Sarne Handbags Corp. v. United States

Slip Op. 00-51

UNITED STATES COURT OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE
______________________________
:
SARNE HANDBAGS CORP., :
:
Plaintiff, :
:
v. : Consolidated Court No. 97-06-00959-S
: BEFORE: CARMAN, CHIEF JUDGE
UNITED STATES, :
:
Defendant. :
______________________________:

Defendant, United States, moves for summary judgment pursuant to U.S. CIT R. 56(b),
contending it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law because the United States Customs
Service (Customs) properly classified the merchandise at issue, handbags, under subheading
4202.22.15, Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (HTSUS), as “Handbags . . . With
outer surface of sheeting of plastic,” dutiable at a rate of 19.2% ad valorem.

Plaintiff, Sarne Handbags Corp., opposes defendant’s motion and cross-moves for
summary judgment pursuant to U.S. CIT R. 56(a), contending it is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law because Customs improperly classified the merchandise at issue under subheading
4202.22.15, HTSUS. Plaintiff argues the imported merchandise should have been classified
under subheading 3926.90.98, HTSUS, as “Other articles of plastics . . . Other: . . . Other,”
dutiable at a rate of 5.3% ad valorem.

Held: The Court finds there are no genuine issues of material fact and summary judgment
is appropriate. The Court holds Customs correctly classified the merchandise at issue.
Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is granted, and plaintiff’s cross-motion for summary
judgment is denied.

Date: May 5, 2000

Serko & Simon LLP (Joel K. Simon and Jerome L. Hanifin), New York, New York, for
plaintiff.

David W. Ogden, Acting Assistant Attorney General of the United States; Joseph I.
Liebman, Attorney in Charge, International Trade Field Office, Commercial Litigation Branch,
Civil Division, United States Department of Justice (Barbara M. Epstein); Beth C. Brotman,
Office of the Assistant Chief Counsel, International Trade Litigation, United States Customs
Service, of Counsel, for defendant.
Court No. 97-06-00959-S Page - 2 -

OPINION

CARMAN, CHIEF JUDGE: Defendant, United States, moves for summary judgment

pursuant to U.S. CIT R. 56(b), contending it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law because

the United States Customs Service (Customs) properly classified the merchandise at issue under

subheading 4202.22.15, Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (HTSUS)1, as

“Handbags . . . With outer surface of sheeting of plastic,” dutiable at a rate of 19.2% ad valorem.

Plaintiff, Sarne Handbags Corp. (Sarne), opposes defendant’s motion and cross-moves for

summary judgment pursuant to U.S. CIT R. 56(a), contending it is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law because Customs improperly classified the merchandise at issue under subheading

4202.22.15, HTSUS. Plaintiff argues the imported merchandise should have been classified

under subheading 3926.90.98, HTSUS2, as “Other articles of plastics . . . Other: . . . Other,”

1
Subheading 4202.22.15, Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (HTSUS),
states, in relevant part:

4202 Trunks, suitcases, vanity cases, attache cases, briefcases, school satchels,
spectacle cases, binocular cases, camera cases, musical instrument cases,
gun cases, holsters and similar containers; traveling bags, toiletry bags,
knapsacks and backpacks, handbags, shopping bags, wallets, purses, map
cases, cigarette cases, tobacco pouches, tool bags, sports bags, bottle cases,
jewelry boxes, powder cases, cutlery cases and similar containers, of
leather or of composition leather, of sheeting of plastics, of textile
materials, of vulcanized fiber or of paperboard, or wholly or mainly
covered with such materials or with paper (con.):
Handbags, whether or not with shoulder strap, including those
without handle:
* * *
4202.22 With outer surface of sheeting of plastic or of textile
materials:
* * *
4202.22.15 With outer surface of sheeting of plastic 19.2%
2
Subheading 3926.90.98, HTSUS, states, in relevant part:
Court No. 97-06-00959-S Page - 3 -

dutiable at a rate of 5.3% ad valorem. The Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1581(a) (1994).

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff is the importer of the merchandise at issue in this case. Plaintiff exported the

merchandise from Hong Kong on August 3, 1996, and entered it at the Port of Long Beach on

August 19, 1996.

