T.C. Memo. 2013-42
UNITED STATES TAX COURT
ROGER PHILLIPS, Petitioner v.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent
Docket No. 28324-10. Filed February 7, 2013.
Roger Phillips, pro se.
David L. Zoss, for respondent.
MEMORANDUM FINDINGS OF FACT AND OPINION
MARVEL, Judge: In a notice of deficiency dated September 13, 2010,
respondent determined a deficiency in petitioner’s 2006 Federal income tax of
$51,864 and additions to tax under sections 6651(a)(1) and (2) and 6654(a) of
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[*2] $11,107, $9,873, and $2,323, respectively.1 After concessions,2 the issues for
decision are: (1) whether petitioner must include in taxable income a distribution
from his individual retirement account (IRA) of $127,074 and, if so, whether he is
liable for the 10% additional tax on early distributions under section 72(t); (2)
whether petitioner received tax-exempt interest income of $521 during 2006; (3)
whether petitioner substantiated his claimed deductions for moving expenses and
business expenses; and (4) whether petitioner is liable for additions to tax under
sections 6651(a)(1) and (2) and 6654 for 2006.
1
Unless otherwise indicated, section references are to the Internal Revenue
Code in effect for the year in issue, and Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules
of Practice and Procedure. Some monetary amounts have been rounded to the
nearest dollar.
2
In the notice of deficiency respondent determined that petitioner received
taxable distributions from his IRA of $157,074. Respondent concedes that
petitioner made a qualifying IRA rollover contribution of $30,000 and, to that
extent, he did not receive taxable income and is not liable for the sec. 72(t) addition
to tax.
Pursuant to the deemed stipulations, petitioner is entitled to a standard
deduction of $5,150 and a personal exemption of $3,300 for 2006.
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[*3] FINDINGS OF FACT
Some of the facts have been deemed established for purposes of this case in
accordance with Rule 91(f).3 The deemed facts are incorporated herein by this
reference. Petitioner resided in Minnesota when he filed his petition.
During 2006 petitioner maintained an IRA at Ameriprise Trust Co.
(Ameriprise). In June 2006 petitioner rolled over $30,000 of his Ameriprise IRA
into a qualifying IRA account at BankAnnapolis. Following the June 2006 rollover
petitioner directed Ameriprise to transfer $127,074, the remaining balance of his
IRA, to his existing savings account at BankAnnapolis. He elected to transfer the
funds to his savings account rather than to a qualified retirement account or IRA.
Petitioner received a total distribution from his Ameriprise IRA of $157,074 during
2006. Ameriprise withheld from this distribution $2,500 of Federal income tax.
3
On January 11, 2012, respondent filed a motion to show cause why proposed
facts and evidence should not be accepted as established under Rule 91(f) and
attached a proposed stipulation of facts. By order dated January 12, 2012, this
Court ordered that petitioner file a response to respondent’s motion in accordance
with Rule 91(f)(2) on or before February 1, 2012. Petitioner failed to file a response
to respondent’s motion that complied with Rule 91(f)(2). By order dated February
8, 2012, this Court made the order to show cause under Rule 91(f) absolute and
deemed established the facts and evidence set forth in respondent’s proposed
stipulation of facts.
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[*4] For 2006 respondent received the following information returns with respect
to petitioner: (1) a Form 5498, IRA Contribution Information, from BankAnnapolis,
reporting a $500 IRA contribution and a $30,000 IRA rollover contribution; (2) a
Form 5498 from Ameriprise, reporting that petitioner’s account had a fair market
value of $6; (3) a Form 1099-INT, Interest Income, from American Express Bank,
reporting interest income of $14; (4) Forms 1099-INT from BankAnnapolis,
reporting interest income of $88 and $520; and (5) a Form 1099-R, Distributions
From Pensions, Annuities, Retirement or Profit-Sharing Plans, IRAs, Insurance
Contracts, etc., from Ameriprise, reporting an IRA distribution of $157,074 and tax
withheld of $2,500.
