Torrington Co. v. United States

Slip Op. 00-102

UNITED STATES COURT OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE

BEFORE: SENIOR JUDGE NICHOLAS TSOUCALAS
___________________________________
:
THE TORRINGTON COMPANY, :
:
Plaintiff, :
:
v. : Court No. 99-08-00461
:
UNITED STATES, :
:
Defendant, :
:
SKF USA INC. and SKF GmbH; :
FAG KUGELFISCHER GEORG SCHAFER AG :
and FAG BEARINGS CORPORATION, :
:
Defendant-Intervenors. :
___________________________________:

Plaintiff, The Torrington Company (“Torrington”), moves
pursuant to USCIT R. 56.2 for judgment upon the agency record
challenging the Department of Commerce, International Trade
Administration’s (“Commerce”) final determination, entitled
Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered Roller Bearings) and
Parts Thereof From France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Romania, Sweden,
and the United Kingdom; Final Results of Antidumping Duty
Administrative Reviews, 64 Fed. Reg. 35,590 (July 1, 1999).
Defendant-intervenors, SKF USA Inc. and SKF GmbH (collectively
“SKF”), oppose Torrington’s motion.

Specifically, Torrington claims that Commerce erred in: (1)
accepting direct price adjustments that were not tied to SKF’s
sales; (2) concluding that the adjustments were supported by
substantial evidence and did not result in distortion; and (3)
making two errors in the computer program that calculates SKF’s
dumping margins. SKF contends that: (1) Commerce acted lawfully in
accepting SKF’s allocated billing adjustment two as a direct
adjustment to normal value; and (2) the adjustments were supported
by substantial evidence. SKF takes no position on Torrington’s
allegation of clerical errors.

Held: Torrington’s USCIT 56.2 motion is denied in part and
granted in part. This case is remanded to Commerce to correct the
clerical errors in the computer program that calculates SKF’s
dumping margins.
Court No. 99-08-00461 Page 2

Dated: August 18, 2000

Stewart and Stewart (Terence P. Stewart, Wesley K. Caine,
William A. Fennell, Geert De Prest and Lane S. Hurewitz) for
Torrington.

David W. Ogden, Assistant Attorney General; David M. Cohen,
Director, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, United
States Department of Justice (Velta A. Melnbrencis, Assistant
Director); of counsel: Arthur D. Sidney, Office of the Chief
Counsel for Import Administration, United States Department of
Commerce, for defendant.

Steptoe & Johnson LLP (Herbert C. Shelley and Alice A. Kipel)
for SKF.

Grunfeld, Desiderio, Lebowitz & Silverman LLP (Max F.
Schutzman and Andrew B. Schroth) for Fag Kugelfischer Georg Schafer
AG and Fag Bearings Corporation.

OPINION

TSOUCALAS, Senior Judge: Plaintiff, The Torrington Company

(“Torrington”), moves pursuant to USCIT R. 56.2 for judgment upon

the agency record challenging the Department of Commerce,

International Trade Administration’s (“Commerce”) final

determination, entitled Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered

Roller Bearings) and Parts Thereof From France, Germany, Italy,

Japan, Romania, Sweden, and the United Kingdom; Final Results of

Antidumping Duty Administrative Reviews (“Final Results”), 64 Fed.

Reg. 35,590 (July 1, 1999). Defendant-intervenors, SKF USA Inc.

and SKF GmbH (collectively “SKF”), oppose Torrington’s motion.

Specifically, Torrington claims that Commerce erred in: (1)
Court No. 99-08-00461 Page 3

accepting direct price adjustments that were not tied to SKF’s

sales; (2) concluding that the adjustments were supported by

substantial evidence and did not result in distortion; and (3)

making two errors in the computer program that calculates SKF’s

dumping margins. SKF contends that: (1) Commerce acted lawfully in

accepting SKF’s allocated billing adjustment two as a direct

adjustment to normal value (“NV”); and (2) the adjustments were

supported by substantial evidence. SKF takes no position on

Torrington’s allegation of clerical errors.