The following material facts are not in dispute: The merchandise at issue consists of

“handbags, style no. S/2061T-BR, invoiced as ‘100% PVC handbag,’ represented by

Defendant’s Exhibit [] A.” (Defendant’s Statement of Material Facts Not In Issue at ¶ 2.) “The

material comprising the outer surface of the handbag consists of a plastic material [“PVC”]

which covers a textile material,” (id. at ¶ 7), and the “outer surface of the handbag is that part of

the surface of the bag which is seen by the user/consumer.” (Id. at ¶ 17.) Furthermore, “[t]he

plastic/textile material [] is in the form of a ‘sheet’ and/or ‘sheeting’ in the handbag at issue.”

(Id. at ¶ 9.) This plastic/textile material (Material) is a “broad, relatively thin surface layer or

covering” with “a thickness greater than 10 mil.” (Id. at ¶¶ 12, 13.) “For the purposes of this

action, the parties agree . . . the terms, ‘sheeting of plastic,’ and ‘plastic sheeting’ may be used

interchangeably,” and “the terms ‘plastic’ and ‘plastics’ may be used interchangeably.” (Id. at

3926 Other articles of plastics and articles of other materials of headings 3901 to
3914:
* * *
3926.90 Other:
* * *
3926.90.98 Other 5.3%
Court No. 97-06-00959-S Page - 4 -

¶¶ 10, 11.)

Customs classified the merchandise at issue under subheading 4202.22.15, HTSUS, as

“Handbags . . . With an outer surface of sheeting of plastic.” Plaintiff timely protested Customs’

classification of the merchandise and after paying all liquidated duties due, timely commenced

this action.

CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES

A. Plaintiff

Plaintiff, Sarne, contends no genuine issues of material fact exist, and it is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law. Plaintiff argues Customs improperly classified the merchandise

under subheading 4202.22.15, HTSUS, as “Handbags . . . With an outer surface of sheeting of

plastic.” Plaintiff asserts this classification is improper because the merchandise is not prima

facie classifiable under heading 4202, HTSUS, as “handbags . . . of sheeting of plastics . . .

wholly or mainly covered with such materials,” because the meaning of “sheeting of plastics”

precludes such a finding.

Plaintiff argues that because neither the statute, nor the Harmonized Commodity

Description and Coding System Explanatory Notes, nor the legislative history of the statute

defines the phrase “sheeting of plastics,” the Court must turn to the common meaning of the

phrase. Plaintiff states the common meaning is “plastic in the form of continuous film (10 mils

or greater in thickness).” (Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion

for Summary Judgment and in Support of Plaintiff’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment (PSJ)
Court No. 97-06-00959-S Page - 5 -

at 12.) Because the Material is more than mere plastic and the plastic component was never a

sheeting, plaintiff contends the common meaning of “sheeting of plastics” excludes the

merchandise at issue.

Plaintiff argues the Material is not “sheeting of plastics,” but rather is “synthetic leather”

which is a composite material of plastic coated to a textile substrate. Plaintiff contends the

plastics, synthetic leather and handbag industries recognized the Material as “synthetic leather”

in 1988, the year the HTSUS was enacted.3 The Material, according to plaintiff, is “a unique,

unitary material which provides functionality beyond that which is achievable by the

combination of a plastic sheet with a textile.” (Plaintiff’s Reply to Defendant’s Opposition to

Plaintiff’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment at 13.) Furthermore, “[t]he composite

plastic/textile material at issue in this case will not separate into a plastic sheet and a textile as

will often happen with a laminated plastic sheet and textiles.” (Id.)

Plaintiff also contends the processes for manufacturing “sheeting of plastics” and

“synthetic leather” are recognized in the industry as being significantly different. Plaintiff claims

when manufacturing “synthetic leather” the plastic component, known as a “melt,” is heated to

170-180EC until it is a viscous, thick liquid which is then applied to the textile component.

According to plaintiff, the “melt” takes the shape of the vessel in or on which it is placed, and if

not coated onto fabric, it becomes a plastic sheet. The process for manufacturing “sheeting of

plastics,” according to plaintiff, is different from the one described above.

3
Plaintiff seems to be making an argument based on the commercial meaning of the
terms “sheeting of plastics” and “synthetic leather.”
Court No. 97-06-00959-S Page - 6 -

Because the Material comprising the merchandise at issue is not, and never was, a

“sheeting of plastics,” plaintiff argues the merchandise cannot be classified under heading 4202,

HTSUS. Contrary to defendant’s arguments, plaintiff contends Chapter 42, Additional United

States Note 2 (U.S. Note 2)4 is inapplicable because U.S. Note 2 only addresses subheadings

within heading 4202, HTSUS, and the General Rules of Interpretation (GRI) require

classification to be determined according to heading first, then subheading.5 Even if U.S. Note 2

were applicable, however, plaintiff claims it still would not help defendant because U.S. Note 2

does not define “sheeting of plastics.”