Petitioner failed to timely file a Form 1040, U.S. Individual Income Tax
Return, for 2006. Respondent prepared a substitute for return pursuant to section
6020(b). On the basis of the substitute for return, respondent mailed to petitioner a
notice of deficiency for 2006 dated September 13, 2010, determining that petitioner
had received a taxable distribution from his IRA of $157,074 and interest income of
$622. Respondent also determined that petitioner was liable for: (1) a 10% tax
with respect to his $157,074 early distribution from his IRA; and (2) additions to tax
under sections 6651(a)(1) and (2) and 6654.
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[*5] On August 26, 2011, petitioner submitted to respondent a Form 1040 for
2006. On petitioner’s untimely filed return, he reported that he received tax-exempt
interest income of $521 and an IRA distribution of $157,239, including a taxable
IRA distribution of $78,125. He claimed moving expenses of $7,698. On an
attached Schedule C, Profit or Loss From Business, petitioner claimed a loss of
$82,603.4 Petitioner attached to his return: (1) the Form 1099-INT from American
Express Bank; (2) the Form 1099-INT from BankAnnapolis; (3) the Form 1099-R
from Ameriprise; and (4) the Form 5498 from BankAnnapolis.
OPINION
I. Burden of Proof and Burden of Production
Ordinarily, the Commissioner’s determinations in a notice of deficiency are
presumed correct, and the taxpayer bears the burden of proving that the
determinations are erroneous. Rule 142(a); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111,
115 (1933). The burden of proof shifts to the Commissioner, however, if the
taxpayer produces credible evidence to support the deduction or position, the
taxpayer complied with the substantiation requirements, and the taxpayer
4
The deemed stipulation of facts states that on his 2006 return petitioner
claimed a Schedule C loss of $88,603. Petitioner’s 2006 return, which is in the
record, shows that he actually claimed a loss of $82,603.
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[*6] cooperated with the Secretary5 with regard to all reasonable requests for
information. Sec. 7491(a); see also Higbee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 438, 440-
441 (2001).
Petitioner does not contend that section 7491(a)(1) should shift the burden
here, and the record establishes that he did not satisfy the section 7491(a)(2)
requirements. Consequently, petitioner bears the burden of proof as to any disputed
factual issue. See Rule 142(a).
Under section 6201(d), if a taxpayer asserts a reasonable dispute with respect
to an item of income reported on an information return filed by a third party and the
taxpayer meets certain other requirements, the Commissioner bears the burden of
producing reasonable and probative evidence, in addition to the information return,
concerning the deficiency attributable to the income item. Petitioner has not raised
any reasonable dispute with respect to the accuracy of the information returns.
Consequently, the burden of production with respect to the income did not shift to
respondent under section 6201(d).
5
The term “Secretary” means “the Secretary of the Treasury or his delegate”,
sec. 7701(a)(11)(B), and the term “or his delegate” means “any officer, employee,
or agency of the Treasury Department duly authorized by the Secretary of the
Treasury directly, or indirectly by one or more redelegations of authority, to perform
the function mentioned or described in the context”, sec. 7701(a)(12)(A)(i).
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[*7] II. IRA Distribution and Section 72(t) Penalty
A. Taxable Distribution Amount
Petitioner does not appear to contest that he received a distribution from his
Ameriprise IRA of $157,074 during 2006. He attached to his untimely filed 2006
return the Form 1099-R from Ameriprise, and he reported on his return that he
received a distribution from Ameriprise of $157,239. Respondent has conceded that
petitioner made a rollover contribution of $30,000 and that that amount is excluded
from petitioner’s taxable income. Accordingly, we need decide only whether
petitioner must include in income the remaining amount of the distribution.
Petitioner appears to contend that the remaining amount of the distribution is not
includable in gross income because he merely made an error in rolling over the
remaining balance of his Ameriprise account.
