¶ 38. (concurring). I agree with Justice Ann Walsh Bradley's concurrence and join it. The only difference in approach I have with that opinion is that I would require the court of appeals and this court to state in any decision mandating a remand whether the parties are entitled to seek substitution. I do not think that the parties should be disputing this issue on remand or *452that the circuit court should expend resources deciding the issue of substitution. Thus I concur.
JON P. WILCOX, J.¶ 39. (concurring). I agree that in this case Findorff was entitled to substitution of judge under Wis. Stat. § 801.58(7) because the directions on remand required "further proceedings." I write separately because, like Justice Bradley, I am fearful that equating "specific action" with purely ministerial duties may result in more liberal substitution of judges in civil actions on remand. Wisconsin is one of only a handful of states in which a litigant may obtain peremptory substitution on remand in civil proceedings.1 Increasing substitution of judges on remand would surely be detrimental to the efficient administration of Wisconsin circuit courts, inasmuch as nearly one half of the circuit judges sit in single judge counties. Because I would not interpret § 801.58(7) to provide such a broad right to substitution, I respectfully concur.
¶ 40. To begin with, I believe that Wis. Stat. § 801.58(7) must be read in light of the fact that it is a purely legislative enactment that directly and substantially impacts the administration of Wisconsin courts. Under the Wisconsin Constitution, such administrative matters are expressly vested in this court; our authority to supervise and administer the Wisconsin court system is not created or circumscribed by the *453legislature. Wis. Const, art. VII, sec. 3; John F. Jelke Co. v. Beck, 208 Wis. 650, 660, 242 N.W. 576 (1932).
¶ 41. In considering the constitutionality of a legislative enactment that on its face directed this court to create the State Bar of Wisconsin, this court observed:
Throughout the history of the state this court in dealing with matters which lie in the zone between the legislative and judicial departments, has always exercised great care to avoid any controversy with the legislature. While the power to make procedural rules is undoubtedly a judicial power, and may be exercised by the court without legislative sanction, nevertheless the court over a long period of time accepted the procedural rules made by the legislature largely because they related to substantive as well as procedural matters....
Integration of Bar Case, 244 Wis. 8, 47, 11 N.W.2d 604 (1943). Rather than reading the statute in question as a legislative directive to the court to consolidate the state bar, this court interpreted the statute as an expression of the legislature's belief that creating a unified state bar would be good for the general welfare. Id. at 52-53. The court explained:
We do not regard the enactment [of the statute] as an attempt by the legislature to invade the province of the court or to dictate to it, but as a declaration that the integration of the bar will promote the general welfare. If in thus expressing its determination the legislature has employed language which might be construed as mandatory or coercive, we do not so regard it. It is as much the duty of the legislature as it is the duty of the court to stay within its constitutional field and we shall presume that it intended to do so in this case.
*454¶ 42. Similarly, I believe this court should view Wis. Stat. § 801.58(7) as an expression of the legislature's determination that judicial substitution on remand for further proceedings would be good for the general welfare. In the interest of comity between coequal branches of government, this legislative determination should be given effect to the extent it is consistent with effective and efficient administration of the courts.2 However, this court has not only the authority but the duty to ensure that this statute does not interfere with proper administration of the courts.3
*455¶ 43. The record in this case demonstrates that both the circuit court and the court of appeals were striving to give effect to Wis. Stat. § 801.58(7) without creating an unqualified right to substitution of judge after remand. Chief Judge Sheedy emphasized that reassigning the case to a new judge would be tantamount to ordering a new trial. Because the court of appeals' mandate did not order a new trial but merely directed the court to perform certain specific tasks, the chief judge concluded that no right to substitution had attached. Similarly, the court of appeals reasoned that Findorff had no right to substitution because the mandate only called for reexamination of the existing record and application of proper legal standards and principles.
¶ 44. I agree with the majority that the test for deciding whether a mandate calls for "specific action" or "further proceedings" does not depend only on whether new evidence must be added to the record. Focusing on that single factor does not take into account the circuit court's great discretion to resolve matters on remand in any manner consistent with the mandate. See majority op. at ¶ 25, discussing Fullerton Lumber Co. v. Torborg, 274 Wis. 478, 80 N.W.2d 461 (1957). In this case, for example, although the mandate does not require that facts be added to the record, the circuit court certainly has the discretion to do so.
