FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION FEB 15 2013
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 12-50319
Plaintiff - Appellee, D.C. No. 3:12-CR-01942-LAB-1
v.
MEMORANDUM *
ANGEL MEZA–FLORES,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of California
Larry A. Burns, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted February 13, 2013 **
Pasadena, California
Before: KOZINSKI, Chief Judge, SILVERMAN, Circuit Judge, and RAKOFF,
Senior District Judge.***
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
***
The Honorable Jed S. Rakoff, Senior United States District Judge for
the Southern District of New York, sitting by designation.
Angel Meza–Flores contends that the district court procedurally erred by
failing to consider the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors other than
deterrence, by improperly considering the cost of prosecution at sentencing, and by
improperly considering what the “community” would regard as an appropriate
sentence. The record belies these contentions. The district court adequately
considered the section 3553(a) factors, and its passing mention of the cost of
prosecution was, in context, an explanation of the specific need for deterrence in
this case. Similarly, the district court’s reference to the views of the “community”
was a permissible illustration of the need to impose a longer sentence than Meza-
Flores had received for his recent previous illegal reentry conviction, in view of his
illegal reentry within a few months of his deportation.
Meza–Flores also contends that his above–Guidelines sentence is
substantively unreasonable. In light of the section 3553(a) sentencing factors and
the totality of the circumstances, including the recency of Meza–Flores’s prior
illegal reentry conviction and the concomitant need for enhanced deterrence, the
sentence is substantively reasonable. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51
(2007); see also United States v. Carty, 520 F.3d 984, 993 (9th Cir. 2008) (en
banc).
AFFIRMED.