Plaintiff argues the Government’s alternative method for achieving prima facie

classifiability under heading 4202, HTSUS, by characterizing the merchandise at issue as

4
Chapter 42, Additional United States Note 2 (U.S. Note 2) states:

For purposes of classifying articles under subheadings 4202.12, 4202.22, 4202.32, and
4202.92, articles of textile fabric impregnated, coated, covered or laminated with plastics
(whether compact or cellular) shall be regarded as having an outer surface of textile
material or of plastic sheeting, depending upon whether and the extent to which the
textile constituent or the plastic constituent makes up the exterior surface of the article.
5
According to plaintiff, U.S. Note 2’s sole purpose is to combat Customs Headquarters
Ruling 082803, and prevent articles of Heading 4202 with an outer surface of plastic sheeting
combined with textiles from being classified as textiles. See United States Customs Service
Headquarters Ruling Letter No. 082803, at 6 (Dec. 27, 1988) (holding “an article consisting of a
textile fabric which is coated, covered, or laminated on one surface with a compact plastics
material would not have an outer surface ‘of plastic sheeting’ because that material is classifiable
in Chapter 56 or 59”); see also, Memorandum to the Committee on Ways and Means of the
United States House of Representatives on H.R. 1900, 101st Congress, A Bill to Add an
Additional U.S. Note to Chapter 42 of the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (ITC
Memo), in Defendant’s Opposition to Plaintiff’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment and
Reply to Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Def. Opp.),
Exhibit K, at 2-3 (lending support to plaintiff’s reading of the legislative history). But see Note
1(l), Section XI, HTSUS (specifically precluding handbags of heading 4202, HTSUS, with
textile, plastic sheeting combinations from being classified as textiles).
Court No. 97-06-00959-S Page - 7 -

“handbags . . . with outer surface of textile materials” is also incorrect because the outer surface

of the merchandise is plastic. Furthermore, plaintiff contends defendant’s arguments for

classification under heading 4202, HTSUS, based on the Tariff Schedule of the United States’

(TSUS) prior treatment of handbags is mistaken because the classification of handbags changed

significantly in the HTSUS.6 Finally, plaintiff argues summary judgment for defendant is

precluded because the Court “must make a factual determination as to whether the common

meaning of ‘sheeting of plastics’ is different from its commercial meaning. In addition, the

Court must determine if the material of which the handbags are constructed is composed of, or

contains, sheeting of plastics.”7 (PSJ at 29.)

6
Plaintiff asserts that from 1981 until the adoption of the HTSUS, all handbags of plastic
were classified under a single provision, 706.62, Tariff Schedule of the United States.
7
The Court notes commercial meaning becomes a material question of fact only when,
among other factors, the party asserting the Court should consider commercial meaning of a
phrase contends it is different from the phrase’s common meaning. See Winter-Wolff, Inc. v.
United States, 996 F. Supp. 1258, 1261 (CIT 1998). The Court also notes plaintiff has failed to
make such an assertion. Moreover, the Court notes plaintiff asserted at oral argument that the
common and commercial meanings of “sheeting of plastics” are the same.

The Court: [I]s it your client’s position that the common meaning and the commercial
meaning [of “sheeting of plastics”] are the same?
Mr. Simon: Yes.
The Court: So that you don’t maintain a difference between the two of them.
Mr. Simon: No - -
The Court: So that really I don’t have any factual determination, as set forth on Page 29
of your brief, that I have to make.
Mr. Simon: No, you don’t, Your Honor.

(Oral Argument at 31-32.) Because plaintiff fails to assert facts that would require the Court to
consider the material, factual differences between the common and commercial meanings of
“sheeting of plastics” which would preclude summary judgment, such analysis is unnecessary.
Accordingly, summary judgment relief is not precluded.
Court No. 97-06-00959-S Page - 8 -

Plaintiff argues the merchandise at issue should be classified under the basket provision

for plastics, subheading 3926.90.98, HTSUS, as “articles of plastics.” Subheading 3926.90.98,

HTSUS, is appropriate, Sarne argues, because the merchandise at issue is composed of plastics,

and it is not classifiable under any other eo nomine provision providing for the classification of

handbags.8 Therefore, classification in a basket provision for articles of plastic would be correct.