¶ 45. Although I agree with the majority that the mandate in this case calls for further proceedings, I agree with Justice Bradley that the definition of "specific action" need not be quite as narrow as the majority determines. Equating "specific action" with purely ministerial duties means that the right to substitution will always attach unless the mandate requires only actions that are "absolute, certain and imperative, *456involving merely the performance of a specific task when the law imposes, prescribes and defines the time, mode and occasion for its performance with such certainty that nothing remains for judgment or discretion." Lister v. Board of Regents, 72 Wis. 2d 282, 301, 240 N.W.2d 610 (1976) (cited in majority opinion at ¶ 20).
¶ 46. No mandate ties the circuit court's hands in such a manner that even the "time, mode and occasion" of performance is certain. I would therefore read a bit more "wiggle room" into the language of § 801.58(7). I believe that the circuit court may exercise a limited degree of discretion in carrying out a mandate without engaging in "further proceedings."
¶ 47. I would hold that appellate courts must expressly state whether a mandate on remand should be interpreted as permitting "specific action" or "further proceedings." This practice would unequivocally inform the circuit court and the parties whether the right of substitution had attached without creating a virtually unqualified right to substitution on remand.
¶ 48. In short, I believe that as long as Wis. Stat. § 801.58(7) is in existence, this court should attempt to accommodate the legislature's determination that substitution on remand for further proceedings serves the general welfare. However, this court need not and should not recognize a right to substitution that is inconsistent with our constitutional duty to supervise and administer Wisconsin courts. For these reasons, I respectfully concur.
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.¶ 49. (concurring). The majority implicitly acknowledges that its interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 801.58(7) is unsatisfactory. It has *457the potential to increase significantly the number of judicial substitutions on remand. Yet, rather than endeavoring to arrive at a reasonable interpretation, the majority throws up its collective judicial hands and instead invites the legislature to enact a new statute to correct the majority's erroneous conclusion. Because the majority misconstrues and misapplies prior cases, and precludes the circuit court from exercising even a scintilla of discretion, I respectfully concur.
¶ 50. In determining when the right to judicial substitution attaches under Wis. Stat. § 801.58(7), the majority reasons first that a circuit court's exercise of discretion on remand forms the crux of the right to substitution. Accordingly, it adopts a definition of "specific action" that is informed by the dissent in Cuccio v. Rusilowski, 171 Wis. 2d 648, 492 N.W.2d 345 (Ct. App. 1992), and that is tied to the concept of a ministerial duty.
¶ 51. Further amplifying specific action as the "purely ministerial," the majority transports the definition of ministerial duty from the arena of public officer immunity to the context of judicial substitution. At the end of this process, the majority concludes that the right to substitution attaches when the remand requires any exercise of discretion on the circuit court's part and declares that its construction of Wis. Stat. § 801.58(7) comports with the liberal view of substitution.
¶ 52. In its interpretation of the right to substitution under Wis. Stat. § 801.58(7), the majority misconstrues the dissent in Rusilowski, resulting in the improvident comparison to a public officer's ministerial duty. Referring with approval to the dissent, the majority narrowly defines "specific action" for substitution purposes as "a purely ministerial duty" that is *458absolute and that leaves no room for discretion. Majority op. at ¶ 20. A closer examination reveals, however, that the dissent did not hinge its determination on whether a "specific action" for substitution purposes was the equivalent of a governmental ministerial duty.
¶ 53. The main concern expressed by the Rusilowski dissent centered on the majority's failure to give deference to the circuit court's exercise of discretion. 177 Wis. 2d at 654. The dissent disapproved of the majority's reversal of the substitution order because the circuit court had acted well within the bounds of its discretion in reading the court of appeals mandate expansively. Id. at 658. Had the circuit court denied substitution by "implicitly conceding the 'specific action' scope of the remand," the dissent made clear that it would nevertheless uphold the circuit court's discretion, although it viewed the remand as non-ministerial in nature. Id.
¶ 54. The dissent's bone of contention, therefore, lay with the usurpation of circuit court discretion, not with the characterization of the remand as a specific action. As the Rusilowski dissent states in the first paragraph, "[t]he issue before us is whether or not the trial court abused its discretion in granting the request for substitution under sec. 801.58(7)." Id. at 654. Thus, the majority misconstrues the focus of the Rusilowski dissent.