Generally, amounts distributed from an IRA are includable in a taxpayer’s
gross income as provided in section 72. Sec. 408(d)(1). However, section
408(d)(3) provides that a distribution is not includable in gross income if the entire
amount of the distribution an individual receives is paid into an IRA or other eligible
retirement plan within 60 days of the distribution. See Schoof v.
Commissioner, 110 T.C. 1, 7 (1998). This recontribution is known as a “rollover
contribution”. Sec. 408(d)(3).
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[*8] In Wood v. Commissioner, 93 T.C. 114, 115-118 (1989), the taxpayer’s
financial institution made a bookkeeping error and the taxpayer’s rollover
contribution was not transferred to an IRA within 60 days of the distribution. The
taxpayer took every reasonably expected step in order to roll over his lump-sum
distribution as required by law. Id. at 122. We held that the bookkeeping error did
not preclude rollover treatment because the taxpayer had, in substance, satisfied the
statutory requirements. Id. at 122-123. By contrast, in Schoof v. Commissioner,
110 T.C. at 10-11, we held that rollover treatment was precluded where the
distribution was rolled over to a trust that lacked a qualified IRA trustee. We stated:
“Where the requirements of a statute relate to the substance or
essence of the statute, they must be rigidly observed. On the other
hand, if the requirements are procedural or directory in that they do not
go to the essence of the thing to be done, but rather are given with a
view to the orderly conduct of business, they may be fulfilled by
substantial compliance.” [Citations omitted.]
Id. at 11 (quoting Rodoni v. Commissioner, 105 T.C. 29, 38-39 (1995)); see also
Crow v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2002-178.
Petitioner testified that after rolling over $30,000 in June 2006 he sought to
transfer the balance of his Ameriprise IRA to BankAnnapolis. He further testified
that he structured the transfer in two parts in order to comply with what he
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[*9] believed was the applicable law. He testified that he intended that the value of
the second transfer would be invested into a certificate of deposit (CD) and
eventually moved from the CD to a qualifying retirement account or IRA. Petitioner
admitted that he received an early distribution from his Ameriprise IRA during
2006.
Even if we were to accept petitioner’s testimony as credible, his testimony
shows that he failed to roll over his remaining Ameriprise IRA balance into an IRA
or a qualified plan as required by section 408(d)(3). After Ameriprise transferred
the funds to BankAnnapolis, BankAnnapolis deposited the funds into petitioner’s
savings account. At that point, petitioner had direct control over the funds.
Petitioner introduced no evidence to show that the funds were later transferred
timely to a qualifying IRA. A fundamental requirement for a rollover contribution is
that the funds are actually rolled over to an IRA or other plan, see sec. 408(d)(3),
and petitioner failed to satisfy this requirement. Accordingly, we find that petitioner
failed to substantiate an IRA rollover contribution in an amount greater than
$30,000. Therefore the remaining amount of the distribution, or $127,074, is
includable in the calculation of petitioner’s taxable income.
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[*10] B. Section 72(t) Additional Tax
Section 72(t)(1) imposes a 10% additional tax when a qualified retirement
plan participant receives an early distribution that fails to satisfy one of the statutory
exceptions. Petitioner admitted that he received an early distribution from his IRA,
a qualified retirement plan for purposes of section 72(t), see sec. 4974(c)(4), and
that he was liable for the section 72(t) additional tax with respect to the portion of
the distribution that he failed to properly roll over into an IRA or a qualified plan.
Respondent determined that petitioner received an early distribution from his
IRA subject to the section 72(t) additional tax, and petitioner failed to prove that
respondent’s determination was erroneous. Petitioner’s distribution of $127,074 is
an early distribution from a qualified retirement plan. Accordingly, the 10%
additional tax applies to the $127,074 distribution unless petitioner qualifies for an
exception. See sec. 72(t)(1) and (2); see also Stipe v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.
2011-92; Dollander v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2009-187.