B. Defendant

Defendant, United States, moves for summary judgment arguing there are no genuine

issues of material fact in this matter, and Customs properly classified the merchandise at issue

under subheading 4202.22.15, HTSUS, as “Handbags . . . With outer surface of sheeting of

plastic.” The Court need not go beyond the plain meaning of the statute, according to defendant,

because the phrase “sheeting of plastic,” as explained by U.S. Note 2, includes the merchandise

at issue. According to defendant, U.S. Note 2 requires all handbags made with an outer surface

of “textile fabric impregnated, coated, covered or laminated with plastics (whether compact or

cellular)” to be classified under subheading 4202.22, HTSUS, as handbags with an outer surface

of “sheeting of plastic.” Defendant contends plaintiff’s claim that U.S. Note 2 is inapplicable is

erroneous because to assert U.S. Note 2 refers to the definition of “sheeting of plastic” in the

subheadings and not in the heading would be to fix a broader definition of a phrase in the

8
Two other provisions to which plaintiff points are: subheading 4602.10.29, HTSUS,
“Basketwork, wickerwork and other articles, made directly to shape from plaiting materials . . .
Handbags,” and subheading 3926.90.33, HTSUS, “Other articles of plastics . . . Beads, bugles,
and spangles . . . articles thereof . . . Handbags.” Plaintiff points to a number of Customs
Headquarters Rulings and New York Rulings for the proposition that handbags not classifiable
under any specific provision should be classified under the basket provision for the material
which makes up the outer surface of the bag.
Court No. 97-06-00959-S Page - 9 -

subheading than in the heading. Such a result would be in conflict with Congressional intent that

headings encompass subheadings in the statute. The definition of “sheeting of plastics” in

heading 4202, HTSUS, therefore, must encompass textile materials covered by plastics in order

to give effect to the subheading which is undisputably subject to U.S. Note 2.

Defendant further argues while no analysis of legislative history is necessary, the

legislative history supports its contention that Congress intended the duty rate for handbags to

remain the same after the conversion from the TSUS to the HTSUS. Defendant cites to the

debate among members on the Harmonized System Committee9 and the International Trade

Commission’s report to Congress10 as proof that there was no intent to exclude handbags with an

outer surface of flexible plastic from heading 4202, HTSUS. Defendant also cites to an opinion

of the Harmonized System Committee,11 as proof that classification under heading 4202,

9
See Summary Record of the 15th Session of the Harmonized System Committee (HSC),
Doc. 24.103, at 2 (March 15, 1978), in Def. Opp., Exhibit J; Summary Record of the 15th Session
of the HSC, Doc. 24.126, at III/1 (April 20, 1978), in Def. Opp., Exhibit J; Summary Record of
the 17th Session of the HSC and its Working Party, Doc. 24.980, at V/58 (March 23, 1979), in
Def. Opp., Exhibit J; Report of the Nomenclature Committee, Doc. 25.108, at 2 (June 19, 1979),
in Def. Opp., Exhibit J; Report to the Customs Co-Operation Council on the Fifth Session of the
Interim HSC, Doc. 32.901, at D/32/Rev. (October 5, 1985), in Def. Opp., Exhibit J. Country
comments during the course of the preparation of the Harmonized Tariff Schedules are
“fragments” of legislative history. See Carl Zeiss, Inc. v. United States, 16 F. Supp. 2d 1097,
1101 (CIT 1998). While defendant cites to these authorities to indicate there was no intention to
exclude handbags with an outer surface of plastic from heading 4202, HTSUS, the Court notes
they do not define the phrase “sheeting of plastic” nor do they clearly indicate why that phrase
was adopted as opposed to other proposed alternatives. See infra note 16.
10
See supra note 5.
11
See Classification of “Gamma Grip” and “Gamma Hi-Tech,” HSC, 16th Sess., Doc
39.646, at ¶¶ 6-8 (August 28, 1995) (Gamma Grip), in Def. Opp., Exhibit N. HSC opinions “are
given the same weight as the international Explanatory Notes in interpreting HTSUS and are
therefore instructive but not binding.” Verosol USA, Inc. v. United States, 20 CIT 1251, 1252,
Court No. 97-06-00959-S Page - 10 -