¶ 55. The majority then misapplies the definition of ministerial duty from the context of public officer immunity to the definition of specific action in the context of judicial substitution. In essence, it transplants a definition that is ill suited for its new purpose. Public officer immunity is founded upon policy considerations aimed towards "protecting] public officers from being unduly hampered or intimidated in the discharge of *459their functions by threat of lawsuit or personal liability." Scarpaci v. Milwaukee County, 96 Wis. 2d 663, 682, 292 N.W.2d 816 (1980).1 As such, liability must be limited to tasks so narrowly circumscribed that officers may perform a wide range of functions freely.
¶ 56. The narrowly drawn parameters of a public officer's liability include the discharge of duties that are "absolute, certain and imperative, involving merely the performance of a specific task when the law imposes, prescribes and defines the time, mode and occasion for its performance with such certainty that nothing remains for judgment or discretion." Lister v. Board of Regents, 72 Wis. 2d 282, 301, 240 N.W.2d 610 (1976). In the realm of judicial substitution, specific action need not be constricted in such a manner. The concerns of perceived bias addressed by substitution do not parallel the concerns of potential paralysis attendant to the performance of a wide range of public duties.
¶ 57. In restricting specific action on remand to purely ministerial duties, the majority sacrifices judicial economy and efficient judicial administration by allowing for the substitution of judges in an increasing number of remand situations. Under today's interpretation, judges who have become well-versed in the complexities of a particular case may be substituted *460even when the remand calls for only a de minimis exercise of discretion.
¶ 58. The trial in this case spanned eight days and required extensive post-trial briefing on several intricate issues. When reviewing the substitution order granted by the trial judge, Chief Judge Sheedy declined to honor the substitution, observing that by doing so he would be "basically ordering a new trial." The majority's interpretation in essence provides litigants a renewed opportunity to get through the back door what they did not get through the front: a new trial.
¶ 59. Instructions on remand are not always of the black and white variety, but often fall into an expanse of gray. The majority's failure to allow for even a de minimis exercise of discretion upon remand foreshadows protests from courts that must grapple with, and be impeded by, the majority's unreasonable interpretation.
¶ 60. An interpretation that allows for substitution upon remand even in cases requiring only a de minimis exercise of discretion and no further involvement of the parties places an unwarranted demand on a system with limited resources. Efficient judicial administration serves not only the interests of those within the judicial system, but also serves the interests of those litigants and witnesses who use that system. Judicial economy requires a more reasonable reading of the substitution statute than the one proffered by the majority.
¶ 61. The majority implicitly acknowledges the limitations of its statutory interpretation and calls forth the legislature "to revise [Wis. Stat. § 801.58(7)], in order to restrict the right to substitute a judge on remand where 'further proceedings' are required." Majority op. at n. 14. Yet the legislature has already *461done so by the very words contained in Section 801.58(7).
¶ 62. The legislature could not have intended the unreasonable construction given to the substitution statute by the majority, a construction that too narrowly restricts the scope of specific action. Under the majority's construction, substitution upon remand is allowed in every case except where the appellate court mandate so "prescribes and defines the time, mode and occasion" for the performance of a specific act "that nothing remains for judgment or discretion."
¶ 63. This highly circumscribed definition of specific action is more rigid and impractical than the definition formulated by the Rusilowski court or the court of appeals in the present case. Neither court foreclosed the exercise of de minimis discretion, but rather limited the discretion to the existing record. Invoking the Rusilowski court's definition of specific action, the court of appeals here stated: "Consequently, we conclude that the right of substitution does not attach because this court's mandate requires [that].. .no new facts need be garnered, no added record be made; rather, the trial court is left with the same record and need not add to it." State ex rel. J.H. Findorff & Son, Inc. v. Circuit Court for Milwaukee County, unpublished slip op. at 5 (Ct. App. March 5,1999).
¶ 64. The majority rejects the court of appeals' interpretation and cloaks specific action with a more narrow meaning than the one advanced even by Findorff at oral argument. A review of that argument reveals Findorff s recognition that defining specific action as the "purely ministerial" is too restrictive. The majority could have chosen to adopt Findorff s suggested interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 801.58(7), one *462permitting judicial substitution only when the remand requires further involvement of the parties.