BACKGROUND

This case concerns the ninth review of the antidumping duty

order on antifriction bearings (other than tapered roller bearings)

and parts thereof (“AFBs”) imported to the United States from

Germany during the review period of May 1, 1997 through April 30,

1998.1 Commerce published the preliminary results of the subject

review on February 23, 1999. See Antifriction Bearings (Other Than

Tapered Roller Bearings) and Parts Thereof From France, Germany,

Italy, Japan, Romania, Singapore, Sweden, and the United Kingdom;

1
Since the administrative review at issue was initiated after
December 31, 1994, the applicable law is the antidumping statute as
amended by the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (“URAA”), Pub. L. No.
103-465, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994) (effective January 1, 1995). See
Torrington Co. v. United States, 68 F.3d 1347, 1352 (Fed. Cir.
1995) (citing URAA § 291(a)(2), (b) (noting effective date of URAA
amendments)).
Court No. 99-08-00461 Page 4

Preliminary Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Reviews and

Partial Recission of Administrative Reviews, 64 Fed. Reg. 8790.

Commerce published the Final Results on July 1, 1999. See 64 Fed.

Reg. at 35,590.

The Court granted FAG Kugelfischer Georg Schafer AG and FAG

Bearings Corporation’s (collectively “FAG”) consent motion for a

judicial protective order on October 10, 1999, after which FAG did

not file any additional papers.

JURISDICTION

The Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 19

U.S.C. § 1516a(a) (1994) and 28 U.S.C. § 1581(c) (1994).

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Court will uphold Commerce’s final determination in an

antidumping administrative review unless it is “unsupported by

substantial evidence on the record, or otherwise not in accordance

with law.” 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(1)(B)(i) (1994); see NTN Bearing

Corp. of America v. United States, 24 CIT ___, ___, Slip Op. 00-64,

at 8-10 (June 5, 2000) (detailing Court’s standard of review in

antidumping proceedings).
Court No. 99-08-00461 Page 5

DISCUSSION

I. Commerce’s Treatment of SKF’s Home Market Billing Adjustments
as Direct Price Adjustments to Normal Value

A. Background

SKF’s home market billing adjustment two (“BILLAD2")

represents billing adjustments not associated with a specific

transaction. See SKF’s Resp. Sec. B Questionnaire (Aug. 28, 1998)

(Case No. A-428-801) at 26-28. SKF explained that BILLAD2 included

multiple invoices, multiple products or multiple product lines and

could not be properly tied to a single transaction. See id. at 26.

SKF, therefore, used customer-specific allocations to report these

adjustments. In reporting BILLAD2, SKF took the sum of all the

adjustments for a particular customer number, divided the totals by

total gross sales to that customer number and applied the resulting

factor “to each reported sale made to that customer number by

multiplying the per unit invoice price by the customer-specific

billing adjustment factor for the relevant period.” Id. at 27.

Commerce accepted SKF’s BILLAD2 as a direct adjustment to

price after determining that SKF acted to the best of its ability

in reporting the adjustment on a sale-specific basis and that its

reporting methodology was “not unreasonably distortive.” Final

Results, 64 Fed. Reg. at 35,603. Commerce found that SKF’s billing

adjustments could not be tied to a single specific transaction

since they were “part of credit or debit notes issued to the
Court No. 99-08-00461 Page 6

customer that related to multiple invoices, products, or invoice

lines,” and that “the most feasible reporting methodology that SKF

Germany could use was a customer-specific allocation, which is not

unreasonably inaccurate or distortive.” Id. Although it prefers

transaction-specific reporting, Commerce realizes that such

reporting is “not always feasible, particularly given the extremely

large volume of transactions involved in these reviews and the time

constraints imposed by the statutory deadlines.” Id.

Furthermore, Commerce determined that SKF’s methodology was

“not unreasonably distortive” since there existed “no evidence on

the record to indicate that the bearings included in SKF Germany’s

current allocations vary significantly, either in terms of value,

physical characteristics, or the manner in which they were sold.”

Id. Commerce noted that it had verified the reasonableness of

SKF’s reporting methodology in the 1996-97 review. See id.

B. Contentions of the Parties

Torrington argues that SFK failed to show that all reported

billing adjustment number two values directly relate to the

relevant sales. See Torrington’s Mem. Support of Mot. J. Agency R.

