2022 IL App (5th) 190183-U
NOTICE
NOTICE
Decision filed 09/15/22. The
This order was filed under
text of this decision may be NO. 5-19-0183
Supreme Court Rule 23 and is
changed or corrected prior to
the filing of a Petition for not precedent except in the
Rehearing or the disposition of
IN THE limited circumstances allowed
the same. under Rule 23(e)(1).
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIFTH DISTRICT
______________________________________________________________________________
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the
) Circuit Court of
Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Marion County.
)
v. ) No. 12-CF-200
)
JOHN A. MORTON, ) Honorable
) Mark W. Stedelin,
Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding.
______________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE WHARTON delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices Welch and Barberis concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: The circuit court did not commit manifest error when it denied the defendant’s
postconviction petition after an evidentiary hearing, and postconviction counsel
fulfilled his duties, and since any argument to the contrary would lack merit, the
defendant’s appellate attorney is granted leave to withdraw as counsel, and the
judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.
¶2 The defendant, John A. Morton, appeals from the circuit court’s order denying his petition
for postconviction relief following an evidentiary hearing. The defendant’s court-appointed
attorney on appeal, the Office of the State Appellate Defender (OSAD), has concluded that this
appeal lacks merit. On that basis, OSAD has filed a motion for leave to withdraw as counsel (see
Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551 (1987)), along with a memorandum of law in support thereof.
The defendant has filed a pro se objection to OSAD’s Finley motion. This court has examined
OSAD’s motion and memorandum of law, the defendant’s pro se objection, as well as the entire
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record on appeal, and has concluded that this appeal does indeed lack merit. Accordingly, OSAD
is granted leave to withdraw as counsel, and the judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.
¶3 BACKGROUND
¶4 In June 2012, the defendant was charged with a single count of aggravated battery (720
ILCS 5/12-3.05(b)(1) (West 2012)), a Class X felony (id. § 12-3.05(h)). He was accused of
shaking his two-month-old son, T.M., causing significant brain injury. Later that June, the
defendant was arrested on a warrant. He spent about one month in pretrial custody in the Marion
County jail, and then bonded out. He was returned to the jail approximately 19 months later, when
he was arrested on new charges in No. 14-CF-15.
¶5 On March 5, 2014, the defendant, his defense counsel, Steve W. Quinn, and an assistant
State’s attorney appeared before the circuit court. Defense counsel announced that the parties had
reached a plea agreement that covered the instant case (i.e., No. 12-CF-200) as well as No. 10-CF-
209 and No. 14-CF-15. The assistant state’s attorney detailed the plea agreement as follows: in
the instant case, the defendant would plead guilty to the aggravated battery of T.M., and he would
be sentenced to imprisonment for 20 years, to be followed by mandatory supervised release (MSR)
for 3 years; in No. 10-CF-209, he would admit to the allegations in the petition to revoke probation,
and he would be sentenced to imprisonment for 5 years, followed by MSR for 2 years, and in No.
14-CF-15, he would plead guilty to count II, a violation of the Illinois Food, Drug and Cosmetic
Act (410 ILCS 620/1 et seq. (West 2014)), while counts I and III would be dismissed, and he
would be sentenced to imprisonment for 4 years, followed by MSR for 2 years; and the sentences
in the instant case and in No. 10-CF-209 would be concurrent with one another, but the sentence
in No. 14-CF-15 would be consecutive to them. Defense counsel agreed that the terms had been
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stated correctly. After being informed of the defendant’s prior convictions, which were all traffic,
the court accepted the parties’ agreement.
¶6 The court fully admonished the defendant as to all three of the cases, and the defendant
indicated his understanding. In the instant case, the court admonished the defendant that
aggravated battery is a Class X felony punishable by imprisonment for 6 to 30 years, and the
defendant indicated his understanding. The defendant also expressed his understanding that under
the terms of the plea agreement, he would be sentenced to 20 years for the aggravated battery, and
his sentence for count II in No. 14-CF-15 would be consecutive to that 20-year sentence. The
court admonished the defendant, and he indicated his understanding, of the presumption of
innocence, of his right to plead guilty or not guilty, of the State’s burden of proving him guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt, of his right to trial by a judge or a jury, of his right to be present, of
his right to confront and cross-examine accusers, of his right against self-incrimination, of his right
to testify if he so chose, of his right to call witnesses and to subpoena them if necessary, and of his
right to a speedy trial. The court also admonished the defendant that by pleading guilty, he would
not have a trial of any kind, he would waive his rights at trial, and he would be sentenced to prison
in accordance with the plea agreement’s terms.