HTSUS, does not depend upon the manner in which the plastics are applied. Furthermore, even

if U.S. Note 2 does not apply in the case at hand, defendant argues the common meaning of the

term “sheeting of plastics” encompasses the merchandise, making it prima facie classifiable

under heading 4202, HTSUS. Finally, defendant asserts that even if the merchandise cannot be

classified under heading 4202, HTSUS, as “handbags . . . of sheeting of plastics” it still can be

classified under heading 4202, HTSUS, as “handbags . . . of textile materials.”12

Defendant attacks several of plaintiff’s arguments against Customs’ classification as

meritless. First, defendant asserts plaintiff’s arguments based on commercial meaning are in

error. Defendant understands plaintiff to assert the Material is not within the commercial

meaning of “sheeting of plastics.” This assertion is inapplicable, defendant argues, because

plaintiff has not acknowledged a difference between the common and commercial meaning of

“sheeting of plastics.” As a result, plaintiff has not rebutted the presumption that the common

and commercial meanings are the same. Second, defendant disputes plaintiff’s contention there

is a legal requirement a “sheeting of plastics” be a solid sheet prior to its initial contact with the

textile in order to be classified under heading 4202, HTSUS. Because heading 4202, HTSUS,

uses the word “of” in lieu of “made/manufactured/composed of” prior to the phrase “sheeting of

plastics,” defendant argues whether the “sheeting of plastics” existed as a separate component

prior to being part of the merchandise at issue is irrelevant. Third, defendant contests what it

941 F. Supp. 139, 140 (1996). See infra note 19.
12
Customs’ classification is still correct under this argument because once the
merchandise is determined to be prima facie classifiable under heading 4202, HTSUS, U.S. Note
2 will require classification under subheading 4202.22.15, HTSUS, because the parties have
stipulated that the outer surface of the handbag is of plastic.
Court No. 97-06-00959-S Page - 11 -

characterizes as plaintiff’s use of the “more than” doctrine13 to argue that the presence of textile

in the Material makes it more than a “sheeting of plastics” and therefore unclassifiable under

heading 4202, HTSUS. Defendant argues the phrase “sheeting of plastics” is broad enough to

include plastic sheeting laminated to a textile substrate, the kind of material used here.

Finally, defendant disputes plaintiff’s proposed classification, arguing plaintiff has

supplied no valid support for classifying the merchandise at issue under subheading 3926.90.98,

HTSUS. Defendant argues plaintiff’s proposal is incorrect for three reasons. First, as the

merchandise is prima facie classifiable under heading 4202, HTSUS, Chapter 39, Note 2 (ij)14

precludes classification of the merchandise under that chapter. Second, even if the merchandise

were prima facie classifiable under both defendant’s and plaintiff’s proposals, the defendant’s

classification is preferred because it is more specific.15 Third, plaintiff’s “more than” doctrine

argument undermines plaintiff’s proposed classification. This is so because if the presence of a

textile substrate makes the merchandise at issue “more than” a “sheeting of plastic” for the

13
The “more than” doctrine holds that when “goods constitute more than a particular
article because they possess additional significant features or perform additional nonsubordinate
functions[,] they are not classifiable” under the heading for that article. Avenues in Leather, Inc.
v. United States, 11 F. Supp. 2d 719, 726 (CIT 1998) (citing Digital Equip. Corp. v. United
States, 889 F.2d 267, 268 (Fed. Cir. 1989)).
14
While defendant cites to Chapter 39, Note 2(h), it appears defendant meant to cite to
Chapter 39, Note 2(ij). Chapter 39, Note 2(ij) states in relevant part: “This chapter does not
cover . . . saddlery or harness (heading 4201) or trunks, suitcases, handbags or other containers of
heading 4202.”
15
Defendant appears to base its argument on General Rule of Interpretation (GRI) 3(a),
HTSUS, which states in relevant part: “When . . . goods are, prima facie, classifiable under two
or more headings . . . [t]he heading which provides the most specific description shall be
preferred.”
Court No. 97-06-00959-S Page - 12 -

purposes of heading 4202, HTSUS, the presence of a textile substrate should also make the

merchandise “more than” an “article of plastic” for the purposes of heading 3926, HTSUS.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

This case is before the Court on defendant’s motion and plaintiff’s cross-motion for

summary judgment. “[S]ummary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine dispute as to

the underlying factual issue of exactly what the merchandise is.” Bausch & Lomb, Inc. v. United

States, 148 F.3d 1363, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 1998); see also U.S. CIT R. 56(d). When deciding

summary judgment motions in classification cases

the court construes the relevant (competing) classification headings, a question of law;
determines what the merchandise at issue is, a question of fact; and then, if there is no
genuine dispute over the nature of the merchandise, adjudges on summary judgment the
proper classification under which [the merchandise] falls, the ultimate question in every
classification case and one that has always been treated as a question of law.