¶ 65. Perhaps the majority could have borrowed and refined the statutory construction from the context of remand in divorce proceedings that delimits substitution when a remand calls for the clarification of judgment on an existing record. See State ex rel. Parrish v. Kenosha County Circuit Court, 148 Wis. 2d 700, 704-05, 436 N.W.2d 608 (1989); State ex rel. Hubert v. Winnebago County Circuit Court, 163 Wis. 2d 517, 523, 471 N.W.2d 615 (Ct. App. 1991). The majority could have also considered a suggested interpretation of the statute that requires the court of appeals and this court to state on every remand whether the remand directs specific action or further proceedings.
¶ 66. I urge the majority to consider a reasonable interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 801.58(7) that would allow the circuit court to exercise de minimis discretion upon remand at least in some cases without triggering judicial substitution. In addition to the above proffered alternatives, I commend an interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 801.58(7) in large part borrowed from the Rusilowski dissent, which the majority cites with favor. 171 Wis. 2d at 656.
¶ 67. Under this suggested interpretation, the appellate mandate must unequivocally define the directed action as constituting specific action pursuant to the statute if the mandate is to be construed as requiring specific action. The appellate court may then define an action that requires only de minimis discretion as constituting specific action. In the absence of such an unequivocal declaration, that is, if any doubt remains as to the scope of the action, the circuit court has discretion to act, and the mandate allows for further proceedings under the statute.
*463¶ 68. Instead of considering any of the above interpretations, however, the majority settles on an unreasonable construction of Wis. Stat. § 801.58(7). Its reading allows for substitution upon remand in all cases involving only de minimis discretion.
¶ 69. In sum, the majority misconstrues the dissent in Rusilowski and misapplies a definition of ministerial duty borrowed from the context of public officer immunity. Additionally, it errs by advancing a bright-line interpretation for facile application that undermines efficient judicial administration. Accordingly, I concur.
¶ 70. I am authorized to state that CHIEF JUSTICE SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON joins this concurrence.
The petitioner's brief notes that very few states, including Wisconsin, California, Montana, and Indiana, have statutes that permit peremptory substitution on remand in civil proceedings. Br. of Pet'r at 20-21. Many states find it unnecessary to permit substitution on remand in civil proceedings in the absence of a showing of bias or prejudice. Id. at 20-21 and n.5.
Although I believe that this court should attempt to accommodate Wis. Stat. § 801.58(7), I wholeheartedly join the majority's invitation to the legislature to revise § 801.58(7). See majority opinion at ¶ 24 n.14. Indeed, I would encourage the legislature to consider repealing this provision in the interest of comity to this court. See State v. Holmes, 106 Wis. 2d 31, 75-76, 315 N.W.2d 703 (1982) (Coffey, J., concurring).
This court considered the constitutionality of the criminal peremptory substitution statute in Holmes, 106 Wis. 2d 31.1 am not convinced that Holmes adequately resolved the issue of whether the legislature's enactment of judicial substitution statutes impermissibly invades the constitutional authority of this court.
In any case, Holmes did not involve a statute requiring substitution after remand. Peremptory substitution after remand is even more wasteful of judicial resources than peremptory substitution before trial, because the trial judge who has already become familiar with the case is obviously best prepared to efficiently resolve the case on remand. In the case at hand, substitution will in effect result in a new trial.
Nearly identical concerns are addressed in the Bacon-Bahr line of cases, which hold that no right to substitution arises in proceedings to modify divorce judgments, even under Wis. Stat. § 801.58(7). See Parrish v. Kenosha County Circuit Court, 148 Wis. 2d 700, 703-05, 436 N.W.2d 608 (1989).
These policy considerations include:
(1) The danger of influencing public officers in the performance of their functions by the threat of lawsuit; 2) the deterrent effect which the threat of personal liability might have on those who are considering entering public service; 3) the drain on valuable time caused by such actions; 4) the unfairness of subjecting officials to personal liability for the acts of their subordinates; and 5) the feeling that the ballot and removal procedures are more appropriate methods of dealing with misconduct in public office.
Lister v. Board of Regents, 72 Wis. 2d 282, 299, 240 N.W.2d 610 (1976).