(“Torrington’s Br.”) at 2. Torrington maintains that the Court of

Appeals for the Federal Circuit (“CAFC”) has clearly defined

“direct” adjustments to price as those that “vary with the
Court No. 99-08-00461 Page 7

quantity sold, or that are related to a particular sale,” and

Commerce cannot treat adjustments that do not meet this definition

as direct. Id. at 10 (citing Torrington Co. v. United States

(“Torrington CAFC”), 82 F.3d 1039, 1050 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (citations

omitted)). Torrington contends that here Commerce “redefined

‘direct’ to achieve what Torrington CAFC had previously disallowed”

by allowing SKF to report allocated post-sale price adjustments

(“PSPAs”) if it acted to the best of its abilities in light of its

record-keeping systems and the results were not unreasonably

distortive. Id. at 12.

Furthermore, Torrington maintains that the amendments to the

Uruguay Round Agreements Act (“URAA”) did not modify the

distinction between direct and indirect adjustments established

under pre-URAA law such as Torrington CAFC. See id. at 13 (citing

19 U.S.C. § 1677a(d)(1)(B), (D) (1994) and § 1677b(a)(7)(B)

(1994)). Torrington is not convinced that the Statement of
2
Administrative Action (“SAA”) accompanying the URAA contradicts

2
The Statement of Administrative Action (“SAA”) represents
“an authoritative expression by the Administration concerning its
views regarding the interpretation and application of the Uruguay
Round agreements.” H.R. Doc. 103-316, at 656 (1994), reprinted in
1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4040. “It is the expectation of the Congress
that future Administrations will observe and apply the
interpretations and commitments set out in this Statement.” Id.;
see also 19 U.S.C. § 3512(d) (1994) (“The statement of
administrative action approved by the Congress . . . shall be
regarded as an authoritative expression by the United States
concerning the interpretation and application of the Uruguay Round
Court No. 99-08-00461 Page 8

its contentions. See id. at 14 (citing SAA at 823-24).

Additionally, Torrington acknowledges that the antidumping

regulations that came into effect on July 1, 1997 apply to this

review and maintains that they support its position. See id. at

14-15 (citing Antidumping Duties; Countervailing Duties; Final

Rule, 62 Fed. Reg. 27,296, 27,416-17 (May 19, 1997); Initiation of

Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Administrative Reviews and

Request for Revocation in Part, 63 Fed. Reg. 35,188 (June 29,

1998)).

Torrington acknowledges that this Court has already approved

of Commerce’s practice as applied under post-URAA law in Timken Co.

v. United States (“Timken”), 22 CIT ___, 16 F. Supp. 2d 1102

(1998), but asks the Court to reconsider its approval. See id. at

16. Torrington complains that Timken erroneously held that 19

U.S.C. § 1677m(e) (1994) shifts the burden of proof away from the

party who stands to benefit from the claim made, here, SKF. See

id.

Torrington also contends that even under its new methodology,

Commerce’s determination was not supported by substantial evidence

inasmuch as SKF failed to show that (1) its reporting method did

Agreements and this Act in any judicial proceeding in which a
question arises concerning such interpretation or application.”).
Court No. 99-08-00461 Page 9

not result in distortion; and (2) it put forth its best efforts to

report the information on a more precise basis. See id. at 2.

Torrington emphasizes that SKF has the burden of showing non-

distortion and best efforts, and having failed to do so, must not

benefit from the adjustment. See id. at 22. Torrington,

therefore, requests that this Court reverse Commerce’s

determination with respect to BILLAD2 and remand the case to

Commerce with instructions to disallow SKF’s downward home market

billing adjustments, but allow all upward home market billing

adjustments in calculating NV. See id. at 32.

Commerce responds that Torrington erred in relying on

Torrington CAFC because the case does not stand for the proposition

that direct price adjustments may only be accepted when they are

reported on a transaction-specific basis. See Def.’s Mem. in

Partial Opp’n to Mot. J. Agency R. (“Def.’s Mem.”) at 7. Rather,

the Torrington CAFC court “merely overturned a prior Commerce

practice . . . of treating certain allocated price adjustments as

indirect expenses,” id. (citing Torrington CAFC, 82 F.3d at 1047-

51), and “does not address the propriety of the allocation methods”