Petitioner has not alleged that any exception applies, nor has he introduced
any evidence that could allow us to conclude that an exception applies. Therefore,
petitioner is liable for the 10% additional tax on his early distribution of $127,074.
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[*11] III. Taxability of Interest Income
Petitioner does not appear to contest that he received interest income of $622
during 2006. He attached to his untimely filed 2006 return the Forms 1099-INT
from American Express Bank and BankAnnapolis. Petitioner appears to contend
that the $521 of interest income he received from BankAnnapolis is excluded from
taxable income because it is attributable to the funds he purportedly intended to roll
over into an IRA but which BankAnnapolis deposited into his savings account.
Accordingly, we need decide only whether petitioner must include in taxable income
the $521 of interest income he received from BankAnnapolis.
Gross income includes “all income from whatever source derived”,
including interest. Sec. 61(a). As discussed supra pp. 8-9, petitioner rolled over
IRA contributions of only $30,000 during 2006. The balance of petitioner’s
Ameriprise IRA was deposited into his savings account at BankAnnapolis.
Petitioner is not eligible to exclude from gross income the balance of the
Ameriprise IRA because he failed to comply with the requirements for making a
rollover contribution. Therefore, petitioner is not entitled to exclude the interest
earned on the balance of the Ameriprise IRA deposited into his BankAnnapolis
account. Petitioner has offered no other arguments regarding why the $521 of
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[*12] interest income qualifies for tax-exempt treatment. Accordingly, we sustain
respondent’s determinations with respect to petitioner’s interest income.
IV. Claimed Expense Deductions
Deductions are a matter of legislative grace, and ordinarily a taxpayer must
prove that he is entitled to the deductions he claims. INDOPCO, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79, 84 (1992). A taxpayer must maintain records to
substantiate claimed deductions and to establish the taxpayer’s correct tax liability.
Higbee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. at 440; see also sec. 6001. The taxpayer must
produce such records upon the Secretary’s request. Sec. 7602(a); see also sec.
1.6001-1(e), Income Tax Regs. Adequate substantiation must establish the amount
and purpose of a claimed deduction. Higbee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. at 440; see
also Hradesky v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 87 (1975), aff’d per curiam, 540 F.2d 821
(5th Cir. 1976). In deciding whether a taxpayer adequately substantiated a claimed
deduction, we are not required to accept the taxpayer’s “self-serving, unverified,
and undocumented testimony.” Shea v. Commissioner, 112 T.C. 183, 189 (1999).
When a taxpayer establishes that he paid or incurred a deductible expense but
does not establish the amount of the expense, we may estimate the amount of the
deductible expense. Cohan v. Commissioner, 39 F.2d 540, 543-544 (2d Cir.
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[*13] 1930). However, we cannot estimate the amount unless the taxpayer
introduces evidence that he paid or incurred the expense and the evidence is
sufficient for us to develop a reasonable estimate. Williams v. United States, 245
F.2d 559, 560 (5th Cir. 1957).
A. Claimed Schedule C Expenses
Petitioner testified that during 2006 he incurred expenses and sustained an
overall loss with respect to his Schedule C business activity. At the pretrial
conference petitioner described his business activity as “a consulting activity
which uses pro se litigation as part of its activity”. At trial he testified that his
business activity involved “intellectual property valuation”. Petitioner did not
testify regarding any of the expenses he purportedly incurred with respect to his
business activity. He also admitted that he had failed to introduce any
documentation to support any of the items he reported as expenses on his
Schedule C.
Petitioner did not introduce any documentation or other credible evidence to
substantiate his reported Schedule C expenses or to provide any reasonable basis for
estimating the expenses. Petitioner’s uncorroborated testimony is insufficient to
substantiate the expenses. Petitioner is not entitled to any deduction for Schedule C
business expenses.
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[*14] B. Claimed Moving Expenses
Petitioner testified that he moved his place of residence from Minnesota to
Maryland in April 2006. He further testified that the moving expenses included the
cost of renting a van to transport his personal belongings to Maryland. Petitioner
did not testify regarding any other moving expenses he paid. He admitted that he
had failed to introduce any documentation to support any of the moving expenses
that he claimed on his return.