¶7 The defendant pleaded guilty to aggravated battery, pleaded guilty to count II in No. 14-
CF-15, and admitted the allegations in the petition to revoke probation in No. 10-CF-209. He also
signed two written pleas of guilty and one written admission, and he indicated his understanding
of each of the three documents. He also indicated that nobody had forced or threatened him, and
nobody had promised him anything apart from what had been stated in court, to persuade him to
sign each document, and that each signature was his free and voluntary act. The court found that
his guilty pleas and his admission were knowingly and voluntarily made.
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¶8 A factual basis in the instant case and in count II of No. 14-CF-15 was provided by the
assistant state’s attorney. The court found factual bases for the guilty pleas and for the admission.
It imposed the agreed-upon sentences. The court admonished the defendant as to his right to
appeal, including the need for a motion to withdraw his guilty pleas, and the defendant indicated
his understanding.
¶9 In July 2014, the defendant filed a pro se motion to withdraw guilty plea and vacate
sentence, and a pro se motion to reduce sentence. In the former motion, he alleged, inter alia, that
he “was not in the right state of mind” at the time of his plea, in part due to drugs, and that plea
counsel did not devote sufficient care or attention to his case. The latter motion made similar
allegations. In September 2014, the state’s attorney filed a motion to dismiss the defendant’s
pro se motion to withdraw guilty plea, and a motion to dismiss his pro se motion to reduce
sentence, both on the ground of untimeliness. In December 2014, the circuit court granted both of
the State’s motions to dismiss. The defendant did not appeal from the judgment of conviction.
¶ 10 In April 2016, the defendant filed with the circuit court a pro se petition for relief under
the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 2016)). Essentially, he claimed
that counsel Quinn had provided ineffective assistance. More specifically, he claimed that
(1) counsel had completely failed to discuss with him pretrial motions, information gleaned from
discovery, tactics, or “an overall defense strategy,” and while the defendant was in pretrial custody
at the Marion County jail, counsel “spent a total of approximately three 10 minute sessions” with
the defendant; (2) counsel had failed to conduct an adequate, independent pretrial investigation
into the facts of the case, which should have included speaking with witnesses whom the defendant
“identified as being favorable”; (3) counsel had failed to conduct pretrial interviews of “readily
available witnesses” who had observed the defendant caring for children, and about whom the
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defendant had “explicitly informed counsel during their 10 minute meeting”; and (4) counsel had
threatened and coerced the defendant into pleading guilty, e.g., by telling the defendant that he
would receive “the max on every case” if he went to trial and lost, and that counsel did not have
time for his case.
¶ 11 The defendant did not specify how the pretrial investigation should have been handled
differently, or what sort of information may have been uncovered. In his affidavit, the defendant
named several witnesses who were familiar with his handling of children, but wrote that they were
unavailable to him as of the date of the postconviction petition.
¶ 12 The court docketed the petition for further consideration, and appointed postconviction
counsel for the defendant. Eventually, attorney Brian C. Wernsman took over as the defendant’s
postconviction counsel.
¶ 13 On December 6, 2017, the defendant filed, through postconviction counsel Wernsman, an
amended petition for postconviction relief. The amended petition claimed that the defendant’s
plea of guilty “was not voluntarily or intelligently entered” because the defendant was inadequately
advised of, and did not fully understand, the direct consequences of the plea, due to the ineffective
assistance of plea counsel Quinn. According to the defendant, plea counsel’s performance fell
below an objective standard of reasonableness, in that (1) counsel failed to adequately
communicate with the defendant, or to adequately discuss pretrial motions, discovery, or defense
strategy, or to raise the prospect of using an investigator to assist in the defense; (2) counsel failed
to conduct an independent investigation of the facts of the case, failed to listen to the defendant’s
“side of the story,” and failed to contact witnesses whom the defendant deemed favorable; and
(3) counsel provided the defendant with misleading and confusing information about the plea offer
and about what would happen if he did not accept it, and he coerced and threatened the defendant
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into accepting the plea. The amended petition also incorporated the pro se petition. The defendant
personally signed a notarized “certificate of veracity” wherein he swore that the allegations in the
amended petition were “true and correct to the best of [his] information, understanding and belief.”