used in reporting the price adjustments in question, id. at 8

(quoting Final Results, 62 Fed. Reg. at 35,602). Also, contrary to

Torrington’s assertion, Commerce did not consider Torrington CAFC

as addressing proper allocation methodologies; rather, Commerce,
Court No. 99-08-00461 Page 10

only viewed Torrington CAFC as holding that “Commerce could not

treat as indirect selling expenses ‘improperly’ allocated price

adjustments.” Id. at 9. Commerce notes that pursuant to its new

methodology, it does not consider price adjustments to be any type

of selling expense, either direct or indirect, and, therefore,

Torrington’s argument is not only without support, but also

inapposite to Torrington CAFC. See id. Moreover, Commerce asserts

that this Court in Timken approved of Commerce’s modified

methodology of accepting respondents’ claims for discounts, rebates

and other billing adjustments as direct price adjustments, where

this Court found the methodology to be consistent with requisites

of 19 U.S.C. § 1677m(e). See id. at 10-11 (citing Timken, 16 F.

Supp. 2d at 1108).

Commerce also argues that its treatment of SKF’s reported home

market billing adjustments was supported by substantial record

evidence and otherwise in accordance with law because it is

consistent with Timken, that is, Commerce: (1) “used its acquired

knowledge of the respondents’ computer systems and databases to

conclude that they could not provide the information in the

preferred form”; and (2) “scrutinized the respondents’ data before

concluding that the data were reliable”; and (3) found “that the

adjustments on scope and non-scope merchandise did not result in

unreasonable distortions.” Id. at 19.
Court No. 99-08-00461 Page 11

Additionally, Commerce argues that its findings are supported

by substantial evidence. See id. at 20. Specifically, Commerce

maintains that “SKF could not properly tie the note to a single

transaction” and, therefore, properly calculated the adjustments on

a customer-specific basis. Id. Commerce noted that it had

“verified SKF’s treatment of the adjustment and granted the

adjustment as a direct adjustment to price during the sixth and

eighth reviews of AFBs” and found that it was not unreasonably

distortive, that is, SKF did not favor out-of-scope merchandise

over in-scope merchandise. Id. at 21-22.

With respect to Torrington’s argument that SKF did not carry

the burden of proving its entitlement to the adjustment, Commerce

responded that it does not require a party to “‘prove a negative’

or demonstrate what the amount of the expense or price adjustment

would have been if transaction-specific reporting had been used.”

Id. at 22-23. Moreover, there was no reason to suspect any

distortion or manipulation in the ninth review. See id. at 24.

Commerce maintains that Torrington is mistaken in its contention

that SKF failed to substantiate that it acted to the best of its

ability to report the adjustment on a transaction-specific basis.

See id. at 25. Specifically, Commerce argues that it would be

unreasonable to expect SKF to modify its accounting system and

generate more precise data when Commerce has made the “reasonable
Court No. 99-08-00461 Page 12

determination that, given the large number of sales, and the manner

in which the billing adjustment was granted, customer-specific

allocations were reasonable.” Id. at 25-26.

SKF concurs with Commerce’s position. SKF contends that in

Timken this Court properly stated that Commerce’s pre-URAA

treatment of allocated PSPAs “does not preclude the agency from

changing its policy, nor does it preclude the Court from

reconsidering, in view of the Uruguay Round amendments to the

statute, its approval of Commerce’s prior practice.” SKF’s Br.

Response to Torrington’s 56.2 Mot. J. Agency R. (“SKF’s Br.”) at

11. SKF also maintains that “[a]s a matter of law, this Court’s

reliance on 19 U.S.C. § 1677m(e) was correct and the same reasoning

should continue to be applied in this case.” Id. SKF contends

that the holding of Torrington CAFC does not answer the issue in

the instant case and, moreover, that case was decided under pre-

URAA law. See id. at 18-19. Furthermore, SKF argues that

subsequent changes in the law, that is, § 1677m(e) and the SAA,

support its position and cannot be ignored. See id. at 20.

SKF also contends that substantial record evidence supports

Commerce’s conclusions. See id. at 30. SKF maintains that the

record demonstrates that SKF has satisfied each of the requirements

of § 1677m(e). See id. Moreover, Torrington only takes issue with

respect to one of the requirements, specifically, that “‘the
Court No. 99-08-00461 Page 13

interested party has demonstrated that it acted to the best of its

ability in providing the information and meeting the requirements

established by the administering authority . . . with respect to

the information.’” Id. at 30-31. SKF responds to Torrington’s

contention by arguing that Commerce reasonably concluded that SKF

acted to the best of its ability and that its methodology was not

unreasonably distortive. See id. at 31.