Bausch & Lomb, 148 F.3d at 1366.

In this case, Customs has not promulgated any regulations interpreting the relevant

headings or subheadings; therefore, the Court conducts de novo review based on the record

before it pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2640(a)(2) (1994). See Carl Zeiss, Inc. v. United States, 195

F.3d 1375, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (citing Mead Corp. v. United States, 185 F.3d 1304, 1307 (Fed.

Cir. 1999)); Amity Leather Co. v. United States, 20 CIT 1049, 1052, 939 F. Supp. 891, 894

(1996). Furthermore, since the question before the court is a legal one, the statutory presumption

of correctness afforded Customs, see 28 U.S.C. § 2639(a)(1) (1994), carries no force. See

Universal Elecs. Inc. v. United States, 112 F.3d 488, 492 (Fed. Cir. 1997). Finally, this Court’s

precedent dictates it “must consider whether the government’s classification is correct, both
Court No. 97-06-00959-S Page - 13 -

independently and in comparison with the importer’s alternative.” Jarvis Clark Co. v. United

States, 733 F.2d 873, 878 (Fed. Cir. 1984).

DISCUSSION

The Court finds summary judgment is appropriate because there are no genuine issues of

material fact in dispute. Therefore, the sole issue remaining in this case is the proper

classification of the merchandise at issue. See JVC Co. of Am. v. United States, 62 F. Supp. 2d

1132, 1136 (CIT 1999).

A. Scope of Heading 4202, HTSUS, Handbags “of sheeting of plastics”

“The HTSUS General Rules of Interpretation (GRI) and the Additional U.S. Rules of

Interpretation (U.S. GRI) govern the proper classification of all merchandise and are applied in

numerical order.” Zeiss, 195 F.3d at 1379. Under GRI 1, “classification shall be determined

according to the terms of the headings and any relative section or chapter notes.” GRI 1, HTSUS

(1996). The section and chapter notes form an integral part of the HTSUS and have the same

legal force as the text of the headings. See Trans-Border Customs Servs., Inc. v. United States,

18 CIT 22, 25, 843 F. Supp. 1482, 1486 (1994). “The function of the Notes is to define the

precise scope of each heading, subheading, chapter, subchapter, and section.” Id.

If Congress has clearly stated its intent in the language of the statute, the Court should not

inquire further into the meaning of the statute or engage in common-meaning inquiry because the

statutory definition is controlling. See Pillowtex Corp. v. United States, 171 F.3d 1370, 1373

(Fed. Cir. 1999); Lonza, Inc. v. United States, 46 F.3d 1098, 1106 (Fed. Cir. 1995). “The court’s
Court No. 97-06-00959-S Page - 14 -

determination of congressional intent in the tariff schedules requires reading all parts of the

statute together, including the relevant headnotes, which are the primary source for ascertaining

such intent.” Trans-Border Customs Servs., 843 F. Supp. at 1486.

“When a tariff term is not defined in the HTSUS or its legislative history, the term’s

correct meaning is its common meaning.” Pillowtex, 171 F.3d at 1374. To determine the

common meaning of a tariff term, a court may consult dictionaries, lexicons, the testimony in the

record, and other reliable sources of information. See JVC, 62 F. Supp. 2d at 1137. A term’s

common and commercial meanings are presumed to be the same. See Zeiss, 195 F.3d at 1379.

“The party who argues that the term ‘should not be given its common or dictionary meaning

must prove that there is a different commercial meaning in existence.’” Winter-Wolff, Inc. v.