¶ 14 Twelve sworn and notarized affidavits were attached to the amended petition, in support
thereof. One of those affidavits was the defendant’s. In it, the defendant described, inter alia, the
case-related communications between himself and plea counsel Quinn prior to the guilty plea.
According to the defendant, during the time that he was held in pretrial custody in the Marion
County jail—between June 29, 2012, and July 27, 2012—Quinn “spent a total of approximately
three 10 minute sessions consulting with [him] on this case.” The defendant also stated that while
he was “out on bond until the time of his plea, over 19 months (7/28/12-3/5/14), [he] had only 4
meetings with [plea] counsel.” Also, the defendant described threatening, coercive, and dismissive
behavior by Quinn that had led him to plead guilty, and he stated that Quinn had failed to inform
him that a private investigator had been hired. As for the other 11 affidavits, almost all of which
were from the defendant’s relatives, they portrayed the defendant as a caring parent who would
never harm a child. On that same day, Wernsman filed a certificate of compliance with Illinois
Supreme Court Rule 651(c) (eff. Feb. 6, 2013).
¶ 15 In January 2019, the defendant, through postconviction counsel Wernsman, filed a
memorandum of law in support of his postconviction petition. The State filed a response.
¶ 16 On January 16, 2019, the court held a hearing on the defendant’s amended postconviction
petition. The defendant, through Wernsman, merely asked the court to read the postconviction
petitions and the sworn affidavits that had been filed with the amended petition. The defendant
did not offer any other evidence; he neither testified nor called anyone else to testify. As for the
State, it called, as its sole witness, the defendant’s plea counsel, Steve W. Quinn.
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¶ 17 Quinn, who was a long-time criminal defense attorney based in Marion County, testified
that in October 2012, he was retained by the defendant’s father, Jack Morton, to represent the
defendant in the instant case, in which the defendant was charged with aggravated battery to his
three-month-old son, and in No. 10-CF-209, wherein the State had filed a petition to revoke the
defendant’s probation in an unrelated case. Of the time spent on the defendant’s criminal matters,
most of it was devoted to the aggravated-battery case. According to Quinn, he knew from
discovery in the case that the defendant was the only adult present at the time his infant son
sustained injury. He also knew that the infant had been transferred to Cardinal Glennon Children’s
Hospital in St. Louis, where doctors diagnosed him with brain injuries and concluded that he was
the victim of shaken baby syndrome. On his own, Quinn researched shaken baby syndrome.
¶ 18 Quinn testified that Jack Morton was more likely than the defendant to stop by his office
to discuss the aggravated-battery case, though sometimes the defendant would join his father.
Quinn met with the defendant “several” times before he pleaded guilty. He always scheduled an
appointment when the defendant requested one. He never refused to speak with the defendant; he
never threatened the defendant in any way; and he never demeaned the defendant’s case or said
that he did not have time for it. He never told the defendant that if he went to trial, he would lose
and get the maximum sentence on everything, or that if he went to trial, he would automatically
be sentenced to 58 years. However, Quinn felt “sure” that he told the defendant “what the
maximum penalty could be” if he was convicted or pleaded guilty. Quinn and the defendant
discussed the case and the State’s evidence.
¶ 19 Quinn met with the defendant “[m]ore than once” regarding his version of events. Initially,
the defendant stated that “the baby had slid in the baby tub, went under water, he hadn’t noticed it
right away,” but when he did notice, he “grabbed the baby, got him back out of the water and
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immediately went down to his father and mother’s house and told them what had happened.”
According to Quinn, this version was consistent with what the defendant had told the police and
medical personnel. Subsequently, though, the defendant gave Quinn another version of events.
This time, the defendant said that the baby had bounced off a couch at his home, and had hit his
head on the floor; afterwards, the child was limp, and it was then that the defendant took his baby
to his parents’ house. Acting on that information, Quinn hired a private investigator, Durbin
Investigations, to photograph the couch and to measure the distance from the couch to the floor.