SKF contends that its inability to report the adjustments on

a more specific basis results from the nature of the adjustment

and, moreover, it would be unreasonable to expect SKF to alter its

dealings with its customers to fit Torrington’s conception of the

antidumping reporting requirements. See id. at 39. Finally, SKF

argues that the same methodology used in the subject review was

used in previous reviews where no distortion was found and,

furthermore, there is no evidence of distortion in the subject

review. See id. at 40.

C. Analysis

The Court notes that this issue has been decided in Torrington

Co. v. United States (“Torrington CIT”), 24 CIT __, 100 F. Supp. 2d

1102 (2000), Timken and, most recently, NTN Bearing, 24 CIT at ___,

Slip Op. 00-64, at 83-101. The Court adheres to its previous

decisions, applying the analysis in NTN Bearing to the instant
Court No. 99-08-00461 Page 14

case.

The Court disagrees with Torrington that Torrington CAFC

dictates that direct price adjustments may only be accepted when

they are reported on a transaction-specific basis. Rather, as

Commerce correctly stated, the Court notes that Torrington CAFC

“does not address the propriety of allocation methods but rather

holds that [Commerce] may not treat direct price adjustments as if

they were indirect selling expenses.” Final Results, 64 Fed. Reg.

at 35,602. The Court further notes that Torrington CAFC was

decided under pre-URAA law, that is, it did not take into

consideration the new statutory guidelines of 19 U.S.C. § 1677m(e).

Moreover, the Court acknowledged in Timken that although (1)

“Commerce treated rebates and billing adjustments as selling

expenses in preceding reviews under pre-URAA law,” and (2)

“previously decided that such adjustments are selling expenses and,

therefore, should not be treated as adjustments to price,” the

Court nevertheless determined that this did not “preclude

Commerce’s change in policy or this Court’s reconsideration of its

stance in light of the newly-amended antidumping statute [(that is,

19 U.S.C. § 1677m(e))].” 16 F. Supp. 2d at 1107.

Indeed, the Court approved in Timken Commerce’s modified

methodology of accepting claims for discounts, rebates and other

billing adjustments as direct price adjustments to NV, see id. at
Court No. 99-08-00461 Page 15

1107-08, and reaffirmed its decision in Torrington CIT.

Specifically, in Timken, the Court reasoned that “[n]either the

pre-URAA nor the newly-amended statutory language imposes standards

establishing the circumstances under which Commerce is to grant or

deny adjustments to NV for PSPAs.” 16 F. Supp. 2d at 1108 (citing

Torrington CAFC, 82 F.3d at 1048). The Court, however, noted that

19 U.S.C. § 1677m(e) “specifically directs that Commerce shall not

decline to consider an interested party’s submitted information if

that information is necessary to the determination but does not

meet all of Commerce’s established requirements, if the [statute’s]

criteria are met.” Id. The Court, therefore, approved of

Commerce’s change in methodology, “as it substitutes a rigid rule

with a more reasonable method that nonetheless ensures that a

respondent’s information is reliable and verifiable. This is

especially true in light of the more lenient statutory instructions

of subsection 1677m(e).” Id.

Accordingly, the Court in Timken upheld Commerce’s decision to

accept Koyo's billing adjustments and rebates, “even though they

were not reported on a transaction-specific basis and even though

the allocations Koyo used included rebates on non-scope

merchandise.” See id. at 1106. Similarly, in Torrington CIT, the

Court followed the rationale of Timken and upheld Commerce’s

determination to accept respondents’ rebates even though they were
Court No. 99-08-00461 Page 16

reported on a customer-specific rather than transaction-specific

basis and even though the allocation methodology used included

rebates on non-scope merchandise. See 24 CIT at __, 100 F. Supp.

2d at 1107-08.