Although petitioner has not offered any support for his contention, we infer
from his testimony that he is claiming that his moving expenses were a deductible
expense under section 217. Section 217 provides that a taxpayer is allowed a
deduction for “moving expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in
connection with the commencement of work by the taxpayer as an employee or as a
self-employed individual at a new principal place of work.” Petitioner did not
testify as to why he moved from Minnesota to Maryland. Regardless, petitioner did
not introduce any documentation or other credible evidence to substantiate his
claimed moving expenses of $7,698 or to provide any reasonable basis for
estimating the expenses. Petitioner’s uncorroborated testimony is insufficient to
substantiate the claimed expenses. Petitioner is not entitled to any deduction for
moving expenses.
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[*15] V. Additions to Tax
If the taxpayer assigns error to the Commissioner’s determination that a
taxpayer is liable for an addition to tax, the Commissioner has the burden, under
section 7491(c), of producing evidence with respect to the liability of the taxpayer
for the addition to tax. See Higbee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. at 446-447. To meet
his burden of production, the Commissioner must come forward with sufficient
evidence that it is appropriate to impose the addition to tax. Id. Once the
Commissioner meets his burden, the taxpayer must come forward with evidence
sufficient to persuade this Court that the determination is incorrect. Id.
Respondent determined that petitioner is liable for an addition to tax for
failure to timely file a return for 2006 under section 6651(a)(1). Section
6651(a)(1) authorizes the imposition of an addition to tax for failure to timely file
a return, unless it is shown that such failure is due to reasonable cause and not due
to willful neglect. See United States v. Boyle, 469 U.S. 241, 245 (1985); United
States v. Nordbrock, 38 F.3d 440, 444 (9th Cir. 1994). Failure to timely file a
Federal income tax return is due to reasonable cause if the taxpayer exercised
ordinary business care and prudence but nevertheless was unable to file the return
within the prescribed time. See sec. 301.6651-1(c)(1), Proced. & Admin. Regs.
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[*16] Willful neglect means a conscious, intentional failure to file, or reckless
indifference toward filing. Boyle, 469 U.S. at 245.
Petitioner admitted that he failed to timely file a return for 2006. In addition,
respondent introduced a copy of petitioner’s account transcript for 2006 which
confirms that petitioner failed to timely file returns for the year at issue.
Consequently, we conclude that respondent has satisfied his burden of production
under section 7491(c), and petitioner must come forward with evidence sufficient to
persuade the Court that respondent’s determination is erroneous. Although
petitioner testified that he did not timely file his 2006 return because he was
involved in litigation in Federal court, we find that he did not have reasonable cause
for failing to timely file his return and that he failed to file his return because of
willful neglect. See, e.g., Cook v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2012-167.
Accordingly, we sustain respondent’s determinations as to the section 6651(a)(1)
addition to tax for 2006.
Respondent also determined that petitioner is liable for an addition to tax for
failure to pay tax shown on a return under section 6651(a)(2). Section 6651(a)(2)
imposes an addition to tax for failure to pay the amount of tax shown on a
taxpayer’s Federal income tax return on or before the payment due date, unless
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[*17] such failure is due to reasonable cause or willful neglect.6 A failure to pay
will be considered due to reasonable cause if the taxpayer makes a satisfactory
showing that he exercised ordinary business care and prudence in providing for
payment of his tax liability and was nevertheless unable to pay the tax or would
suffer undue hardship if he paid on the due date. See sec. 301.6651-1(c)(1), Proced.