He wanted to be able to show a jury how the infant may have been injured innocently. The
defendant also suggested that Quinn speak with the infant’s mother and some other potential
witnesses. Quinn spoke with the infant’s mother, but he did not speak with any of the defendant’s
other potential witnesses, for they were not “event witnesses.” Instead, they were witnesses who
could testify about the defendant’s parenting in general. They could come in handy at a sentencing
hearing, Quinn thought, but not at the defendant’s trial. Quinn knew that he needed an expert
witness, someone who could counter the anticipated testimony of the Cardinal Glennon doctors
with an alternative, innocent explanation of how the infant was injured.
¶ 20 With the cooperation of the infant’s mother, Quinn obtained all the medical records relating
to the mother’s pregnancy and the infant’s birth, and all the infant’s medical records since birth,
including those relating to his injuries. The records filled a banker’s box. Quinn looked them over
as best he could. Then, he shipped all the records, plus the police reports and the private
investigator’s photos, to Dr. Marcus DeGraw, “a physician specializing in injuries to children,”
whom he had located in Detroit, Michigan. Quinn hoped the records would contain something
useful to the defense. Dr. DeGraw reviewed everything that Quinn had sent him. Dr. DeGraw
told Quinn that the infant’s injuries were severe, and that symptoms would appear very quickly.
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His conclusion was that the infant’s injuries resulted from shaken baby syndrome; the injuries
were consistent with shaking, not with falling from a couch to the floor. As Dr. DeGraw indicated
to Quinn, his conclusions would be adverse to the defendant. Quinn shared this news with the
defendant.
¶ 21 Quinn negotiated with the state’s attorney’s office. Originally, the State offered 25 years
for aggravated battery in the instant case, 5 years in No. 10-CF-209, concurrent with the
aggravated-battery sentence, and 10 years in No. 14-CF-15, consecutive to the aggravated-battery
sentence. The sentences in the instant case and in No. 14-CF-15 were mandatory consecutive
because the crime in No. 14-CF-15 was committed while the defendant was out on bond in the
instant case. Quinn discussed the State’s offer with the defendant. The two of them agreed that
Quinn should make a counteroffer, under which the defendant would receive 20 years in the instant
case, and 4 years in No. 14-CF-15. With the concurrent sentence of 5 years in No. 10-CF-209, the
total aggregate sentence, pursuant to the counteroffer, would be 24 years. The State agreed to the
counteroffer, and that became the agreement pursuant to which the defendant pleaded guilty.
¶ 22 After Quinn testified, the parties agreed to submit their arguments in writing. They did so.
¶ 23 On April 30, 2019, the circuit court entered an order denying the amended postconviction
petition. The court found that plea counsel Quinn’s performance, contrary to the defendant’s
claim, did not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness. The defendant filed a notice of
appeal. The circuit court appointed OSAD as his attorney on appeal.
¶ 24 ANALYSIS
¶ 25 This appeal is from the circuit court’s denial of the defendant’s amended petition for
postconviction relief, following an evidentiary hearing. As previously noted, the defendant’s
appointed attorney on appeal, OSAD, has filed with this court a Finley motion to withdraw as
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counsel, along with a supporting memorandum. OSAD suggests two potential issues for review,
viz.: (1) whether the circuit court’s denial of the amended postconviction petition was manifestly
erroneous, and (2) whether postconviction counsel provided a reasonable level of assistance. In
his written objection to OSAD’s Finley motion, the defendant argues that postconviction counsel
failed to provide reasonable assistance. This court finds OSAD’s motion well taken, and the
defendant’s objection unavailing.
¶ 26 The Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Act) (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 2018)) provides
that a criminal defendant may challenge his conviction or sentence for substantial violations of
federal or state constitutional rights. Id. § 122-1(a)(1); People v. Edwards, 2012 IL 111711, ¶ 21.
A postconviction proceeding begins when the defendant files a verified petition in the circuit court.