The Court finds that Commerce’s decision to accept SKF’s

reported home market billing adjustments was supported by

substantial evidence and was fully in accordance with the post-URAA

statutory language and the SAA’s statements. The record clearly

indicates that Commerce properly used its acquired knowledge of

SKF’s billing practices to conclude that it could not provide the

information in the preferred form and, moreover, properly

scrutinized SKF’s reported billing adjustments before concluding

that the adjustments were reliable. See Final Results, 64 Fed.

Reg. at 35,603. Commerce also properly accepted SKF’s allocation

methodology even though the adjustments related to multiple

invoices, products or product lines since there was no evidence

“that the bearings included in . . . [the] allocation var[ied]

significantly, either in terms of value, physical characteristics,

or the manner in which they were sold,” indicating that the

allocations were not unreasonably distortive. Id.

Moreover, the record and the Final Results demonstrate that

the requirements of 19 U.S.C. § 1677m(e), as noted earlier, were

satisfied by the respondents. First, SKF’s reported adjustments
Court No. 99-08-00461 Page 17

were submitted in a timely fashion. See § 1677m(e)(1). Second,

the information SKF submitted was verifiable, as shown in prior

reviews that utilized the identical treatment of BILLAD2. See §

1677m(e)(2). Third, SKF’s information was not so incomplete that

it could not serve as a basis for reaching a determination. See §

1677m(e)(3). Fourth, SKF demonstrated that it acted to the best of

its abilities in providing the information and meeting Commerce’s

new reporting requirements. See § 1677m(e)(4). Finally, the Court

finds that there was no indication that the information was

incapable of being used without undue difficulties. See §

1677m(e)(5).

Commerce’s determination with respect to SKF was also

consistent with the SAA. The Court agrees with Commerce’s finding

in the Final Results that given the extremely large volume of

transactions and time constraints imposed by the statute, SKF’s

reporting and allocation methodologies were reasonable. This is

consistent with the SAA directive under § 1677m(e), which provides

that Commerce “may take into account the circumstances of the

party, including (but not limited to) the party’s size, its

accounting systems, and computer capabilities.” SAA at 865. Thus,

the Court finds that Commerce properly considered the ability of

SKF to report BILLAD2 on a more specific basis.

Accordingly, the Court concludes that Commerce’s acceptance of
Court No. 99-08-00461 Page 18

SKF’s reported billing adjustments as direct adjustments to NV is

supported by substantial evidence and fully in accordance with law.

II. Clerical Errors

Torrington contends that, contrary to Commerce’s intent, the

computer program used to calculate SKF’s dumping margins

erroneously failed to exclude further manufactured sales from the

antidumping calculations. See Torrington’s Br. at 28 (citing SKF’s

Preliminary Results Analysis Mem. (Feb. 18, 1999) (Case No. A-428-

801) (“SKF’s Preliminary”) at 4). Torrington also contends that

Commerce erred in failing to exclude sales made outside the period

of review from the United States sales database. See Torrington’s

Reply Br. at 11. SKF takes no position on the alleged clerical

errors. See SKF’s Br. at 49.

Commerce agrees that it committed the errors alleged by

Torrington. Specifically, Commerce maintains that in SKF’s

Preliminary it had “explained that the United States value added

for ball bearings was likely to exceed substantially the value of

the imported subject merchandise” and, therefore, Commerce declared

that it was excluding sales of further-manufactured merchandise.

Def.’s Br. at 30. Due to an error in the computer programming

language that failed to include the proper definition of further-

manufactured sales, these sales were not excluded from the margin
Court No. 99-08-00461 Page 19

calculation. See id. Commerce also admits that it failed to

properly exclude SKF’s sales made outside the period of review from

the United States sales database. See id.

The Court has reviewed the record and finds that Commerce did

indeed commit the two errors specified in Torrington and Commerce’s

briefs. See Torrington’s Br. at 28-31; Def.’s Br. at 30. The

Court, therefore, remands this matter to Commerce to correct the

errors.

CONCLUSION

This case is remanded to Commerce to: (1) exclude SKF’s

further-manufactured sales from the margin calculation for

constructed export price sales; (2) exclude SKF’s sales made

outside the review period from the United States sales database;

and (3) recalculate SKF’s dumping margins. Commerce’s final

determination is affirmed in all other respects.

__________________________
NICHOLAS TSOUCALAS
SENIOR JUDGE

Dated: August 18, 2000
New York, New York