it has no jurisdiction to
grant the desired relief in paragraphs (1), (5), and (7) of the
Request for Judgment and Relief.
II. Plaintiff’s Claims under Paragraphs (2), (3), (4), and (8)
of the Request for Judgment and Relief Are Based on
Speculation and Are Thus Not Ripe and Do Not Present
Justiciable Controversies
While one part of a controversy may be rendered moot, other
issues in a case may remain alive and the proper subject of this
Court’s jurisdiction. With respect to certain other requests for
relief based on claims made in the complaint, however, the court
finds that they are not ripe for adjudication and therefore do
not present a justiciable controversy. The purpose of the
ripeness doctrine is “to prevent the courts, through avoidance of
premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract
disagreements over administrative policies, and also to protect
the agencies from judicial interference until an administrative
decision has been formalized and its effects felt in a concrete
way by the challenging parties.” Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387
U.S. 136, 148 (1967); see also Nat’l Right to Life Political
Action Comm. v. Connor, 323 F.3d 684, 692 (2003). A claim is not
ripe for adjudication if it rests upon “‘contingent future events
Court No. 05-00509 Page 13
that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at
all.’” Texas v. United States, 523 U.S. 296, 296 (1998) (quoting
Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 580–81
(1985)).
Here, plaintiff has no merchandise either in the United
States ready for entry or in transit. See Tr. of 9/15/05 at 17.
Nor is it certain that there will be any future imports.
Plaintiff may, for instance, decide that it will purchase the
white sauce from a domestic producer. Beyond the question of
whether there will be any future entries, it is further not known
the extent to which plaintiff, at some future time, will be
entitled to enter its merchandise subject to the continuous entry
bond alone. For instance, there is no way of knowing whether
plaintiff, on the future date of a hypothetical white sauce
entry, will have a history of timely compliance with Customs’
requirements with regard to other merchandise it might import.6
6
Title 19 C.F.R. § 113.13(b) sets the guidelines for
determining the amount of a bond, including:
(1) The prior record of the principal in timely payment of
duties, taxes, and charges with respect to the
transaction(s) involving such payments;
(2) The prior record of the principal in complying with
Customs demands for redelivery, the obligation to hold
unexamined merchandise intact, and other requirements
relating to enforcement and administration of Customs
and other laws and regulations; [and] . . .
(5) The prior record of the principal in honoring bond
commitments, including the payment of liquidated
Court No. 05-00509 Page 14
As a result, it is not known, nor is it knowable, whether
Customs’ regulatory guidelines dealing with bond requirements
will come into play. Similarly, it is within the Port Director’s
discretion7 to determine the type of security demand that will be
imposed on merchandise based on the facts at the time of entry.
Thus, for instance, the Port Director, on the date of a future
entry, may have legitimate concerns about whether the duty on the
entry ultimately will be paid. Therefore, the Port Director may
rightfully conclude that the entry of plaintiff’s merchandise
would place the revenue of the United States in jeopardy and
demand further security.
As the foregoing examples indicate, plaintiff’s claims for
future relief rest on the premise that the facts with respect to
the entry of its merchandise will not change. They are therefore
based on “speculative contingencies [that] afford no basis for
[the court] passing on the substantive issues the appellants
would have [the court] decide . . . .” Hall v. Beals, 396 U.S.
45, 49 (1969). For example, paragraph (2) of plaintiff’s Request
damages . . . .
7
Under 19 C.F.R. § 113.13(d), if the Port Director
“believes that acceptance of a transaction secured by a
continuous bond would place the revenue in jeopardy or otherwise
hamper the enforcement of Customs laws or regulations, he shall
require additional security.” Id.
Court No. 05-00509 Page 15
for Judgment and Relief asks the court to declare that the
continuous entry bond of $400,000 required by the Office of
Finance is the only bond that Customs may impose on its white
sauce. This request is thus based on the supposition that there
will be future entries and that the facts as to these entries
will otherwise remain static. In like manner, the relief
requested in paragraphs (3)(seeking an injunction against the
imposition of any bond requirement other than the $400,000
continuous bond), (4) (seeking an injunction preventing Customs
from imposing requirements or restrictions of any kind that would
impede plaintiff from importing its white sauce until the Ruling
Letter is revoked), and (8) (seeking other and further relief)
are equally speculative. Because the requests for relief in
paragraphs (2), (3), (4), and (8) are speculative, the court
declines to hear them on the grounds that they are not ripe for
adjudication and therefore do not present a justiciable case or
controversy. See Am. Spring Wire Corp. v. United States, 6 CIT
122, 124, 569 F. Supp. 73, 75 (1983)(“Straying into a prediction
of future events is no substitute for showing an actual
controversy, or even one that is likely to recur.”); see also
Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller,& Edward H. Cooper, Federal
Practice and Procedure § 3532, at 112 (2d ed. 2002)(stating that
with respect to ripeness, “[t]he central concern is whether the
case involves uncertain or contingent future events that may not
Court No. 05-00509 Page 16
occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all.”).
III. Plaintiff Is Not Entitled to Attorney’s Fees and Other
Costs Under the Equal Access to Justice Act
Plaintiff cannot be granted the relief sought under
paragraph (6) of the Request for Judgment and Relief requesting
“attorney[’s] fees, expenses, and court costs,” pursuant to the
Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412, because the court
has found that it does not have jurisdiction over the underlying
claims. See Hudson v. Principi, 260 F. 3d 1357, 1363 (Fed. Cir.
2001) (“This court and others have established that there cannot
be an award of attorneys’ fees unless the court has jurisdiction
of the action.”). Therefore, the court denies so much of
plaintiff’s motion as seeks this relief.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, plaintiff’s Motion for Judgment
on the Agency Record is denied and defendant’s Motion to Dismiss
is granted. Judgment shall be entered accordingly.
/s/ Richard K. Eaton
Richard K. Eaton
Dated: November 8, 2005
New York, New York