725 ILCS 5/122-1(b) (West 2018). The Act provides for three stages of examination by the court.
People v. Domagala, 2013 IL 113688, ¶ 32. At the third stage, an evidentiary hearing is held. 725
ILCS 5/122-6 (West 2018); Domagala, 2013 IL 113688, ¶ 34. At that hearing, the defendant bears
the burden of making a substantial showing of a constitutional violation. People v. Coleman, 206
Ill. 2d 261, 277 (2002). The court “may receive proof by affidavits, depositions, oral testimony,
or other evidence” and it “may order the [defendant] brought before the court.” 725 ILCS 5/122-
6 (West 2018). The court typically acts as factfinder, determining the credibility of witnesses and
the weight to be given particular testimony and evidence, and resolving any conflicts in the
evidence. Domagala, 2013 IL 113688, ¶ 34. Relief is granted or denied based on that hearing.
725 ILCS 5/122-6 (West 2018). The denial of a postconviction petition after an evidentiary
hearing is generally reviewed for manifest error. People v. Coleman, 2013 IL 113307, ¶ 98.
Manifest error is that which is plain, clearly evident, and indisputable. Id.
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¶ 27 In his petition, the defendant claimed that his plea counsel had provided ineffective
assistance. When presented with an ineffective-assistance claim, this court applies the two-
pronged test of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Under that test, a defendant must
show both (1) that his attorney’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,
as measured by reference to prevailing professional norms, and (2) that the substandard
representation so prejudiced the defendant that there is a reasonable probability that, absent the
errors, the outcome would have been different. Id. at 687-88. A defendant must satisfy both
prongs of Strickland; failure to satisfy either prong will preclude a finding of ineffective assistance.
People v. Clendenin, 238 Ill. 2d 302, 317-18 (2010). Also, the defendant who claims ineffective
assistance must overcome a “strong presumption” that counsel’s performance falls within “the
wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. Strickland applies
to claims arising out of the plea process. Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 140 (2012); Hill v.
Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 57 (1985).
¶ 28 The first potential issue raised by OSAD is whether the circuit court’s denial of the
amended postconviction petition was manifestly erroneous. It was not. This court will examine
each of the amended petition’s three allegations.
¶ 29 The defendant’s first postconviction allegation was that plea counsel had failed to
adequately discuss pretrial motions, discovery, or defense strategy, or to mention that he had hired
a private investigator to assist in the defense. In his affidavit, the defendant attempted to support
this allegation by stating that during the time he was in pretrial custody on the aggravated-battery
charge—from June 29, 2012, to July 27, 2012—plea counsel “spent a total of approximately three
10 minute sessions consulting with [him] on this case,” and also stating that during the 19-month
period that he was out on bond on the charge—from July 28, 2012, to March 5, 2014—he had only
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four meetings with plea counsel. As the circuit court observed in its order denying the
postconviction petition, the crucial point in assessing the quality of a defendant-defense counsel
relationship is not “the number of meetings” between the two, but rather “the information
exchanged during the meetings.” At the evidentiary hearing, plea counsel Quinn testified that on
“several” occasions before the plea of guilty, he and the defendant discussed the case, the State’s
evidence in the case, and the defendant’s version—or versions—of events. Quinn testified that he
also discussed the case with the defendant’s father (who generally seemed more curious about the
case than the defendant himself), but whenever the defendant, who was out on bond for most of
the relevant time period, requested an appointment with Quinn, an appointment was made.
According to Quinn, he discussed with the defendant the State’s plea offer and, with the
defendant’s approval, made a counteroffer to the State. It was this counteroffer that ultimately
served as the basis of the parties’ plea agreement. Also, defense counsel may not have mentioned
that he had hired a private investigator, but an attorney is not obligated to mention each
investigatory technique that he uses to obtain evidence. It is enough that he discusses all the
pertinent evidence he has found, regardless of how he found it. There was no substantial showing
of a constitutional violation in the first allegation.