United States, 996 F. Supp. 1258, 1261 (CIT 1998) (quoting Rohm & Haas Co. v. United States,

727 F.2d 1095, 1097 (Fed. Cir. 1984).

The Court finds the statute does not define the phrase at issue, handbags “of sheeting of

plastics.” Additionally, the Court finds the legislative history fails to provide any guidance

regarding the proper interpretation of the phrase as used in heading 4202, HTSUS.16 Therefore,

16
There is no definition of the phrase handbags “of sheeting of plastics” in the legislative
history. See H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 100-576 (1988). The ITC Memo discussed by the parties is
irrelevant because the language of the sponsor’s original bill was not adopted by Congress, and
the memo fails to provide any rationale for the language adopted in U.S. Note 2 aside from
noting, rather cryptically, that as phrased, it is consistent with the United States’ treaty
obligations. Furthermore, the various country comments proffered by defendant are
unenlightening because they fail to define the phrase “sheeting of plastics” and do not explain
why the phrase was eventually adopted. The only pertinent legislative history to heading 4202,
HTSUS, of which the Court is aware concerns U.S. Note 2. The Court notes U.S. Note 2 does
not assist the Court in determining the meaning of heading 4202, HTSUS, but rather applies only
to goods already classified under heading 4202, HTSUS. See H. R. CONF. REP. NO. 101-650
Court No. 97-06-00959-S Page - 15 -

the Court must determine the common meaning of the phrase “of sheeting of plastics.”17 See

Pillowtex, 171 F.3d at 1374.

The Court derives the common meaning of the phrase by determining the meaning of

each of its constituent words. WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY

(WEBSTER’S) (1986) defines “sheeting,” in relevant part, as “1 : material in the form of sheets or

suitable for forming into sheets : as . . . b : material (as a plastic) in the form of a continuous film

. . . .” Id. at 2092. WEBSTER’S defines “sheet,” in relevant part, as “3 a : a broad stretch or

surface of something that is usu. thin in comparison to its length and breadth . . . .” Id. at 2091.

WEBSTER’S defines “film” as “2 b : a thin covering or coating or veil.” Id. at 850. The OXFORD

ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d Ed. 1989) defines “sheet” as “9. a. A relatively thin piece of

considerable breadth of a malleable, ductile, or pliable substance.” Id. at 224. Based on the

above definitions, the Court finds “sheeting” is material in the form of or suitable for forming

into a broad surface of something that is unusually thin, or is a material in the form of a

continuous thin covering or coating.

WEBSTER’S (1986) defines “plastic” as “3 a (1) : a substance that at some stage in its

manufacture or processing can be shaped by flow . . . and that can retain the new solid often rigid

shape under conditions of use.”18 Id. at 1733. Finally, the Court finds the use of the word “of”

(1990).
17
See supra note 7.
18
The Court notes that the statute similarly defines “plastics:”
Court No. 97-06-00959-S Page - 16 -

prior to the words “sheeting of plastics” indicates that whether the “sheeting of plastics” existed

as a separate component prior to being part of the “handbag” is irrelevant.19 See Jacques Isler

Corp. v. United States, 433 F.2d 1399, 1401-02 (C.C.P.A. 1970). Indeed, absent a provision to

the contrary goods are classified in their condition as imported. See Heartland By-Products, Inc.

v. United States, 74 F. Supp. 2d 1324, 1341 (CIT 1999) (citing Worthington v. Robbins, 139 U.S.

337, 341 (1891)).

B. Merchandise at Issue Properly Classified Under Subheading 4202.22.15, HTSUS,
“Handbags . . . With outer surface of sheeting of plastic”

The Court finds the merchandise as identified by the parties in their stipulations falls

within heading 4202, HTSUS, and therefore is correctly classified under heading 4202, HTSUS.

The parties stipulate the merchandise is a “handbag” whose “outer surface” contains a “plastic”

(or “plastics”) component that is exposed, entirely “covers” a textile component, and is relatively

thin in comparison to its breadth. Therefore, the only word in the heading whose application to

the merchandise at issue is seemingly unclear is “sheeting.” As discussed above, the common

Throughout this tariff schedule the expression “plastics” means those materials of
heading 3901 to 3914 which are or have been capable, either at the moment of
polymerization or at some subsequent stage of being formed under external
influence (usually heat and pressure, if necessary with a solvent or plasticizer) by
molding, casting, extruding, rolling or other process into shapes which are
retained on the removal of the external influence.

Chapter 39, Note 1, HTSUS.
19
The Gamma Grip opinion supports this interpretation. In Gamma Grip the Secretariat
argued there should be no distinction for merchandise composed of plastic between
“coated/impregnated products (application of a liquid product) and covered/laminated products
(pre-existing sheets)” and consequently, “whether or not the sheet is pre-existing” does not affect
classification of products “presented in the form of a sheet.” See Gamma Grip, supra note 11, at
¶¶ 6 - 8.
Court No. 97-06-00959-S Page - 17 -

meaning of “sheeting” is material in the form of or suitable for forming into a broad surface of

something that is unusually thin, or is a material in the form of a continuous thin covering or

coating. Based on this definition and the parties’ stipulations, the Court finds the merchandise is

correctly classified under heading 4202, HTSUS, “handbags . . . of sheeting of plastics.”

