UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 12-4540
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
BOBBY LEE MCCAINE MINTON,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Statesville. Richard L.
Voorhees, District Judge. (5:07-cr-00010-RLV-CH-1)
Submitted: January 15, 2013 Decided: February 6, 2013
Before NIEMEYER, WYNN, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Chiege O. Kalu Okwara, LAW OFFICE OF CHIEGE O. KALU OKWARA,
Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellant. Maria Kathleen Vento,
OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Charlotte, North Carolina,
for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Bobby Lee McCaine Minton appeals the district court’s
order revoking his term of supervised release and imposing a
sentence of twelve months’ imprisonment. Counsel has filed a
brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967),
certifying that there are no meritorious issues for appeal, but
questioning whether the district court erroneously revoked
Minton’s supervised release and whether the twelve-month
sentence was plainly unreasonable. Minton was given the
opportunity to file a pro se supplemental brief, but has not
done so. The Government has declined to file a response. We
affirm.
A district court may revoke a term of supervised
release if it “finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the
defendant violated a condition of supervised release.” 18
U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) (2006). Minton admitted to violating the
terms of his supervised release by using illegal drugs.
Revocation of supervised release is required if the defendant
possessed a controlled substance, 18 U.S.C. § 3583(g)(1) (2006),
and “proof of intentional use of a controlled substance is
sufficient to establish possession and trigger the application
of § 3583(g).” United States v. Clark, 30 F.3d 23, 25 (4th Cir.
1994). The district court therefore did not err in revoking
Minton’s supervised release.
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A district court has broad discretion to impose a
sentence after revoking a defendant’s supervised release.
United States v. Thompson, 595 F.3d 544, 547 (4th Cir. 2010).
We will affirm a sentence imposed after revocation of supervised
release if it is within the statutory maximum and is not
“plainly unreasonable.” United States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433,
439-40 (4th Cir. 2006). In making this determination, we first
consider whether the sentence imposed is procedurally or
substantively unreasonable. Id. at 438. A supervised release
revocation sentence is procedurally reasonable if the district
court considered the advisory policy statement range and the 18
U.S.C.A. § 3553(a) (West 2000 & Supp. 2011) factors applicable
to supervised release revocation. Id. at 438-40. “A court need
not be as detailed or specific when imposing a revocation
sentence as it must be when imposing a post-conviction sentence,
but it still must provide a statement of reasons for the
sentence imposed.” Thompson, 595 F.3d at 547 (internal
quotation marks omitted). A sentence is substantively
reasonable if the district court stated a proper basis for
concluding the defendant should receive the sentence imposed, up
to the statutory maximum. Crudup, 461 F.3d at 440. Only if a
sentence is found procedurally or substantively unreasonable
will we “then decide whether the sentence is plainly
unreasonable.” Id. at 439.
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After review of the record, we conclude that the
revocation sentence is both procedurally and substantively
reasonable. The twelve-month sentence is well below the
applicable statutory maximum of twenty-four months’
imprisonment. The district court sufficiently explained its
rationale for the sentence imposed, emphasizing the fact that
the court previously provided Minton an opportunity to rectify
his behavior after testing positive for illegal drug use within
two months of his release from prison, to no avail. In
addition, the court appropriately considered the § 3553(a)
factors in fashioning its sentence, including the goal of
deterrence, the history and characteristics of the defendant,
and the need to provide the defendant with rehabilitative care.
The imposition of a twelve-month sentence was therefore not
plainly unreasonable.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire
record for meritorious issues and have found none. We therefore
affirm the district court’s judgment. This court requires that
counsel inform Minton, in writing, of his right to petition the
Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If
Minton requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes
that such a petition would be frivolous, counsel may move in
this court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s
motion must state that a copy thereof was served on Minton. We
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dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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