¶ 30 The defendant’s second postconviction allegation was that plea counsel had failed to
investigate the facts of the case independently, had failed to listen to the defendant’s “side of the
story,” and had failed to contact witnesses whom the defendant deemed favorable. Quinn made
clear in his testimony at the evidentiary hearing that indeed he had conducted an independent
investigation. He researched shaken baby syndrome, he hired a private investigator to take pictures
and measurements at the defendant’s home, he compiled all the medical records relating to T.M.,
and he located an expert, Dr. DeGraw, to examine all the evidence and give his professional
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opinion as to the causes of T.M.’s brain injuries. Quinn listened to the defendant’s versions of
events, on more than one occasion. Indeed, it was in response to the defendant’s second version
of events that Quinn hired the private investigator. Also, Quinn acted properly in not contacting
those witnesses whom the defendant deemed favorable. None of those witnesses was an
occurrence witness; they could do nothing more than comment on the defendant’s interactions
with children generally. As Quinn correctly concluded, they were witnesses who could be useful
at a sentencing hearing, but not at the defendant’s trial for the aggravated battery of T.M. There
was no substantial showing of a constitutional violation in the second allegation.
¶ 31 The defendant’s third (and final) postconviction allegation was that plea counsel had
provided the defendant with misleading and confusing information about the plea offer and about
what would happen if he did not accept it, and he coerced and threatened the defendant into
accepting the plea. Quinn’s evidentiary-hearing testimony flatly contradicted this allegation, and
the court was free to credit his testimony. Plus, at the guilty-plea hearing on March 5, 2014, the
circuit court questioned the defendant about the knowing and voluntary nature of his pleas, and
found that they were entirely knowing and voluntary, in accordance with Illinois Supreme Court
Rule 402(b) (eff. July 1, 2012). The defendant did not make a substantial showing of a
constitutional violation in the third allegation.
¶ 32 The second of the two potential issues raised by OSAD is whether the defendant’s
postconviction counsel provided a reasonable level of assistance. On the same day that
postconviction counsel Wernsman filed the amended postconviction petition on the defendant’s
behalf, he also filed a certificate of compliance with Illinois Supreme Court Rule 651(c) (eff. Feb.
6, 2013). Wernsman certified that he had consulted with the defendant in person and by telephone
in order to ascertain his contentions of deprivation of constitutional rights in regard to his guilty
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plea and sentence, that he had examined the trial court file and the official transcript of the
proceeding held on March 5, 2014 (i.e., the guilty-plea hearing), and that he had amended the
pro se petition as necessary for an adequate presentation of the defendant’s contentions. His
certificate thus hit upon all three of the areas specified in Rule 651(c). The certificate and its filing
created a presumption that Wernsman had provided a reasonable level of assistance to the
defendant, and because nothing else in the record rebuts or contradicts that presumption, the
certificate is facially valid. See People v. Perkins, 229 Ill. 2d 34, 52 (2007). Any argument that
Wernsman had not provided reasonable assistance would lack merit.
¶ 33 In his written objection to OSAD’s Finley motion, the defendant argues that postconviction
counsel Wernsman failed to provide a reasonable level of assistance. More specifically, he argues
that postconviction counsel (1) failed to cross-examine plea counsel Quinn at the evidentiary
hearing in regard to (i) an invoice submitted by Dr. DeGraw to Quinn, and a letter written by Dr.
DeGraw to Quinn, and (ii) an invoice submitted by the private investigator whom Quinn had hired,
and photographs allegedly taken by the private investigator at the defendant’s residence; (2) failed
to examine the trial court record and Quinn’s case file, and as a result failed to make necessary
amendments to the defendant’s pro se postconviction petition or made amendments that were
unnecessary or incorrect; and (3) failed to make necessary changes in the amended postconviction
petition and in the defendant’s signed affidavit in support thereof, even after the defendant
informed him that both documents contained “things” that were “wrong” and needed to be
“changed.” The defendant’s objection—considered in conjunction with the pro se and amended
petitions, and the transcript of the evidentiary hearing—does not show that Wernsman failed to
provide a reasonable level of assistance. Nothing in it changes this court’s conclusion that OSAD’s
motion is well taken.
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¶ 34 CONCLUSION
¶ 35 For the foregoing reasons, the circuit court did not err in denying the defendant’s amended
postconviction petition, and postconviction counsel provided the defendant with reasonable
assistance. No contrary argument would have merit. Accordingly, OSAD’s Finley motion to
withdraw as counsel is hereby granted, and the judgment of the circuit court is hereby affirmed.
¶ 36 Motion granted; judgment affirmed.
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