U.S. Note 2 provides support for the Court’s conclusion. While U.S. Note 2 relates only

to specific subheadings within heading 4202, HTSUS, and therefore, is not binding for

determining prima facie classifiability under heading 4202, HTSUS, it is persuasive as to what

Congress intended the phrase “sheeting of plastics” to mean in the context of the statute as a

whole. Cf. Productol Chem. Co. v. United States, 74 Cust. Ct. 138, 151 (1975) (when the same

word or phrase is used in different parts of the same statute it will be presumed to have the same

meaning, unless a contrary intent is indicated). Thus, it appears when “textile fabric [is]

impregnated, coated, covered, or laminated with plastics” and “the plastic constituent makes up

the exterior surface of the article,” Congress intended the material on the outer surface of the

merchandise to be considered a “sheeting of plastics.” See U.S. Note 2.

Plaintiff’s counter-argument that the “plastic/textile material” is a unitary substance and

thus cannot be considered a “sheeting of plastics” is unconvincing. Under GRI 2(b),20 “[a]ny

reference in a heading to a material or substance shall be taken to include a reference to mixtures

or combinations of that material or substance with other materials or substances.” GRI 2(b),

HTSUS. Handbags “of sheeting of plastics” can thus be taken to include reference to handbags

20
GRI 2(a) is inapplicable as no party asserts that the merchandise at issue is incomplete,
unfinished, unassembled, or disassembled.
Court No. 97-06-00959-S Page - 18 -

“of sheeting” of a combination “plastic/textile material.” Consequently, the merchandise is

prima facie classifiable under heading 4202, HTSUS. If merchandise is prima facie classifiable

under heading 4202, HTSUS, it is precluded from classification as a textile, see Section XI, Note

1(l), HTSUS21, and from classification as an item of plastic. See Chapter 39, Note 2(ij).22

Therefore, plaintiff’s proposed alterative classification under subheading 3926.90.98, HTSUS, as

“Other articles of plastics . . . Other: . . . Other,” is incorrect. Because the parties have not

suggested, nor has the Court found, any other potential headings under which the merchandise

may fall, the Court, under GRI 2(b), considers the combination “plastic/textile material” of which

the merchandise at issue is composed to be “sheeting of plastics” under heading 4202, HTSUS.

In addition to finding the merchandise is correctly classified under heading 4202,

HTSUS, the Court finds Customs correctly classified the merchandise under subheading

4202.22.15, HTSUS. U.S. Note 2 instructs, for the purpose of determining whether merchandise

is properly classified under subheading 4202.22, HTSUS, merchandise composed of textile

covered with plastic on the exposed surface of the merchandise is considered as having an outer

surface of plastic sheeting. Since the parties have stipulated the material comprising the outer

surface of the handbag consists of a plastic material on the exterior surface of the bag which

covers a textile material, and there are no alternative subheadings the Court finds appropriate, the

Court finds the merchandise is correctly classified under subheading 4202.22, HTSUS, as

“Handbags . . . With outer surface of sheeting of plastic.” For the reasons stated above and

21
Section XI, Note 1(l), HTSUS, states, in relevant part, “This section does not cover . . .
[a]rticles of textile materials of heading 4201 or 4202.”
22
See supra note 14.
Court No. 97-06-00959-S Page - 19 -

because the relevant phrase in subheading 4202.22.15, HTSUS, is identical to that in subheading

4202.22, HTSUS, the Court finds Customs’ classification of the merchandise under subheading

4202.22.15, HTSUS, as “Handbags . . . With outer surface of sheeting of plastic,” is correct both

independently and in comparison with the importer’s alternative.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the Court finds Customs correctly classified the

merchandise at issue under subheading 4202.15.22, HTSUS, as “Handbags . . . With outer

surface of sheeting of plastic.” Consequentially, defendant’s motion for summary judgment is

granted, and plaintiff’s cross-motion for summary judgment is denied.

__________________
Gregory W. Carman
Chief Judge
Dated: May 5, 2000
New York, NY