& Admin. Regs. The section 6651(a)(2) addition to tax applies only when an
amount of tax is shown on a return filed by the taxpayer or prepared by the
Secretary. Sec. 6651(a)(2), (g)(2); Cabirac v. Commissioner, 120 T.C. 163, 170
(2003). When a taxpayer has not filed a return, the section 6651(a)(2) addition to
tax may not be imposed unless the Secretary has prepared a substitute for return that
satisfies the requirements of section 6020(b). See Wheeler v. Commissioner, 127
T.C. 200, 210 (2006), aff’d, 521 F.3d 1289 (10th Cir. 2008).
Respondent introduced into evidence a substitute for return that satisfies the
requirements of section 6020(b), as well as a copy of petitioner’s account
transcript. The substitute for return and the account transcript establish that
petitioner failed to pay the tax shown on the substitute for return. Respondent has
satisfied his burden of production under section 7491(c). Petitioner did not
6
The sec. 6651(a)(2) addition to tax is 0.5% of the amount of tax shown on
the return, with an additional 0.5% per month during which the failure to pay
continues, up to a maximum of 25%.
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[*18] introduce any evidence that he was unable to pay the tax owed or that he
would have suffered undue hardship if he had paid the tax on the due date.
Accordingly, we sustain respondent’s determination as to the section 6651(a)(2)
addition to tax.
Respondent also determined that petitioner is liable for additions to tax for
failure to pay estimated tax under section 6654. Section 6654 imposes an addition
to tax on an individual who underpays his estimated tax.7 The addition to tax is
calculated with reference to four required installment payments of the taxpayer’s
estimated tax liability. Sec. 6654(c) and (d). In general, each required installment
of estimated tax is equal to 25% of the “required annual payment”. Sec. 6654(d).
A taxpayer has an obligation to pay estimated taxes only if he has a “required
annual payment”. Wheeler v. Commissioner, 127 T.C. at 211-212; see also
Mendes v. Commissioner, 121 T.C. 308, 324 (2003). The “required annual
payment” is equal to the lesser of (1) 90% of the tax shown on the individual’s
return for that year (or, if no return is filed, 90% of his tax for such year), see sec.
7
Unless a statutory exception applies, the sec. 6654(a) addition to tax is
mandatory, see sec. 6654(a), (e); Recklitis v. Commissioner, 91 T.C. 874, 913
(1988), and sec. 6654 does not contain a general exception for reasonable cause or
absence of willful neglect, see Grosshandler v. Commissioner, 75 T.C. 1, 21 (1980).
Petitioner does not contend that any of the statutory exceptions under sec. 6654(e)
are applicable to this case.
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[*19] 6654(d)(1)(B)(i), or (2) if the individual filed a return for the immediately
preceding taxable year, 100% of the tax shown on that return, see sec.
6654(d)(1)(B)(ii), see also sec. 6654(d)(1)(A) and (B) and (C). If, after the
Commissioner issues a notice of deficiency for a taxable year, a taxpayer files a
return for that year showing no tax due, the Court will disregard the return for
purposes of determining whether the taxpayer satisfies “the return-filed safe harbor
of section 6654(d)(1)(B)(i).” Mendes v. Commissioner, 121 T.C. at 328.
Because petitioner failed to file his 2006 return until after respondent issued
the notice of deficiency, we disregard his untimely filed 2006 return. Accordingly,
petitioner’s required annual payment was equal to the lesser of 90% of his tax for
2006 or, if he filed a return for the immediately preceding taxable year, 100% of the
tax shown on that return. See sec. 6654(d)(1)(B). Respondent introduced a copy of
an account transcript showing that petitioner did not file his 2005 return until 2011.
Because petitioner did not file his 2005 return until after respondent issued the
notice of deficiency for 2006, we disregard his untimely filed 2005 return.
Therefore, petitioner’s required annual payment was equal to 90% of his tax for
2006. Petitioner failed to make any estimated tax payments for 2006. We therefore
sustain respondent’s determination as to the section 6654 addition to tax for 2006.
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[*20] We have considered all the other arguments made by the parties, and to the
extent not discussed above, find those arguments to be irrelevant, moot, or without
merit.
To reflect the foregoing,
Decision will be entered under
Rule 155.